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Abstract 
 
 
Many observers have identified Europeanization as undermining the foundation of 
national systems of capitalisms.  This paper addresses a national level response.  
The approach taken assesses the positions (for change) by actors within the Swedish 
Model toward the ‘Laval’ European Court of Justice ruling (C-341/05).  Through 
the analysis of position documents and semi-structured interviews with 
representatives from the social partners, this paper identifies key pressures within 
the Swedish labour market model in response to the Court ruling.  The extension 
model (autonomous collective agreement model) proved to be the preferred option 
for the Swedish partners.  Concurrently, this model results in the least amount of 
change to Swedish industrial relations.  While a substantial degree of support was 
identified for ‘change’, specifically the legislated minimum wage option, 
institutional structures were identified that restricted such positions from reaching 
official channels of influence.  This case provides evidence of institutional 
continuity and is an example of national industrial relations proving robust against 
the forces of European integration.  
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1.1 PROBLEM 
 
Regional integration is a pervasive trend taking place at different levels across 
the globe.  Examples abound, but no case is as entrenched, widespread, or 
institutionalised as the European Union (EU). This political and economic union which 
began to form only years after the Second World War divided Europe, has emerged as a 
‘Petri dish’ for globalisation.  National states that were previously organised as 
competing mercantilist units now share a common currency, a single monetary policy 
and a single market in which there is free movement of labour.   
This achievement, however, has not come without cost.  Europe – like all 
regions – contains a huge degree of diversity.  Its countries are disparate in terms of 
wealth, size, culture, and institutional arrangements.  Within the EU exists competing 
national identities, perceptions on how societies should be arranged, and attitudes as to 
what role the ‘state’ should play in regulating society. 
One consequence of this diversity has been a constant tension between national 
sovereignty and a unified Europe.  Integrating such a large number of countries means 
that ‘give and take’ is inevitable; there will be winners, but there will also be losers.  To 
achieve a common goal, some countries will be forced to change and may also have to 
bear disproportionate costs. 
Sweden, a relative newcomer to the EU, has recently risen to the forefront of 
tension between national and EU level institutions.  Renowned for its high-standard of 
living and its position as a leader in almost all international social indicators, Sweden is 
looked to by many as a successful fusion of market capitalism with strong social and 
worker protection.   
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On 18 December 2007, The European Court of Justice (ECJ) made a ruling 
which reverberated throughout Sweden and the rest of Europe.  The Laval, or Vaxholm, 
ruling (C-341/05) was viewed by many as a severe blow to aspirations of a social 
Europe and Sweden’s unique style of labour relations.  The landmark ECJ case was 
won by Laval un Partneri, a Latvian company undertaking short-term building 
renovation in the suburb of Vaxholm on the outskirts of Stockholm.  The controversy 
existed because Laval was employing Latvian workers at Latvian wages.  Given that 
the GDP per capita of Sweden is US$50, 940, and Latvia is US$11,870,1 there was fear 
that an influx of low-wage workers would mean the end of Sweden’s economic and 
social model. 
The ruling stated that certain Swedish labour market institutions were 
incompatible with European Community (EC) law. In particular, unions could not 
prevent short-term workers from another EU member state undertaking work in Sweden 
subject to home conditions. These conditions include significantly lower wages than 
what is generally acceptable in Sweden.  While this is a simplification, it does capture 
the source of public fear and animosity in Europe toward this ruling and perceptions of 
the pitfalls of increasing European integration. 
The Laval ruling represents an archetypal ‘external shock’ to a national level 
institution - in this case the Swedish labour market institutions.  Disputes take place in 
the many institutions of the European Union: the Council, Commission, Parliament, and 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ).  The ECJ, however, has in particular become an 
interesting arena as it can rule in a manner which can be perceived as a reduction on 
national sovereignty.2  There is criticism of a democratic deficit within the EU 
institutions, such as the ECJ.3  The ECJ Laval case was followed by a succession of 
similar rulings - Viking (Finland) and Rüffert (Germany) cases – and provoked 
opposition from both within Sweden and Europe.4   
                                                 
1
 World Bank, "Gross National Income Per Capita 2008," World Development Indicators 
Database, World Bank, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GNIPC.pdf. 
2
 Larry Siedentop, Democracy in Europe (London Penguin Books, 2001), 25-46. 
3
 B Bercusson, "Democratic Legitimacy and European Labour Law " Industrial Law Journal 28, 
no. 2 (1999): 163-65.  
4
 Swedish Parliament, "Response to Interpellations 2007/08: 624, 560, 561, 562, 563 and 582 on 
Issues on the Occasion of Laval and Rüffert Cases,"  (Parliamentary Protocol, 2008, May 13), 
Christin Johansson, "Eu-Hot Mot Kollektivavtal Nonchaleras Av Regeringen (the Eu Threat to 
Collective Agreements Ignored by Government) " Dagens Nyheter 2008, August 18, 
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This study is particularly concerned with how national institutions respond to this 
type of integration.  Do institutions converge upon equilibrium, do they remain static, 
or do they transform incrementally?  These are issues that are important to scholars, 
government, and policymakers in every country.  A range of opinions about how 
Sweden should respond to the ECJ ruling have been voiced.  These include change at 
the European level, change at the national level, or departure from the EU.  This has led 
to the intense debate and a subsequent government enquiry into the possible options in 
response to this case.  The interesting question is what, if any, changes Sweden has 
taken or is likely to take in response to the ECJ ruling and why.  Responses from actors 
within Sweden provide insights into the process of institutional change (at the national 
level) and offer an opportunity to understand how national institutions react to the 
process of regionalisation.  Observing these tensions show how compatible the Swedish 
model of industrial relations is with Europeanisation.   
 
1.2 RESEARCH  QUESTIONS 
 
To best contribute to the macro-questions outlined above, the questions asked by 
this study must be narrowed.  Pressure for change, in response to the Laval case can be 
being taken at two levels - the European and the Swedish levels. This particular study 
will examine the tension that exists at the Swedish national level, rather than looking at 
why the ECJ ruled the way it did, or integration from the EU perspective.  
The research problem begins with an external shock (ECJ ruling) to Swedish 
labour market institutions.  The model can respond in different ways, such as remaining 
robust or collapsing.  An important element of how institutions adapt will be linked to 
how actors within the labour market model respond.  Therefore, this study will examine 
the response of Swedish actors to the ECJ ruling; particularly it focuses on whether 
change or continuity can be observed.  Figure 1.1 provides a diagram of the research 
problem.  
Thus, this thesis addresses the three following questions: 
 
                                                                                                                                   
Anonymous, "A Severe Blow to Sweden's Long Standing Collective Bargaining " Radio Sweden 
2007, Dec 19. 
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• What are the positions of social partners (unions, employers 
associations) toward the ECJ Laval ruling (C-341/05)? 
• Do institutions play a role in shaping the positions of social partners? 
• What can these areas tell us about the pressures within the Swedish 
model and its propensity for change? 
 
Through addressing these micro-questions on the Swedish model, this study will 
contribute to the knowledge of how national level institutions respond to regional 
integration.   
 
 
 
 
1.3 METHODOLOGY 
 
In order to investigate the conflicts played out in the current ‘reorganisation’ of 
the Swedish model, a number of different sources of information are available to this 
study.   
One option is to assess the positions of social partners, government agencies, civil 
society groups, and public opinion.  Upon deeper investigation, the issue is played out 
in a restricted manner with the peak-level social partners being the most influential and 
vocal.  The way in which political parties interpret the issue is aligned with those of the 
social partners.   
External Shock: 
ECJ Laval ruling 
Swedish Model 
Option (a) 
Option (b) 
 
Option (c) 
 
Option (d) 
 
Change 
Potential Options 
Figure 1.1 Diagram of Research Problem 
Continuity 
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Thus, this study has taken the approach of assessing the main peak level 
organisations on both sides of labour and employers (which will be further discussed in 
the literature review section). The investigation also involves analysis of the core 
government enquiry on the Laval issue (Claes Stråth investigation) and the 
renegotiation of the Saltsjöbaden Agreement (Head Agreement). 
Three core sources of primary and secondary data have been used.  First, 
positions papers, published statements, and other relevant documentation were sourced 
from the core actors.  Second, 10 face-to-face semi-structured interviews, of 
approximately 60 minutes in length, were completed with senior officials from the main 
social partners.5  The interviews were used to explore organisation positions to a much 
greater depth; they were also used to supplement written statements, particularly where 
a position required elaboration or no official or non-official position papers exist.  
Those senior officials interviewed consisted of Chief Legal Advisors, Heads of 
Negotiations, and Directors General.  All of the main five social partners were 
interviewed: Confederation of Swedish Enterprise; Swedish Agency for Government 
Employers (SAGE); Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO); Swedish Confederation 
of Professional Employees (TCO); and Swedish Confederation for Professional 
Associations (SACO).  See Table 1.1 for a description of each of the main social 
partners.  In addition to this were three interviews made up of affiliate organisations of 
the peak-level social partners: Trade Unions of Commercial Employees (Handels), 
belonging to LO; and the Association of Swedish Engineering Industries 
(Teknikföretagen) and the Electrical Installer Organisation (EIO) affiliated to Swedish 
Enterprise.  Additional interviews were made with the Moderate Party (lead political 
party) and the key government agency Swedish National Mediation Office. 
Where needed, written correspondence supplemented interview data.  Thirdly, 
secondary texts were assessed in the form of academic publications (journal articles and 
books), as well as other reputable analyses from research institutes, government bodies, 
and non-governmental organisations.  
                                                 
5
 Of these 10 semi-structured interviews, 9 were face to face while one was via telephone 
interview.  From the 11 representatives sought by the project, only 10 were used as a suitable 
representative from the Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP) was not found.  This actor, 
however, was not as important as the others included in the study.  Further, sufficient written 
documentation on the position(s) of the SAP were obtained. 
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Table 1.1. Peak Level Social Partners 
 Organisation Representation Membership 
Size 
Number of 
Affiliates 
Employer 
Associations 
Confederation of 
Swedish 
Enterprise 
Private sector 
employers 
1.6 million 
employers 
40 sectoral and 
employers 
associations 
 
Swedish Agency 
for Government 
Employers 
(SAGE) 
Public sector 
employers 
250 member 
agencies (0.24 
million 
employees)  
- 
Employee 
Associations 
Swedish Trade 
Union 
Confederation 
(LO) 
Blue-collar 
employees 
1.9 million 
employees 
16 national 
unions 
 Swedish 
Confederation of 
Professional 
Employees 
(TCO) 
White-collar 
employees 
Over 1 million 
members 
18 national 
unions 
 Swedish 
Confederation 
for Professional 
Associations 
(SACO) 
Professional 
(university-
trained) 
employees 
0.56 million 
members 
26 national 
unions 
Source: Organisation Web pages and National Mediation Office Swedish Rules on 
Negotiation and Mediation  
 
The study recognised the strengths and limitations of each type of source utilised.  
Written documentation was particularly useful when it articulated the official position 
of the organisation.  This type of documentation, however, was relatively rare.  
Unofficial position documents were more common and these varied greatly in level of 
legitimacy and authority.  Additionally, position papers and documents consistently 
differed in quality and depth, and often addressed a heterogeneous set of issues.6 
A further limitation was that some actors did not release any statements.  The 
reasons for this varied: sometimes no position existed; other times a position existed but 
the organisation did not wish to make it public.  This important distinction, however, 
required greater investigation for clarity.  In summary, a great deal of difficulty was 
encountered when trying to obtain standardised information from written 
documentation.  Despite these shortcomings, these documents were used to obtain 
indications of positions of necessary organisations where available. 
                                                 
6
 For a more in depth evaluation of sources see the following: Lisa Harrison, Political Research 
: An Introduction (New York : Routledge, 2001), 57-71, 89-138. 
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Semi-structured interviews were used to remedy the shortcomings of written 
documentation.  These interviews provided the core primary source for this study.  
Semi-structured interviews were particularly successful in the following ways: 
elaborating on why a position was taken (or not) toward the ECJ Laval ruling; ranking 
preferred positions; and determining unacceptable and non-negotiable positions. With 
these strengths and weaknesses in mind, the interviews were devised and conducted in 
order to gain optimal data quality for this study.  Further, compliance with the Victoria 
University of Wellington ethics standards meant appropriate conduct was followed. 
The third type of source used was secondary academic and non-academic texts.  
These were particularly useful in providing background and contextual information, 
filling gaps where the scope of this study’s primary research did not reach, and 
triangulation with similar studies.  It is important to note that there was, at the time of 
writing, little published analyses on the Laval case (due to its recent nature); a plethora 
of previous studies on complementary areas, however, provided a fruitful platform in 
which to contextualise and evaluate the findings. 
This research takes a single case study approach, which as a methodology has 
particular advantages as well as disadvantages.  Comparing ‘many cases’ has the 
benefit of being able to generate more widely applicable conclusions.  However, in 
doing so, much of the case specific detail is lost which increases the risk of making 
oversimplified generalisations.  Comparing a few cases (for example Vaxholm, Rüffert 
and Viking) could provide an alternative starting point for this study, however, the 
constraints of this thesis mean that such a study would not be feasible.  Similarly, much 
of the Sweden specific factors unique to this case could potentially be ‘glossed over’. 
For a more in-depth discussion on the merits and drawbacks of the number of case 
studies used it is useful to consult the following: Landman (2003), Lijphart (1971), and 
Mill (1967).   
Using the single case study method is justifiable under the constraints imposed on 
a MA thesis and for the ability of a case study to support or question the existing 
literature.  It is within the confines of comparative politics as it uses concepts which are 
used in a comparative context with other countries, and seeks to make a contribution to 
theory that holds across a number of countries.7 
                                                 
7
 Landman p 34-35 
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1.4 STRUCTURE OF THESIS 
 
To begin this study, Chapter Two will survey the literature on this area.  It will 
determine the scope of previous research, and determine where gaps in previous 
knowledge exist.  It will examine the literature in four broad categories: diverging 
approaches to how institutions are studied; views on the number and ‘types’ of 
capitalism; core actors in the creation of labour market institutions; and most 
importantly, perspectives on how labour market institutions change.  This will 
determine the framework of analysis for which the remainder of the thesis will be 
based. 
From this point, Chapter Three will provide the background to the study and 
define the technical terms which will be used in the remaining chapters.  It will build 
upon the introduction to the ECJ Laval dispute by providing an introduction to Swedish 
law and European law.  From here, an overview of the Laval case and its implications 
will be provided so the positions of the social partners can be sufficiently understood.  
The next section will define what this study means by the ‘Swedish model of industrial 
relations’. It will define precise parameters in which change or continuity will be 
measured.  The same will be done for European employment policy.  The remainder of 
the chapter will define the major ‘positions’ that have been considered by the social 
partners in response to the ECJ ruling (such as erga omnes and legislated minimum 
wages).  With the definitions of the technical terms made clear, the following chapter 
will analyse the positions of the core actors. 
Chapter Four assesses what type of change to the Swedish model actors want 
following the ECJ Laval ruling.  Here, the four most influential models are discussed in 
turn.  First, it evaluates the positions of Swedish actors on the ‘legislated minimum 
wage model’ (representing the most change).  Secondly, it focuses on the positions 
surrounding the ‘universal declaration of collective agreements model’, or ‘erga omnes’ 
(representing change, albeit to a lesser degree than the former option).  Thirdly, the 
study looks at the options under the ‘extension model’, of which the ‘autonomous 
model of collective agreements’ is the most prominent. This option represents little or 
no change to the Swedish model depending on which variant is advocated.  The fourth 
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model to be assessed will be the ‘status-quo model’ that affects domestic and foreign 
posted workers in different ways. 
Chapter Five reviews how the Claes Stråth investigation may affect the success of 
the social partners in achieving their goals.  This chapter assesses this in two core parts.  
First, it considers the structure of the investigation as well as its directives.  From here, 
it then turns to the perspectives of the social partners.  In particularly, it will assess the 
way in which the investigation may ‘aid’ or ‘hinder’ a certain position.  Next the 
analysis continues by turning to the renegotiation of the ‘Saltsjöbaden Agreement’ or 
new ‘Head Agreement’.  It considers the concern of issue linkage and how the timing of 
the Head Agreement renegotiation may be used to influence the positions of opposed 
social partners.  Particularly, this section focuses on leverage gained by labour 
representatives over some employer representatives resulting from bargaining power 
disparities in the Claes Stråth investigation. 
Chapter Six, discusses the conclusions of the previous chapters and explores what 
the findings of this thesis can tell us about the Swedish model.  It approaches this in the 
following manner.  Firstly, this chapter assesses the interests of the actors within the 
model, particularly the role of class solidarity vs. the notion of cross class alliances.  
Secondly it discusses the institutional constraints of these interests.  And thirdly, this 
chapter clarifies the explanatory value of the ‘competing’ models of change. 
The seventh and final chapter concludes the study.  It provides an overview of the 
aggregate findings of the thesis, alongside a discussion of its implications and areas for 
further research.   
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Literature Review  
 
 
 
As introduced, the Laval ECJ ruling (C-341/05) illustrates the tensions between 
supranational governance (Europeanisation) and national level (Swedish model) 
institutions in the process of regional integration.  The literature on institutionalism is 
wide.  It encompasses competing approaches to the study of institutions, debates over 
the existence and importance of national models of capitalisms, alongside competing 
explanations of how institutions are created, maintained, and change.  Sweden has been 
a favourite subject for political economists and comparative political scientists because 
it has an entrenched welfare state and coordinated market mechanisms alongside 
exceptional social, economic, political and cultural indicators. 
This wealth of information creates both advantages and disadvantages.  From a 
positive outlook, this study does not suffer from an absence of information, and can be 
enriched from the range of perspectives put forth.  The depth and breadth of the works 
written in this area mean numerous points of view exist around the question of 
‘institutions’.  Care must be taken about how to enter the debate, and how to make a 
meaningful contribution.   
Despite the ‘bounty’ of information, and perhaps because there is so much debate 
on this issue, much more work is required in particular areas.  Many gaps in the 
literature exist due to changing dynamics and composition of the EU.  In addition to 
gaps in the literature, ongoing events provide more material to help us understand 
institutional change.   
This chapter addresses the core concern of what is the previous research on the 
impact of regional integration on national level institutions. Particularly, the impact of 
European integration on the Swedish industrial relations institutions.  
In order to assess institutional change in Sweden (and the impact of the Laval 
ruling) this study uses three analytical frameworks.  The convergence model suggests 
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that institutions will converge upon an equilibrium.  In other words, Swedish labour 
market institutions will move toward a European employment policy norm.  The second 
model of the punctuated equilibrium suggests that the Swedish employment model will 
be robust (during periods of stasis), however, has the propensity to collapse when faced 
with a critical juncture.  The third model, of incremental transformation, characterises 
Swedish labour market institutions as changing gradually over time, due to the 
pressures of displacement, layering, drift, conversion and exhaustion.   
But these three models of how institutions change are influenced by a number of 
assumptions.  These assumptions include: how to approach the study of institutions; the 
number of capitalisms that exist; and the main actors in labour market change.  
Our starting point is the external shock to Sweden, that of the Laval ECJ ruling. 
So what can the literature tell us about how institutions respond to an external shock?  
Do they converge, are the characterised by punctuated equilibrium, or do they 
transform incrementally?  To explore these issues in a meaningful way this study must 
explain how and why this threefold model has been reached.  This chapter begins its 
review of the literature by discussing different approaches to the study of institutions.  
Secondly, it will next discuss competing schools of thought on the ‘different types of 
capitalism’.  Thirdly, this chapter assesses what the literature can tell us about the main 
actors in the creation and evolution of the labour markets.  Only once each of these 
areas are addressed will this review the threefold model of convergence, punctuated 
equilibrium and incremental transformation.   
 
2.2 APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF INSTITUTIONS 
 
The different approaches of the study of institutions have implications for how to 
undertake the study of labour market change.  Three broad perspectives have been 
identified by various commentators on the ‘new institutionalisms’.  While these 
categories are by no means exclusive and overlap to various degree, analytically 
separating the three is important due to the contrasting assumptions which inform the 
different approaches.  Hall and Taylor (1996) provide a concise overview and 
evaluation of this ‘threefold’ typology in Political Science and the Three New 
Institutionalisms.  Of particular concern to this study, as well as other institutionalist 
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approaches, is that it demarcates two issues1: (1) the role of institutions on ‘social and 
political outcomes’ or the behaviour of actors; as distinct from (2) the origins of 
institutions and the conditions under which they are subject to change.  While it is the 
second of these issues that this study is most concerned with, there are often strong 
links between both of these aspects. 
An important observation by Hall and Taylor (1996) is that there has been 
polarisation between the three approaches, particularly along disciplinary lines and 
methodology.2  They also observed that the different approaches developed somewhat 
‘independently’ from each other, with scarce dialogue between them.3   
Rational choice institutionalism holds the strictest behavioural assumptions.  It 
assumes that actors operate subject to fixed preferences and rational self-interest.4  
Accordingly, the scholars who use this approach view the creation of institutions in a 
particular way; specifically the function of an institution is conceptualised as resulting 
from institutional design.5  In other words, institutions are the result of ‘voluntary 
agreements’ by the actors concerned in order to ensure mutually beneficial gain.6  Thus, 
the rational choice institutionalism approach is defined as highly functionalist. 
Explanations of change informed by rational choice instituionalism are explicitly 
linked to assumptions above.  Primarily, institutions are viewed to exist so long as the 
associated actors benefit from them.  A shift in the pay-offs actors receive from them 
may result in actors wanting to reshape institutions so as to meet their changing 
interests.7  While some authors praise the theoretical elegance of rational-choice 
institutionalism, they have been criticised as empirically insignificant and over-
simplistic.8 
                                                 
1
 Peter A Hall, Rosemary C R.  Taylor, and "Political Science and the Three New 
Institutionalisms," Political Studies Vol. 44, no. Iss. 5 (1996): 936-37. 
2
 A preliminary classification identifies the following: rational choice insitutionalism being 
linked with economics and quantification; historical institutionalism being linked with Political 
Science; and sociological institutionalism with Sociology and qualitative methodology. 
3
 This argument is made by Hall and Taylor with an evaluation of the cross-referencing in the 
literature. P 937 
4
 Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," in 
Structuring Politics : Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis ed. Sven Steinmo, 
Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth (Cambridge [England] ; New York : Cambridge 
University Press, 1992). 
5
 Hall, Taylor, and "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms," 944-45. 
6
 Ibid.: 945. 
7
 Ibid. 
8
 See Karen Schweers Cook and Margaret Levi, eds., The Limits of Rationality (Chicago 
University of Chicago Press, 1990). 
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Historical institutionalism (HI) takes a different view of institutions, based on a 
different set of assumptions.  HI depicts temporal processes and historical events as 
important in shaping institutions that are crucial in informing preferences.9  In other 
words actors behave according to institutional rules that define their strategies.  Thus in 
contrast to rational choice institutionalists, HI recognises the presence and legacies of 
existing institutions. 
Hall and Taylor identify four characteristics of HI. First, HI has much broader 
assumptions concerning the effect of institutions on actor behaviour.10  Asymmetries in 
power relations shape how institutions operate and develop.11  Furthermore,  historical 
institutionalism is more likely to include other variables, such as ideas, into the 
institutional analysis.12  This willingness to encompass the complexities of institutional 
and individual behaviour enriches the approach.  The core critique of this literature is its 
propensity to generalise, as opposed to making coherent theoretical contribution.  
Further, it places a strong focus on path-dependence, which contributes to a more static 
view of institutions. 13 In addition unintended consequences have a tendency to be a 
driver in HI analysis.   
Overall, HI has been very successful in explaining how institutions maintain 
themselves over time as a result of reinforcing mechanisms.14  Many authors have 
suggested that its strength at explaining continuity comes at the expense of explaining 
change and transformation.15 
Sociological institutionalism offers an explanation of institutions removed from 
the focus of rationality and/or temporal processes.  Sociological institutionalism, as 
defined by Hall and Taylor, views institutions as primarily ‘culturally-specific 
practices’ which are integrated into organisations.16  Thus, explanations by sociological 
institutionalists focus on ‘institutional forms, procedures or symbols’17 which 
proliferate in a particular sphere (such as a nation or field).   
                                                 
9
 Thelen and Steinmo, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," 7-10. 
10
 Hall, Taylor, and "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms," 938. 
11
 Ibid. 
12
 Ibid. 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Thelen and Steinmo, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," 21-2. 
15
 See Thelen 1999 
16
 Hall, Taylor, and "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms," 946. 
17
 Ibid.: 947. 
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Thus, Hall and Taylor characterise sociological institutionalism as having three 
core implications for institutional analysis.  Firstly, sociological institutionalism 
provides a wider definition of institutions.  The sociological definition of institutions 
includes ‘symbol systems, cognitive scripts, and moral templates that provide the 
frames of meaning guiding human interaction.’18  This extends part the definition of 
institutions generally used by HI political scientists that include formal rules, 
procedures and norms.19 
Secondly, institutions are viewed to influence the behaviour of individuals 
inducing actors to ‘internalise norms’ associated with particular roles.20 Thus, 
institutions prescribe behaviour because what actors believe to be rational is in itself 
socially constructed.21 
A third characteristic of this approach is its view on the motivations for the 
implementation and maintenance of an institution.  Here it is assumed that institutions 
have the purpose of increasing ‘social-legitimacy’ of the actors concerned.22 This stands 
in contrast to end goals of ‘efficiency’ and provides an explanation for why particular 
institutions are upheld despite hindering the ‘end-goals’ of particular actors.   
A valid critique of this approach, however, is its tendency to overlook any agency 
within actors. Rather it sees agency to be ‘conditioned’ by respective institutions.  This 
can overlook power struggles within particular institutional arrangements.23 
Thus, the literature approaches the study of institutions in different ways through 
rational choice, historical and sociological institutionalisms.  This is particularly true 
with reference to the initial assumptions around institutions and their relationship to 
actors.  While this section provides a snapshot of the different analytical approaches, 
combinations of these approaches are more often used.  Nevertheless, it highlights the 
importance of initial assumptions in the study of institutions.  Particularly, it suggests 
the need for analytical clarity around the role of actors; particularly, whether their 
interests are endogenous or exogenous to institutions, or both.  Furthermore, these 
assumptions have implications for institutional change.  Different theories hold that 
                                                 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Ibid.: 948. 
21
 Ibid.: 949. 
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Neil Fligstein, The Transformation of Corporate Control (Harvard University Press 1993), 
295-316. 
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actors rationally create institutions, history and institutional legacies matter, or that 
actors’ prescriptions for changing or creating institutions are socially constructed from 
previous or existing institutional structures. 
The literature has illustrated a wide range of assumptions surrounding the study 
of institutional change and the effect of actors. It strongly supports the importance and 
relevance of historical and institutional legacies; but this study will also not ignore any 
agency displayed by actors in the Swedish system.  Due to the constraints of this thesis, 
however, the manner in which institutions construct preferences will not be a focus of 
the study. In light of this, the Historical Institutionalist framework has the greatest 
relevance for this study of Swedish labour market institutions.  The next section 
discusses the number of ‘types of capitalisms’ that exist and its implications for the 
study of institutional change. 
 
2.3 ONE OR MORE CAPITALISMS? 
 
Another controversy concerns whether one or many types of capitalisms exist.  
This has implication for convergence and punctuated equilibrium models.  If 
institutions converge, do they converge on one type of capitalism or on different types? 
This issue is particularly important to the study of Sweden and the European Union.  
An underlying assumption of this thesis is that Sweden does embody a ‘unique’ type of 
capitalism, of which the Swedish model of industrial relations is an integral component. 
Political economists have particularly placed an emphasis on divergent political 
and institutional arrangements that may form national models of capitalism.  This view, 
embedded in the HI institutionalist approach, sees different types of capitalist 
economies organised and operating around the globe.  For example the structure of the 
United States economy differs to Germany, and both differ to Sweden.  Not all scholars, 
however, accept this idea that more than one type of capitalism exists.  This section will 
unpack the diverging literature. 
Two primary categories can be demarcated: first, there are those authors who take 
the assumption that there is only one form of capitalism.24   Those within this school are 
                                                 
24
 Particularly post-war modernisation theorists, and those authors that follow from Max 
Weber’s ideal-type.  For further discussion see Colin Crouch, "Models of Capitalism," New 
Political Economy 10, no. 4 (2005). 
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likely to adhere to neo-liberal explanation and prescriptions for economic and social 
advancement.  The second category is composed of those who argue that different 
‘types’ of capitalisms exist in advanced western democracies.  This literature is 
collectively referred to as Varieties of Capitalism (VoC).  Within the VoC approach, 
however, diversity continues to exist.  This particularly concerns the main unit of 
analysis: welfare states or firms.   
The view of a single type of capitalism has not been popular within the schools of 
institutionalism.  Authors that take this view hold the assumption that the effects of 
globalisation are inevitable, and that it is a driving trend toward homogeneity.25 
Modernisation theorists have been significant proponents of this approach.26  While it 
might recognise diversity between nation states, it does not see any institutionally 
distinctive groups of economies.  Rather, it believes that the differences between 
economies such as the US and Sweden are overstated.  Each country has a unique 
economic structure, and differences do not warrant multiple capitalist classifications.  
This school of thought draws parallels to earlier authors’ views of capitalist 
development in ‘evolutionary’ terms.27  Particularly, different countries are identified as 
passing through different stages of the same historical process.  Examples of this 
include approaches that follow from Max Weber’s ‘ideal-type’ method.28  Similarly, 
followers of Antonio Gramsci’s approach classified Fordism as an evolutionary, or 
natural, successor of classical free-market liberalism.29  Of the scholars that this study 
will draw from, however, most have undertaken substantial work in illustrating and 
explaining how different types of ‘capitalisms’ have come about. 
Authors who agree that countries fall into different types of capitalist 
organisation argue that countries are not necessarily on the same evolutionary track.  
Rather, they conceive of multiple tracks.  Despite this shared starting point, however, 
continued diversity exists.   
For example, there may be consensus that the USA and Germany constitute 
separate camps, but some argue that Germany and Sweden do not exhibit the structural 
difference to be characterised a ‘different types’ of capitalism.  The discussions on the 
                                                 
25
 Ibid.: 439. 
26
 Adam Przworski and Feranado Limongi, "Modernization: Theories and Facts," World Politics 
49, no. 2 (1997): 155-83. 
27
 Crouch, "Models of Capitalism," 439. 
28
 Ibid. 
29
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models of capitalism are centred on two primary approaches, one group of authors who 
classify economies according to their production side, and those authors who classify 
according to the consumption side.  
First, authors influenced by the works of scholars such as Esping-Andersen 
characterise countries according to their consumption side, with a focus on the type of 
welfare state. This analysis primarily began with a threefold classification of advanced 
western democracies: Liberal Market Economies (LME), Co-ordinated Market 
Economies (CME), and Social Market Economies (SME).  A second group of authors, 
such as Hall and Soskice, demarcate countries by their production side and the structure 
of the private sector.  Here the types of capitalisms are limited to two primary groups: 
LME’s and CME’s. In order to progress to the discussion of institutional change, the 
next section will discuss the scholarship in these divergent areas. 
The scholarship on the ‘consumption side’ draws upon the work of Gosta Esping-
Andersen.  In the book The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990), Esping-
Andersen argues that the welfare state, which falls into three broad groups, is 
paramount to the development of current models of capitalism.30  In other words, social 
policy (and thus welfare regimes) are tied to the labour market model as the welfare 
regime is used in differing degrees to clear the labour market, to ease entry and exit (for 
example, retirees and mothers), or as being a source of employment.31  As a 
consequence, the relationship between welfare regime and the labour market results in a 
distinct post-industrial trajectory; this is evidenced in Germany, Sweden, and the US by 
the differing role of government involvement in employment growth, the distinct 
internalisation of services within firms, and the differing levels of managerialism.32 
In the follow up work by Esping-Andersen (1999) Social Foundations of 
Postindustrial Economics the previous framework is tested alongside more recent 
empirical evidence.  Esping-Anderson also addressed critiques directed toward the 1990 
work and, for example, extends the threefold typology (of LME, CME, and SME) to 
include a Mediterranean model that was previously grouped under CMEs.  As a whole, 
however, Esping-Andersen still held the role of institutions, namely the institutional 
relationship between the labour market structure, changes in family life (such as 
                                                 
30
 Gosta Esping-Anderson, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton 
University Press, 1990), p5. 
31
 Ibid., pp144-62. 
32
 Ibid., pp191-221. 
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structure and participation in paid employment), and tertiarisation (or globalisation), as 
core features of national state trajectories.33  In response to domestic or international 
changes, the nature of industrial relations and the structure of the labour market 
institutions are seen as shaping and determining the outcomes which take place.  Thus, 
using the Nordic example, distinct labour market institutions result in different 
outcomes (such as levels of unemployment) when compared across a number of 
different countries.34 
Works that draw from consumption-side welfare state categorisation focus on the 
way in which welfare states influence the type of ‘capitalism’ displayed in a particular 
country.  This approach has, however, come under criticism by another group of 
authors who believe that welfare state explanations are limited.  
Hall and Soskice pioneered an approached that classified types of capitalisms 
according to ‘production’ criteria.  In their 2001 work ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ Hall 
and Soskice react against the three previous perspectives on institutional variation.  
They argue that some literature focuses too strongly focus on the state (in terms of its 
influence over the private sector). Furthermore, they critique work that categorise 
countries according to their organisation of the trade union movement.  Hall and 
Soskice wanted to emphasise variation between national political economies.  This is 
because it held that the most important institutional structures depend on national 
regulatory regimes, such as labour market regulation, education and training, and 
corporate governance.35  They based their comparison on the organisation of the private 
sector.  They wanted to make firms the centre of analysis. 
Particularly they wanted to move more toward a particular approach of how 
institutions affect behaviour: this is through affecting strategic interaction resulting in a 
game-theoretical system.  Using these principles, Hall and Soskice identify two types of 
capitalism: LME’s and CME’s. 
                                                 
33
 Gosta Esping-Andersen, Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies (New York : Oxford 
University Press, 1999), p119. 
34
 Ibid., pp120-43. 
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 Peter A. Hall and David Soskice., eds., Varieties of Capitalism : The Institutional Foundations 
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Different authors have identified other approaches that extend past the twofold 
typology of capitalist countries.36  Richard Whitely in Divergent Capitalisms (1999) 
places his focus on East Asian nations (such as Japan, Korea, and Taiwan); this has had 
the effect of removing the focus on the ‘liberal’ vs. ‘coordinated’ binary which has 
dominated analyses which focus on Europe and North America.37  Whitely identifies 
six typologies of business systems that are based upon sociological models of 
capitalism.38  
Due to the evidence of the literature, this study will adopt the broad assumption 
that multiple ‘types’ of capitalisms exist. But what causes institutions to change?  We 
have taken the assumption of multiple types of capitalism.  It is dependent on what the 
analysis is focused upon as to what type of change that will take place. 
 
2.4 MAIN ACTORS IN THE CREATION OF LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS: 
 
While there is agreement that institutional diversity falls into categories, further 
debate surrounds the question of who the driving actors are in the creation of labour 
market institutions. An analysis of institutional change that places a focus on labour 
will be different to an analysis that focuses on employers as the main actors. 
In the literature we identify three broad schools of thought on the core drivers in 
the development of labour market institutions. The first set of authors takes a ‘labour 
centred’ view and perceive labour market institutions (and welfare state development) 
as concessions made as a consequence of class conflict.  A second set of authors, to the 
contrary, place an emphasis on the role of employers (and cross-class alliances), 
rejecting this labour-centred approach. Further, a third group of authors argues that this 
binary approach of labour and employers relationship being labelled as ‘partnership or 
alliance’ or ‘adversarial or conflictual’ is overly simplistic and that factions can occur 
regarding areas of distribution production. 
 
Employee based explanations 
 
                                                 
36
 For a highly developed fivefold typology see Bruno Amable The Diversity of Modern 
Capitalism 
37
 Crouch, "Models of Capitalism," 448. 
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 Ibid. 
Literature Review 
 
20
 
So what can theories that explain labour as the core driver in the creation of 
labour market institutions tell us about institutional change in Sweden?  Walter Korpi 
has long been a proponent of the school which sees labour markets and welfare states 
being the result of class conflict.  This is also known as Power Resources Analysis 
(PRA) with the assumption that wealth, resources, and knowledge and access to power 
are unequally distributed.39  Thus it places a focus on ‘distributive conflicts’ in labour 
markets.  The lower resources held by individual employees gives rise to ‘class-related 
collective action’. Political parties representing ‘labour’ are expected to be the core 
drivers behind the welfare state, and labour market institutions which favour 
employees; employers are not assumed to take an opposing role in these developments. 
40
 Thus, Sweden’s large welfare state (and ‘employee friendly’ labour market structure) 
is viewed as the result of concessions won by strong unions and Social Democratic 
Parties.  In other words, the type of welfare model found in a country is a reflection of 
the strength of unions and left-wing parties.41  
In his 2006 article, Korpi argues vehemently against analyses that focus on cross-
class alliances as the main drivers of welfare states and labour market institutions.  He 
is particularly critical of authors who discount class (and PRA) in favour of employer 
centered explanations.42 
Korpi believes that VoC scholars have substantially misinterpreted the countries 
used as case studies.  The article argues that it is important to demarcate between three 
different types of actors. There are the protagonists who are responsible for the 
initiation of welfare state expansion; there are consenters, who only become involved in 
later stages; and finally there are antagonists who continually oppose welfare state 
expansion.43 Korpi argues that the core VoC scholars have used the label ‘protagonist’ 
to include ‘consenters’ framing employers as playing a much larger role than they had 
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 Walter Korpi, "Power Resources Approach Vs. Action and Conflict: On Causal and 
Intentional Explanations in the Study of Power " Sociological Theory 3, no. 2 (1985): 40-1. 
40
 ———, "Power Resources and Employer-Centered Approaches in Explanations of Welfare 
States and Varieties of Capitalism: Protagonists, Consenters, and Antagonists," World Politics 
58, no. 2 (2006): 168. 
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 Kåre Vernby, "Classes, Sectors and Political Cleavages," in Power and Institutions in 
Industrial Relations Regimes: Political Science Perspectives on the Transition of the Swedish 
Model, ed. PerOla Öberg and Torsten Svenssen (Stockholm, Sweden: National Institute for 
Working Life, 2005). 
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in reality.  Thus, he argued that class interests and PRA explanations still provide the 
most convincing explanations, if the order of preferences is taken in to account and 
employers are recognised as consenters.44 
The lead role of labour in driving the development of labour market institutions is 
supported by a range of empirical evidence, such as that offered in Classes, Sectors and 
Political Cleavages (2005) by Kåre Vernby.  Vernby undertakes a broad analysis of 
actors in Sweden to determine whether class or sectoral perspectives hold the greatest 
explanatory power in elucidating ‘political cleavages over economic and welfare 
policy’.45  In this study, Vernby found that ‘well defined class interests’ were the most 
important political cleavages.46 This was particularly evident between blue and white 
collar unions vis-à-vis organised business irrespective of the associated sector.47  Some 
sectoral division did exist; however, class appeared to be the most important variable in 
this case. 
Employee centred approaches tell us that weak labour will cause a deterioration 
of the Swedish model that is favourable to workers.  Given the ECJ ruling has 
weakened unions and empowered employers, we should expect the Swedish model of 
industrial relations to change as a result of the case toward the interests of employers. 
 
Employer based explanations 
 
Employer focussed explanations interpret the effects of the ECJ ruling in Sweden 
in a starkly different manner to the former.   The PRA literature, which focuses on class 
explanations, has occurred alongside - and been involved in a dialogue with - authors 
who see cross-class alliance and employer-centric explanations to be the most 
convincing. 
In Capitalists against Markets : The Making of Labor Markets and Welfare States 
in the United States and Sweden (2002), Peter Swenson provided an influential 
argument for the role of employers in the development of the welfare state in the United 
States and Sweden.  Contrary to PRA analyses, Swenson illustrates the role of 
employers in pushing to enhance aspects of the welfare state and the protective 
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characteristics of labour market.  He shows how from the 1950s onwards employers in 
Sweden were active in the expansion of the welfare state; this however, did not occur in 
the US that had a different capitalist model.48  In Sweden, the interests of employers 
and labour overlapped, and the result was a cross-class alliance in favour of a 
solidaristic model. The consequence of these observations is that if employer interests 
coincide with labour interests, an analysis that ties the cohesion and organizational 
strength of union to the size of the welfare state and labour market structure is 
subsequently undermined.49  In other words, an analysis of labour against capital is 
conceptually discredited if the two groups have worked for the same cause. 
Thus, Swenson argued that PRA has not taken into account the core role of 
employers in welfare state development.  In contrast to an explanation where the 
welfare state is the result of class conflict, or where the ‘left’ had gained concessions, 
he argues that the welfare state developed in recognition of employers’ interests.  
Cross-class alliances developed between employees and employers in the same sector. 
Swenson and Pontusson (2000) further develop this ‘employer led’ analysis in the 
The Swedish Employer Offensive against Centralized Wage Bargaining.  They discuss a 
change in preferences among employers to ‘dismantle’ a system which they had 
previously supported (that of centralized wage bargaining in Sweden).50  This too 
argues against the assumption that labour market structure (in this case ‘centralised 
bargaining’) reflects the gains of unions and left-wing political parties.  Rather, it 
illustrates that the presence of centralized bargaining is largely the result of the 
preference of employers.  Thus, two explanations are provided for the decline of 
centralized bargaining in Sweden during the 1990s.51  The first explanation was a 
change in the wage bargaining system that deviated from the original norm.52  The 
second is that a change in production strategies of employers to favour ‘flexibility’ led 
to a desire to decentralize the wage setting system.53  These descriptions significantly 
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explain the level of centralization in wage bargaining by the preference of employers; 
this is counter to analyses which emphasis the size and strength of unions.   
The employer centred approach suggests that the increased power given to 
employers by the ECJ ruling does not necessarily prescribe a change for the Swedish 
model.  To the contrary, stronger employers will create a stronger model of Swedish 
industrial relations, as they too are core drivers.  In sum, if VoC interpretations prove to 
hold the greatest explanatory value, we can expect the Swedish model on industrial 
relations to hold, unless the interests of employers shift. 
 
Dual typology simplistic 
 
A third group of authors, however, argues that both employer and labour-centered 
approaches are overly simplistic.  Svensson and Öberg (2002) make an important 
contribution to this area in Power and Trust: Mechanisms of Cooperation.  They argue 
that in an examination of changes within the Swedish model, it is necessary to look at 
the ways and mechanisms in which the actors within the regime are able to influence 
public policy-making. Svensson and Öberg assess this area by looking at whether 
Swedish Labour market organisations influence public policy-making to a significant 
degree.54  Their findings, based upon survey data, suggest that the participation of social 
partners and interest groups within the Swedish model of industrial relations has 
decreased but is still significant.  A reduction in formally institutionalised participation 
has generally been compensated for by informal non-institutionalised participation.55  A 
dual system has developed in non-institutionalised participation: employers 
organisations have stronger informal links to public servants and bureaucracy, whereas 
labour unions have stronger informal ties to politicians and political parties.56   Studies 
such as Petersson et al. (1997) provide evidence for the existence of a dual-elite system 
in Sweden.57  In aggregate, a strong argument can be made that the social partners (both 
unions and employers) remain highly significant actors in Swedish politics. 
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Much of this influence, argued by Svensson and Öberg, can be attributed to the 
strong informal links between the LO and the SAP.  It is questionable, however, to what 
degree this continues to hold today, given government control by the centre-right, 
‘Alliance for Sweden’, coalition. 
Huzzard and Nilsson (2004) further illustrate the complexities which may 
enhance understanding of the polarised ‘employers’ vs. ‘labour’ literature.  In  
‘Dancing Queen? : Partnership, Co-Determination and Strategic Unionism in Sweden’ 
they ask whether there have been changes to the forms of partnerships between labour 
and employers and the relation to collective bargaining.  The article argues that both 
have changed.58  Huzzard and Nilsson illustrate that there is partnership in the following 
areas: on distributional goals within white-collar unions; and production issues within 
blue-collar unions.  Adversarial relations were identified, however, on distribution goals 
between blue-collar unions.  In summary, the article argues that labeling the strategic 
choices of unions as adversarial or partnership is overly simplistic.  Rather, it can vary 
depending on what type of issue, in this example, distribution vs. production issues. 59 
The nature of this study, and the way it analyses the positions of both ‘employers’ 
and ‘labour’, seeks to avoid some of the inherent biases that may exist in an analysis 
that focuses on one or the other.  We have discussed the actors that influence 
institutions, and now seek to examine how institutions change. 
 
2.5  HOW LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS CHANGE: 
 
Here we return to the initial problem of ‘models of institutional change’.  The 
above sections review the literature on the dynamics of institutions.  This includes 
multiple views on the existence of competing capitalisms and the role of social actors in 
analyses.   
This section outlines explanations of the way in which institutions change.  There 
are three broad models which are used in the literature to explain the types of change 
that may occur.  Within these models, however, further diversity exists, particularly 
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concerning the ‘assumptions’ of the literature discussed above (for example there is a 
combination of employer and labour centred perspectives). 
The first model of convergence argues that institutions converge on one 
equilibrium.  The second model of punctuated equilibrium views institutions as static 
entities with multiple levels of equilibrium that change only in response to large crises 
that call for institutional overhaul.  The third explanation of incremental transformation 
describes institutions that are going through gradual processes of change, rather than 
institutional overhaul at a critical juncture.      
To begin, the convergence literature argues that national level institutions 
converge upon a single equilibrium.  In other words, labour market institutions in 
Europe are moving toward a single type; this is likely to be a more liberal or 
deregulated labour market.   
The issue of convergence has been approached in two general ways.  Firstly, 
there are authors (such as proponents of modernisation theory) who take the assumption 
that there is one type of capitalism.  For them, institutional convergence is tied to the 
‘inevitable effects of globalisation’, as discussed above.  The second group of authors 
takes the assumption of multiple types of capitalism.  Such analyses are distinctive from 
the first group of authors in a number of ways.  These authors argue that institutions 
convergence within particular groupings of states. 
Authors such as Sykes argue for institutional convergence of the second type.  
Sykes et al (2001) draws from Esping-Andersen’s previous work to assess the changing 
nature of the welfare state in response to globalisation and Europeanisation.  The 
processes of globalisation and Europeanisation were found to be the internationalisation 
of enterprises, deregulation of financial markets, and European Monetary Union (EMU) 
convergence.60 Recognising that diversity exists between the Nordic states, it was 
identified that there were shared pressures, evidenced by national shifts.61 Underlying 
trends in the Nordic legacy were found suggesting that economic and welfare policy is 
not significantly affected by changes in government, but rather by external challenges.  
The punctuated equilibrium model has been perhaps the most influential 
explanation for institutional change over the past two decades.  Until recent years it has 
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been the dominant analytical framework for understanding institutional change and has 
greatly influenced the studies on institutional change within advanced democracies.  
The argument is drawn from evolutionary biology, particularly critiques against ‘the 
conventional Darwinian synthesis’ which views evolutionary progress as slow.  This 
perspective, inaugurated by the widely cited article by Stephen Krasner, ‘Approaches to 
the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics’, places emphasis on the 
need to conceptually distinguish between periods of institutional stasis, and periods of 
institutional creation.62  Other scholars who have developed this theory include 
Ikenberry (1989), Almond (1973), and Kelly (1994).63 
Proponents of the punctuated equilibrium model argue that a particular distinction 
needs to be made between periods of institutional creation and institutional stasis.  In 
other words, the conditions that explain the initial creation of an institution, particularly 
a period of crisis, will be quite distinct to the conditions that explain its continuity and 
stasis.64   
A moment of institutional creation is normally referred to as a ‘critical juncture’, 
where the structural influence of political action is significantly reduced for a short 
period of time.  Structural factors include economic, cultural, ideological and 
organisational influences.65  The main consequences are two-fold: the range of choices 
open to powerful actors expands, and the consequences of their decisions are 
substantially more influential.  Critical junctures are relatively short periods of time in 
which there is increased probability of actors’ decisions affecting outcomes.66 
Periods of institutional stasis are normally explained as path-dependent processes.  
These comprise of frameworks such as lock-in, increasing returns, and sequencing.67  In 
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‘Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics’, Pierson characterises 
‘path dependence processes’ or ‘increasing returns’ as having four core features. 
One feature is the concept of inertia.  This suggests that the positive feedback 
effects of an institutional arrangement may lead to a single equilibrium.  Once this 
equilibrium has been created, divergence is difficult.68  A second feature is the 
importance of timing and sequencing.  This maintains that the timing of an event is 
crucial as to whether increasing returns processes are created.  If an event occurs ‘too 
late’ or ‘too early’ it may have a negligible affect; correctly timed events, however, can 
have lasting consequences.69  This links to the third issue of contingency.70  Here, small 
events can have large consequences – many of which are unintended.  The fourth 
feature is the idea that a number of outcomes are possible from the process of 
increasing returns.  This suggests there are potentially multiple equilibrium possible 
under which institutional arrangements may develop along.71 
Scholars have come to criticise the punctuated equilibrium model, largely 
according to weaknesses in explaining those ‘critical junctures’ in which change occurs, 
despite its strengths in explaining the periods of ‘continuity’.    Streeck and Thelen have 
developed theory that explains institutional change in a different way from the 
‘convergence’ and ‘punctuated equilibrium’ models.   
Streeck and Thelen explain how institutions may change incrementally over 
lengthy periods of time, rather than abruptly at ‘critical junctures’ or calamitous events. 
In ‘Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies’ (2005) 
Streek and Thelen compile a collection of authors who develop a critique of 
‘mainstream theories’ of institutional change and continuity.  They argue that much of 
the punctuated equilibrium literature has a propensity to ignore ‘real’ changes, labeling 
any change as ‘variations of the old’.72  They draw upon authors who view the main 
weakness of ‘path-dependent’ and ‘lock-in’ explanations as their inability to explain 
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why institutions change.  A particular example of this is the phenomenon of a shrinking 
welfare state in many western democracies, including Sweden.73   
An important difference between the ‘incremental transformation’ and 
‘punctuated equilibrium’ literatures is what may cause ‘change’.  In Streek and Thelen 
(2005) the authors focus on changes that occur endogenously, from actors within the 
institution.  A particular focus is the ‘gaps’ that form between the design and realisation 
of the institution.  In the words of Streeck and Thelen, these openings develop over time 
to become: 
 
sites of political contestation over the form, functions, and salience of specific institutions 
whose outcome may be an important engine of institutional change.74 
 
In other words, ambiguities that may exist, particularly around the enforcement 
and purpose of an institution, become arenas of strategic political struggle.  In contrast 
to punctuated equilibrium models, where change usually occurs in response to large 
external shocks, this new model illustrates how ongoing power struggles within existing 
institution may cause ‘real’ gradual change.75  Thus, Streeck and Thelen find a 
compromise between rational choice and historical institutional explanations; while 
agency exists, it is only exerted within constrained parameters. 
The work constructs a typology of how incremental change may take place.  It 
identifies five gradual processes of transformative change: displacement, layering, drift, 
conversion, and exhaustion.76 Displacement is characterized by the assumption that an 
‘institution’ may be founded on a number of different (and even contradicting) ‘logics’ 
or ‘sub-institutions’.  Some will remain subordinated or ‘latent’, however, may be 
promoted by certain actors to become dominant.  Thus, formally marginalized ‘sub-
institutions’ may come to greater prominence and change the institution.77  Layering 
describes a different process whereby new provisions are added to an existing 
institution, gradually ‘crowding’ out its existing functions. 78 Drift refers to deliberate 
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neglect leading to a ‘slippage’ of institutional practice.79  Conversion refers to certain 
actors capturing an existing institution for a different purpose than originally intended.80  
And finally, exhaustion refers to the gradual breakdown of an institution over time.81  
The first four refer to institutional change, while the fifth model suggests institutional 
breakdown. 
Streeck and Thelen make a significant assumption, however, that there is a 
‘dominant trend’ toward liberalization.  In particular, they emphasise the ease of 
individuals in ‘opting out’ over increased difficulty in implementing collective 
coordination.  Subsequently it argues that these five processes are leading to gradual 
change characterized by a liberalization of advanced political economies.82    
In ‘Europeanisation of Social Partners in Smaller European Democracies’, 
Falkner and Leiber (2004) illustrate examples of incremental transformation in Austria, 
Denmark, Luxembourg, and Sweden. This study assesses the impact of 
‘Europeanisation’ on the mechanisms around national policy-making on labour market 
issues; it does this by focusing on six European employment directives. Denmark 
displayed the largest impact from Europeanisation.  It cited social partner autonomy 
moving to complementary legislation.83 In the assessment of Sweden, it was noticed the 
effects of Europeanisation were subtle, and more in line with the experiences of Austria 
and Luxembourg.   
The light convergence, identified in the four countries, can be explained using 
Thelen’s fivefold typology of incremental transformation.  It shows how institutions 
may change gradually overtime as distinct to punctuated equilibrium or convergence 
models.   
The three models – convergence, punctuated equilibrium, and incremental 
transformation – will form the framework to explain the dynamics of the Swedish 
industrial relations model in response to the ECJ Laval ruling. 
 
2.6  CONCLUSIONS: 
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This chapter has provided a snapshot of the current literature that helps to explain 
institutional change.  Figure 2.1 provides a summary of this chapter.  The literature 
offers three broad approaches to the study of institutions; each of these varies 
depending on the type of assumptions taken.  The limitation of rational choice 
institutionalism and the broad scope of sociological institutionalism suggested that 
historical institutionalism would be the most relevant approach in order to study 
Swedish labour market institutions and European integration.  Here, the study takes the 
assumption that temporal processes and historical events do play a significant role in 
producing institutional legacies that influence preferences.  
 
 
 
 
 
The leading question of this study – how institutions change – provides an 
indication of another assumption concerning the number of capitalisms that exist.  The 
typology of ‘one type of capitalism’ proved to be insufficient as a framework for  
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this particular study.  This is reinforced by the relevant supporting literature that takes 
the premise of the existence of multiple types of capitalisms.  
The literature contained different views on the main actors in the creation of 
labour market institutions.  The polarisation between employer centred versus labour-
centred approaches appeared to be overly simplistic.  Therefore, it is important to take 
into consideration the third model which goes beyond this, and proposes that employers 
and labour are neither universally antagonistic nor always in alliance.   
Finally, the literature on how institutional change occurs was examined.  Three 
primary models have been identified in the scholarship, each prescribing different 
explanations for the way in which institutions change.  The first perspective of 
convergence holds that national level institutions converge upon a single equilibrium in 
the long run.  Punctuated equilibrium places an emphasis on alternating periods 
characterised of ‘institutional stasis’ and ‘institutional creation’.  The third theory of 
incremental transformation provides an explanation of how institutions evolve over 
time.  These theories will be tested against the empirical findings of the study in order 
to determine which have the greatest explanatory value in this case. 
With this framework taken into account, the remainder of the study can now be 
conducted.  The next chapter will outline the background to the Laval case.  It will 
define the subject areas relevant to this study: the Vaxholm dispute; the Swedish model 
and Swedish law; European employment policy and EC law; competing frames in 
which the ECJ ruling is viewed; and finally, definitions for competing options for 
change considered by the Swedish social partners. 
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The Laval Case: Background 
 
 
 
The first chapter defined how this thesis will research the impact of the ECJ 
Laval case and document the positions of the social partners toward the courts ruling.  
The second chapter followed this with a discussion of the literature on which this study 
will draw. Before this study can proceed, however, it must introduce a number of 
contextual factors and definitions.  First, this chapter will reintroduce the Laval dispute 
and the Vaxholm conflict.   From here, it will outline the Swedish context: it will define 
the Swedish model of industrial relations, followed by a discussion of Swedish law.  
Next, the European context will be introduced, starting with European employment 
policy, followed by EC law.   
Once the Swedish and European contexts have been introduced, the chapter will 
embark on an in-depth discussion of the ECJ Laval ruling (C-341/05).  The ruling, 
however, is multifaceted and has been interpreted in a number of different ways.  To 
address this issue, the chapter will include a discussion of the competing frames in 
which the ECJ ruling is viewed.  This is necessary in order to understand the positions 
that have been taken by the social partners and under what areas agreement or 
disagreement arise.  The final section will discuss the key terms that the social partners 
use in discussing changes to the Swedish model in response to the ECJ case.  It will 
define the four core options for national level change: legislated minimum wage, 
universal extension of collective agreements or erga omnes, extension model 
(autonomous collective agreements), and the status-quo model. These discussions will 
provide context for the remainder of the study.  But to begin, the next section will 
return to the period of Sweden’s initial accession into joining the EU, when the seeds of 
the Laval case were sown. 
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3.1 LOW WAGE LABOUR IN SWEDEN: THE EVENT  
 
Sweden formally joined the European Union on January 1st 1995.  At this time, 
all countries in the European Union were categorised as high-income states, except for 
(geographically distant) Spain, Portugal, and Greece.  As a result, the issue of ‘posted 
workers’ – employees undertaking short term work in a foreign country - had not posed 
a significant problem to any of the existing states.  The landmark 1990 ECJ ruling Rush 
Portuguesa (Case C-113/89, Rush Portuguesa Ldª v Office national d'immigration), 
between Portuguese posted workers in France, set the precedent that community law 
does not prevent nation states from implementing national legislation, allowing for 
national re-regulation1.   
On May 1st 2004, the Eastern Enlargement took place in which eight new Eastern 
Bloc countries joined the European Union (Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Czech Republic, Estonia, and Hungary). Within a month of this event the 
municipality government of Vaxholm, in metropolitan Stockholm, was one of the first 
entities to make commercial use of the Eastern Enlargement.  For the purpose of 
undertaking building renovations for a school, they tendered a contract to prospective 
companies including firms from new EU member states. 
The winner of the contract was Latvian company Laval un Partneri Ltd (Laval) 
and its subsidiary L&P Baltic AB.  Swedish trade union, Bygnnads, attempted to create 
a collective agreement with Laval but it was without success.  Instead, Laval concluded 
two collective agreements with the Latvian Workers Union.2  The use of Latvian 
workers at Latvian wages and outside of a Swedish Collective Agreement resulted in 
Bygnnads giving written notification for industrial action on 19th October 2004 to 
blockade the building site.3  Sympathy action was taken by the Electricians Union on 3 
December 2004.4  As work on the site subsequently ceased, L&P Baltic AB went into 
receivership.5 
                                                 
1
 Georg Menz, "Re-Regulating the Single Market: National Varieties of Capitalism and Their Responses to 
Europeanization," Journal of European Public Policy 10:4 (2003): 539-41. 
2
 Kerstin Ahlberg, Niklas Bruun, and Jonas Malmberg, "The Vaxholm Case from a Swedish and 
European Perspective," Transfer 12, no. 2 (2006): 6. 
3
 Ibid. 
4
 Ibid. 
5
 Ronnie Eklund, "The Laval Case," The Industrial Law Journal 35, no. 2 (2006): 202. 
The Laval Case: Background 
 
34
 
Laval brought the case to the Swedish Labour Court (A268/04) under the 
justification that the action taken by the Swedish trade unions was unlawful.  On 15 
September 2005 the Swedish Labour Court published a preliminary ruling stating that 
Laval’s case did not fit the criteria for unlawful trade unions action.6  In 2005 Laval 
brought the case to the European Court of Justice. On 23 March 2007, Advocate 
General Mengozzi (belonging to the ECJ) released an opinion in support of the Swedish 
Labour Courts ruling against Laval.7 This led many to believe the final ECJ ruling 
would support the Swedish Labour Court’s ruling.  However, the final judgment from 
the ECJ, released on 11 December 2007 (3 years after the actual dispute), ruled in 
favour of Laval.  It concluded that Swedish labour union action in this case was 
unlawful.8  In other words, the ECJ ruled contrary to the Swedish Labour Court’s 
preliminary ruling, stating the actions of Laval in using workers under a Latvian 
collective agreement was consistent with EC law.  
In order to understand what grievances are held by the Swedish social partners 
and what this ruling means for labour relations, the Swedish perspective will be 
introduced.  
 
3.2 THE  SWEDISH  MODEL  OF  INDUSTRIAL  RELATIONS 
 
The following section will outline the Swedish model of industrial relations. The 
Swedish model has different characteristics when described as: a social and cultural 
model; an economic model; or as a particular arrangement for industrial relations.  It is 
the third feature – the Swedish model as a particular set of industrial relations – that is 
important in this study. 
To address this issue, this section will take a fivefold path.  To begin, it will 
discuss the origins of the Swedish model, followed by an introduction to the core 
characteristics of the model.  Next, the section will discuss the feature of solidarism and 
its relationship to the Rehn-Meidner model.  Finally, it will critique the typology 
constructed. 
                                                 
6
 Swedish Labour Court Ruling A268/04 p 1 
7
 Norbert Reich, "Free Movement V. Social Rights in an Enlarged Union: The Laval and Viking 
Cases before the European Court of Justice " German Law Journal 9, no. 2 (2008): 127. 
8
 Ibid. 
The Laval Case: Background 
 
35
 
There are three broad conceptions of the origins of the Swedish model.  The first 
concept is that the Swedish model is the result of class concession made on the side of 
labour.  According to Stewart Wood, it had its origins in the struggle between the elites 
of classes exposed to industrialisation and the depression of 1873 to 1886.9 
A second view is that the Swedish model is result of a cross-class alliance 
between labour and capital responding to a distinct type of capitalism.10  
A third concept is that the Swedish model is a legacy of Sweden’s unique 
historical factors, in particular its position as a relative late industrialiser in the late 
nineteenth century (vis-à-vis its Continental and Anglo-Saxon neighbours).  Such 
preconditions, along with popular movements such as the religious revivalist 
movement, temperance movement, and the labour movement, led to the development of 
several institutions which were to ultimately form Sweden’s corporatist labour 
structure.  These historical processes resulted in the formation of the Swedish Trade 
Union Confederation (LO), the Swedish Employers Confederation (SAF) and, at the 
nexus between the two, the Swedish Social Democratic Labour Party (SAP). 11 A strong 
labour movement developed with two wings: the LO which took its place in 
workplaces, and the SAP which constituted the political wing.  Employers developed 
the SAF, which was the main representative for employers. These institutions formed 
the core of Sweden’s corporatist labour structure.12 
Whichever perspective is chosen, it is clear that a particular model of social and 
economic relations developed in Sweden which is distinct from the rest of Europe and 
Great Britain.  As noted earlier, this study assumes that Sweden still has a unique 
model. 
The Swedish model of industrial relations has been significantly shaped by 
historical factors.  Two main events are the Saltsjöbaden Agreement and the 
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constitutionally enshrined right to industrial action.  In the post-war era there was 
significant conflict between the two peak level organisations, resulting in large strikes 
that were harmful to both labour and industry.  In 1938, a new agreement between the 
SAF and the LO provided ‘labour peace, constructive co-operation on issues of 
common interest, and a strong emphasis on collective bargaining as a better way of 
solving problems of employment relations rather than through legislation.’13  This new 
agreement, called the Saltsjöbaden Agreement, was signed between the two main 
confederations with the objective of maintaining industrial peace.  This ‘head 
agreement’ is a cornerstone of the Swedish model.   
A second important aspect of the Swedish model is the guarantee to the right to 
industrial action (in addition to the freedom of association).  This right is entrenched in 
Article One of the Swedish Constitution.14  The result has been a system of corporatism, 
in which autonomous social partners engage in tri-partite or peak-level bargaining.   
This collective method of industrial relations regulation, that takes place outside 
of state control, allowed for the development of labour and employment relations based 
on the solidaristic model.  This is a core aspect of the Swedish labour market co-
ordination.  It is distinct from the Segmentalist model which is archetypal of the US and 
Anglo-Saxon countries.  The key differences between the two is the price of labour and 
the availability of labour. 
In the example of Segmentalism labour is overpriced, and there is a surplus of 
employees within a dual labour market characterised by wage spread.  In this model, 
firms act according to a decentralised strategy in which they aim to provide higher 
wages and benefits to attract and maintain a desirable labour force. 15 The overpricing 
of labour and the associated surplus of workers gives firms additional leverage vis-à-vis 
employees. This system has a self-reinforcing equilibrium, as there is no incentive for 
firms or workers to ‘opt out’.16  The result, however, is a dual labour market; often it 
results in very high wages for skilled workers (where there is a shortage) coinciding 
with low wages for low skilled workers. 
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In the solidaristic model labour is under-priced and, in a labour market 
characterised by wage compression, there is a shortage of workers.  This reflects a 
collective approach where unions - with the support of employers - impose a ceiling on 
the benefits and wages paid to workers.17  This results in wages being under-priced 
subsequently leading to a scarcity of labour.  There is ‘a queue of employers’ while 
workers are scarce, giving labour organisations a high degree of bargaining power.  The 
tensions in this model pertain to the system not being in a natural equilibrium.  In other 
words, there is an incentive for firms to ‘opt out’ and pay higher wages to attract 
workers. In order for this system to work in the long term, there needs to be co-
operation between employers and unions, and an absence of ‘cheating’.  Cheating may 
benefit the individual firm or individual workers, but it comes at the expense of the 
wider arrangement which benefits all parties.18 
Wage compression or solidarity was, however, part of wider Rhen-Meidner 
economic model that the newly emerging ‘Swedish Model’ was to draw heavily from.  
The Rhen-Meidner model differs significantly from neo-classical models of labour 
relations, which have prevailed since the 1980s.  The objective of the Rhen-Meidner 
model is to raise low-skilled wages and limit high-end wages to place pressure on the 
businesses which were less profitable.  The consequence is that capital collects in the 
most efficient industries thereby facilitating growth; firms that are reliant on cheap 
labour correspondingly go out of business.19  This, however, was only part of the 
model.   
In this model, the state has an important role in facilitating the transfer of labour 
from declining to emerging industries by actively ‘up-skilling’ workers.  Thus, an 
underlying feature of the Rhen-Meidner model is a large public sector, active labour 
market policies (ALMP’s)20, social welfare system, and a state that is active in driving 
economic development.  The result of this state driven model was that the Swedish 
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economy developed around core industries that were medium to high wage, and away 
from low-skilled industry. 21  
The Swedish model of labour relations, however, has been subject to many 
challenges and has not existed in any ‘pure’ form since its formation in the early 
twentieth century.  It developed on top of a set of ideational foundations of the Rhen-
Meidner model.  The Rhen-Meidner model was not always destined to become the 
underlying theory behind the Swedish model, and rather resulted from the contestation 
between certain groups.  Before 1950 the SAP favoured an alternative model, the 
Rubbestad model.22  By the late 1950s, within policy circles, the Rhen-Meidner model 
gained supremacy in government policy making.23  Throughout the remainder of the 
twentieth century the Rhen-Meidner model had become consolidated in what we call 
the ‘Swedish Model’, although there were also efforts to undermine the model. 24 
A labour offensive took place in the 1960s and 1970s in the form of repeated 
strike action, suggesting the model was not meeting the ‘wage demands of labour’. 25 
Furthermore, the strikes reflected dissatisfaction with the structure of authority (such as 
lack of union influence in the workplace) in firms.26  In the 1980s and 1990s exporting 
employers staged an offensive, led by the Engineering Employers’ Federation, with the 
aim to decentralise the wage bargaining process.  They managed to shift the wage-
bargaining process from the national to industry level, but were unsuccessful in moving 
it to the firm level. 27 
Alongside these factors, encroaching legislation has been identified throughout 
these times.  Despite this, minimum wages have remained in the exclusive hands of the 
social partners. 
A liberalisation of regulations preceded the economic recession during the 1990s 
and an evolution of these corporatist institutions.28  By the end the 1990s, many of the 
core aspects of the Swedish Model had been re-established, with the new Industrial 
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Agreement of 1997 and the establishment of the National Mediation Office.  
Institutional resistance to ‘substantive’ change has allowed Sweden’s unique industrial 
model to persist.29  Importantly, although there was adjustment in the institutional 
framework, the ‘outcomes’ and ‘objectives’ of the Swedish model remained largely 
unchanged. This new form of labour relations has maintained wage restraint and wage 
solidarity in Sweden.  There has been a rise in inequality, but this has been marginal: 
Sweden is among the countries with the lowest wage distributions in the world. The 
core elements of the Swedish Labour model have remained intact and in some cases 
have been strengthened. 30 
Thus, core features can be attributed to the Swedish model of industrial relations.  
Those underlying features are the Rehn-Meidner model combined with a ‘centralised’ 
form of wage bargaining.  They are: 
 
(1) strong social partners and high levels of unionisation; 
(2) political parties that do not deal with labour market issues; 
(3) wage formation which is decided by the social partners; and 
(4) the right to strike. 
 
There are various ‘means’ to accomplish this, such as active labour market policies 
(ALMP) and public employment.  The ‘ends’ of the model are: high aggregate wages; 
wage restraint (low distribution between wage earners and employers); wage solidarity 
(low distribution of income among wage earners); and strong worker protection. 
 While the Swedish model of industrial relations has been questioned in light of 
the ECJ ruling, its legal basis is where the main tension is identified.  The next section 
will discuss Swedish law relevant to the case. 
 
 
3.3  SWEDISH LAW  
 
The constitutionally guaranteed right to industrial action is crucial to Swedish 
law.  Constitutionally, all groups including trade unions and employer/employee 
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associations can take industrial action.31  Provisions, however, exist to limit the right to 
industrial action under certain conditions.  It cannot be taken when a ‘peace obligation’ 
exists, in the form of a collective agreement, between the two parties.  As a result, it is 
illegal to take industrial action to alter an existing collective agreement (including a 
collective agreement between foreign parties). 
The Swedish government, however, has limited this restriction by the law of Lex 
Britannia. The law of Lex Britannia states that if temporary activities are undertaken 
(typically by posted workers) industrial action is permitted.  In particular, this law has 
made it unlawful to take industrial action against those involved in a collective 
agreement only if it relates to conditions of work that have a strong connection to the 
Swedish labour market. The activity of posted workers is not considered to be strongly 
connected to the Swedish labour market.32   
Thus, industrial action is classified by the Swedish constitution as a fundamental 
right to citizens, unless it infringes upon a collective agreement which has a strong 
connection to the Swedish labour market.  The company Laval was only undertaking 
temporary work (with weak connection to the Swedish labour market) in Vaxholm, 
thereby giving Swedish labour unions a right to strike under Swedish law.   
Lex Brittania is located in the 1976 Act on Co-determination at Work (MBL).  
This legislation deals with questions that arise from the relationship between employers 
and employees.  This covers the areas such as: right of association, right of negotiation, 
duty of negotiation, exchange of information, obligation to maintain industrial peace, 
notification, and damages.33 Another important piece of legislation in the Swedish 
labour market is the 1999 Foreign Posting of Employees Act (utstationeringslagen).  
This Act outlines the provisions that were made in order to make Swedish industrial 
relations compliant with the 1996 Posting of Workers Directive.  The Foreign Posting 
of Employees Act makes no mention of minimum wages for posted workers because it 
was initially believed to be covered by the Lex Brittania clause in the MBL.  What the 
Act does include, however, are areas such as: annual leave, parental leave, and 
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discrimination.34 With the relevant parts of the Swedish labour market model and 
Swedish law outlined, the next section will discuss European employment policy.   
 
3.4 EUROPEAN EMPLOYMENT POLICY 
 
The European Union consists of countries with diverse national models of 
industrial relations.  Within this range of national models, Sweden can be characterised 
as an ‘outlier’, perhaps alongside with Denmark.  Specifically, out of the 27 EU 
member states, 25 have either at least some form of legislated minimum wages or 
universal declaration of collective agreements. The differences between Sweden and the 
EU average are illustrated in Table 3.4 which indicates trade union density, workplace 
representation, collective bargaining coverage, degree of bargaining centralisation, and 
strike activity index.   It is important to note that all member states have some anomaly 
in their industrial relations system, and Sweden is not necessarily the only outlier.  
 
Table 3.2. Sweden and EU25 Industrial Relation Indicators 
 Sweden(%) EU25(%) 
Trade Union Density 77 25 
Workplace Representation 86 53 
Collective Bargaining Coverage 92 66 
Degree of Bargaining Centralisation 56 34 
Strike Activity Index 3 9 
Source: European Industrial Relations Observatory 
 
While the process of Europeanisation has an impact on national models, there is 
no European model of industrial relations per se.  It is more useful is to define European 
employment policy, so as to discuss its effect on national models of labour relations.  
The European employment policy is centred on three core areas: 
 
1. combination of the ‘Community method’ and EU regulatory model; 
2. social dialogue and law via collective agreement; and 
3. the European Employment Strategy (EES) and the Open Method of Co-
ordination (OMC). 
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Commentators have observed that employment policy in the European Union has 
often been closely linked to social policy development.35  It has been most successful at 
producing ‘negative’ integration or ‘harmonising downwards’; in other words, 
European employment policy has liberalised aspects of European labour markets.36  It 
has been less successful at ‘positive’ integration - building institutions - in particular, 
creating a ‘social Europe’.  This is particularly the case as employment policy has 
largely been under ‘unanimity’ voting, rather than ‘qualified majority voting’ (QMV) in 
area of market deregulation. However, there has been an ongoing dispute over the 
ability to deliver a coherent policy plan as tools for delivery has been experimental and 
have changed over time.   
An important aspect of area one, the combined community method and EU 
regulatory model, is its focus on legislation and legalistic modes.  This is in contrast to 
Sweden which has relied upon co-operation between the social partners.37  Area two, 
social dialogue and law via collective agreement, moved this initial focus, however, it 
retained a legalistic manner.  Here, the legislative proposals were moved to the method 
of law through collective agreement.38 Area three, in contrast has used ‘soft’ 
mechanisms of labour co-ordination, through the use of the Open Method of Co-
ordination (OMC) and the European Employment Strategy (EES).  Here, states are not 
legally bound to any instruction, rather monitoring by member states aims to encourage 
compliance.39 The EES aims to increase cooperation among actors, co-ordination of 
national employment policies, and convergence of labour market outcomes.40 
Another important point is that overarching policies of the EC aim to create a free 
market of labour, capital, and technology.  This suggests there has in general been a 
bias toward the neo-liberal approach, where labour and moves freely with minimal 
barriers from government.  And where intervention is permitted, this is generally 
reserved by the state giving it a monopoly in the regulation of the labour market. 
In summary, the three core aspects of European employment policy can be 
characterised as follows.  First, it aims to co-ordinate diverse labour markets under a 
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single umbrella.  Second, European employment policy has a legalistic nature. Where it 
regulates the labour market, it does so using legislation through state implementation.  
And third, it has a liberal character and seeks to create a single market for labour 
(alongside capital, services, and technology) within the EU with minimal obstacles.  
From here, the next section will discuss the relevant EC law and how it is applicable to 
the events of the Laval dispute. 
 
3.5 EC LAW 
 
EC law will be discussed in two main themes: the Posting of Workers Directive, 
followed by the EC Treaty.  EC law provides an important background to the Laval 
case as it explains why the Swedish industrial relations model has come into question 
by the ECJ. 
The Posting of Workers Directive (96/71/EC) was established to provide a legal 
framework in which EU countries can determine minimum conditions for posted 
workers.  Posted workers are temporary labour sent to another member state for a 
limited period of time (usually a maximum of 4 weeks).41  The Directive was first 
proposed in 1991 and only finalised in 1996 after extensive debate between member 
countries over its content.42  The core purpose of the Posting of Workers Directive is to 
ensure minimum standards and equality of treatment in the free movement of services 
and competition.43  Many problems have been associated with the transposing of the 
directive into member-state law, particularly in ensuring it is consistent with EC law.44  
The mechanism used in Sweden to ensure minimum standards for posted workers 
was found to be in conflict with the EC Treaty.  The tension stems from the breach of 
four core articles of the EC Treaty: Article 12, Article 49, Article 50, and Article 234. 
An important aspect of the EC treaty is the principle against discrimination on the 
grounds of nationality: 
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PART ONE PRINCIPLES Article 12 
Within the scope of application of this Treaty, and without prejudice to any special 
provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be 
prohibited. 
The Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251, may 
adopt rules designed to prohibit such discrimination. 
 
As discussed in the Swedish law section, Lex Brittania states that the rules for 
industrial action depend on whether the collective agreement has a strong link to the 
Swedish labour market or not.  In other words, different rules apply depending on the 
‘nationality’ of a collective agreement.  This is ‘discrimination’ under prohibited by 
Article 12. 
Another important feature of the EC treaty is the article of the free movement of 
services: 
 
CHAPTER 3 SERVICES Article 49 
Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on freedom to provide 
services within the Community shall be prohibited in respect of nationals of Member 
States who are established in a State of the Community other than that of the person for 
whom the services are intended. 
The Council may, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, 
extend the provisions of the Chapter to nationals of a third country who provide services 
and who are established within the Community. 
 
In other words, the article prohibits any organization or actor from restricting the 
freedom of a company in one member state to provide services in another.  This 
suggests that Swedish trade unions cannot prevent Laval from providing services in 
Sweden. Article 49 contradicts the Swedish constitution that gives unions the right to 
undertake industrial action against employers with collective agreements of little 
connection to the Swedish labour market. As a result this tension is a highly contentious 
issue.  Lex Brittania aims to prevent the ‘unfair’ competition posed by foreign labour 
subject to few minimum standards.  From an EU perspective, however, prevention of 
unfair competition in this way restricts the free movement of services.  
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While Article 49 limits actors (such as trade unions) from restricting the freedom 
of services, Article 50 suggests that the state can impose some minimum standards on 
foreign workers: 
 
CHAPTER 3 SERVICES Article 50 
Services shall be considered to be "services" within the meaning of this Treaty where they 
are normally provided for remuneration, in so far as they are not governed by the 
provisions relating to freedom of movement for goods, capital and persons. 
"Services" shall in particular include: 
(a) activities of an industrial character; 
(b) activities of a commercial character; 
(c) activities of craftsmen; 
(d) activities of the professions. 
Without prejudice to the provisions of the chapter relating to the right of establishment, 
the person providing a service may, in order to do so, temporarily pursue his activity in 
the State where the service is provided, under the same conditions as are imposed by that 
State on its own nationals. 
 
In other words, minimum standards may be enforced by the state but must be the same 
as what is imposed on its own nationals.  The important distinction to note is that while 
Article 49 limits restrictions on the freedom of services, Article 50 gives the state – not 
mentioning the social actors - some power to impose minimum condition.   
Article 234 proves important as it states that interpretation of the EC laws 
ultimately falls on the ECJ: 
 
SECTION 4 THE COURT OF JUSTICE Article 234 
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give a preliminary ruling 
concerning: 
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty; 
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community and 
of the ECB; 
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of the Council, 
where those statutes so provide. 
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The ECJ has the discretion to interpret the meaning of the treaty, and therefore is 
ultimately accountable for deciding whether EC or national legislation will dominate in 
the case of a dispute.  Furthermore, the ECJ has discretion to protect the ‘public 
interest’ where workers’ rights will be marginalised (for example to stop ‘social 
dumping’).45  If the ECJ enforces its discretion to protect the public interest it may 
allow national legislation to override EC law where it will harm the local population. 
Thus, the EC treaty prohibits any organization from restricting a company’s 
freedom to provide goods and services to another EC state; it further encourages the 
free movement of labour, and prevents discrimination on the grounds of nationality.  An 
important aspect of the EC treaty, however, is the discretion given to the ECJ to 
interpret how these prohibitions will be applied whey they conflict with national 
legislation.    
The Swedish model and Swedish law on the one hand, and EU employment law 
and EC law on the other, has been the core conflict of the Laval case.  With this 
outlined, the next section will discuss and define the ECJ ruling.  This is a prerequisite 
for understanding and explaining the positions of the social partners that will be 
examined in the following chapter. 
 
3.6 ECJ RULING 
 
The ECJ ruling has been interpreted in varying ways.  On a basic level, these 
different interpretations may contribute to explaining the importance of this case. In 
particular they may demonstrate why the case has roused such emotional sentiment and 
stimulated strong public debate within and outside of Sweden.  As with many important 
legal rulings, the complex and legalistic nature of the Laval judgement leads to some 
difficulty in interpretation, particularly when assessing its broader implications.  
Among certain groups, particularly legal circles, the ruling has been received with little 
animosity and general clarity in its provisions.  Others groups however, such as political 
parties and social partners, have expressed a degree of outrage highlighting perceived 
contradictions and violations embedded in the judgement.46   
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The following section will explain how the European Court of Justice ruled in the 
Laval Case (C-341/05). Two core areas of the ruling will be expanded upon. First, this 
section will explain why the methods used by the Swedish trade unions, with the stated 
objective of prevent social dumping, were deemed illegitimate.  Second, it will further 
explain the ruling concerning Lex Britannia. 
The first issue is the compatibility of the Posted Workers Directive with the 
industrial action used by the Swedish trade unions during the Vaxholm dispute.  The 
ruling on this issue is explicit. It specifically states that the PWD does not allow a trade 
union to take industrial action to force foreign companies to sign a collective 
agreement.47 The emphasis here is on the nationality of the firm.  While collective 
action cannot be used for this purpose, other options are available under the PWD. 
The ECJ ruled that Sweden had not used the full extent of the options available to 
it to protect itself against social dumping.  The court stated that there is room for 
protection against social dumping in Article 3(1) (by law, regulation or administrative 
provision, or by universally declared collective agreements) and Article 3(8) 
(alternative options outside universally declared collective agreements).  Highlighted in 
the Committee Terms of Reference, the options available for use by Sweden in Article 
3(8) are by means of collective agreement which are generally applicable or concluded 
by the most representative employers and labour organisations in an area.48  This is 
supported by the paragraph 68 of the legal judgement which states: 
 
It must be noted, in this respect, that since the purpose of Directive 96/71 is not to 
harmonise systems for establishing terms and conditions of employment in the 
Member States, the latter are free to choose a system at the national level which is 
not expressly mentioned among those provided for in that directive, provided that 
it does not hinder the provision of services between member states.49 [Italics added 
by author] 
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In other words, the ECJ does not prohibit states from protecting themselves 
against social dumping outside of legislative means.  Nor does it rule that industrial 
action cannot be undertaken by the social partners as a tool to prevent wage dumping.  
Instead, the judgement bars unions from using industrial action to force companies to 
sign agreements that are not transparent (clear terms and conditions).  This lack of 
transparency and predictability is where the incompatibility has arisen.  As stated in the 
ruling, Sweden is free to find a mechanism so long as it is transparent, predictable and 
does not impede the free movement of services. 
A further implication of the ruling is that a state cannot demand from foreign 
posted workers more than what it outlined as the ‘hard core’ of the directive in Article 
3(1).50  The judges ruled that public policy, in Article 3(10), cannot be used in this case 
to extend the ‘hard core’ of the PWD because trade unions are not ‘bodies governed by 
public law’.51 
A further aspect of the ruling is identified between paragraphs 95 and 110 of the 
original judgement by the court.  These too have been identified in the Terms of 
Reference to the Claes Stråth investigation.52  The ruling makes specific reference to 
whether or not collective action is a fundamental right that can override the ‘freedom of 
services’.  The judgement states that industrial action is considered a fundamental right 
which can override the freedom of services (Article 49), if it is for the purpose of public 
interest.53 This classifies the protection of domestic workers from social dumping as 
being in the ‘public interest’.54 
In the Laval case, however, the court ruled that the unions were asking the 
foreign company to sign a collective agreement which went far beyond the prevention 
of social dumping.55  The conditions regarding minimum pay were not transparent and 
subsequently could not be used as a justification of the public interest criteria.56  In 
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other words, the demands made on the foreign company went beyond the ‘hard core’ of 
Article 3(1) of the PWD. 
The second issue ruled by the ECJ concerns the right to undertake industrial 
action. Particularly it assesses whether a collective agreement can be enforced by a 
trade union (in the form of industrial action).57  In the ruling, the court prohibits unions 
using industrial action as a tool to enforce national laws.58 
Specifically, the judgement decided that Lex Britannia discriminates on the basis 
of nationality rather than the content of a collective agreement.59 Lex Britannia rules 
that any obligations which are decided in a foreign member country via collective 
agreement are illegitimate in Sweden.  In other words, this law defines all foreign 
collective agreements which are formulated outside of Sweden null and void.60  While 
this may have the effect of impeding social dumping, it goes beyond, by discriminating 
against all foreign collective agreements irrespective of its content. 
For the purposes of the study, there are four key points to the ECJ ruling: first, the 
PWD does not allow trade unions to force foreign companies to sign a collective 
agreement. Sweden had not used all of the options available to it to protect itself from 
social dumping. Second, demands cannot be made beyond the ‘hard core’ of the PWD.  
The Swedish unions’ collective agreements were found to be insufficiently transparent 
to meet the ‘hard core’ of the PWD.  Third, the Laval case did not meet the criteria of 
issues of public policy, public health, or public security for the ‘hard core’ to be 
extended.  In this case, therefore, industrial action did not qualify a fundamental right 
that would override the freedom to provide services.  Fourth, the ECJ found that Lex 
Britannia distinguishes on the basis of the ’nationality’ of a collective agreement, 
thereby violating EC non-discrimination rules. 
The courts findings against the Swedish model resulted from complex interplay 
between events, the Posting of Workers Directive (96/71/EC) and the EC treaty.  The 
justification has been confined to a core collection of articles: Articles 3(1), 3(8), and 
3(10) of the Posted Workers Directive; and Articles 12 EC, 49 EC, 50 EC, and 234 EC 
of the EC treaty. 
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This ruling brings to fore the role of unforeseen consequences.  The Posting of 
Workers Directive was written and agreed upon in a context in which such a dispute 
had not yet been experienced.  When it was written in 1996, the Eastern Enlargement 
was not necessarily forecasted. As a result the issues associated with widening 
integration (as distinct from deepening integration) could not have been addressed in 
it.61 
The ruling highlights some of the claims made on the Swedish side, particularly 
by the social partners, that there is a deficit of knowledge within the European Union 
regarding the complexity of the Swedish system of industrial relations. In short, a great 
deal of work would be needed to make all collective agreements in Sweden 
‘transparent’.62  Collective agreements are often extensive documents that merely have 
a set of guidelines, rather than the raw numerical values required to make them 
transparent.  This is despite claims made at the European level that the Swedish model 
and the Posted Workers Directive are in fact compatible.  This may provide an 
explanation of why Sweden did not make any references to minimum wages in the 
Swedish Foreign Posting of Employees Act, 1999: the system of Lex Britannia was 
believed by some to be sufficient. 
The legal complexities surrounding the ruling make it difficult for some actors 
(such as smaller organisations or individuals) to articulate well regarded positions on it.  
This tends to restrict official debate over the ruling to elites and peak-level 
organisations 
As a result, there is some confusion by actors over what the ECJ has in ruled in 
this particular case.  Actors have different ideas of what the decision said, and as a 
result prescribe different remedies. This is further compounded by the complex debate 
over potential options for remedying the issue, and their consequences.  The next 
section will provide background on the three main framings of the ECJ. 
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3.7 DIFFERENT FRAMES IN WHICH TO VIEW THE ECJ RULING 
 
At this point, it is useful to distinguish between different actors’ views on the ECJ 
ruling.  Before doing so, it is important to note that the above discussion is somewhat 
simplified.   
It is difficult to find a single authoritative interpretation of the ruling as it is not 
singular, but rather a collection of interrelated judgements.  Due to the fragmented 
nature of the ruling, different actors may emphasise different parts of it depending on 
their interests. Different interpretations may also result intentionally, to make a 
particular argument, or unintentionally due to a genuine misinterpretation.  The 
following section, will address the different ways in which the ECJ ruling can be 
viewed. 
To begin, this thesis makes no claim that this typology exhausts all frames 
through which this ruling can be viewed.  Nor does it claim that these are the exact 
ways in which the actors view the ruling. Rather, it sets out three broad perspectives 
that illustrate the diversity of actors’ perspectives.  Furthermore, it is important to 
clarify that the perceptions and frames of the ruling change over time, particularly as 
actors invest more resources toward uncovering the nuances of the ruling.  Therefore, 
while the views of some actors have remained largely unchanged over the entire 
duration from the judgement in December 2007, others have shifted to differing 
degrees.  To illustrate this, the following section will illustrate three frames that will be 
used in this study: (1) simplified; (2) narrow; and (3) wide. 
The simplified frame is one often utilised by individuals and actors with only 
passing concern, or those who do not possess a large degree of information about the 
issue.  This view can be summarised as follows:  
 
The ECJ ruling states that foreign companies can now come to Sweden and work under 
home conditions. 
 
This frame places focus on the immediate outcome of the ruling.  While not 
exhaustive, does hold some basic explanatory merit, although it is factually incorrect in 
some ways. It does, however, illustrate the immediate effect of the ruling, and has been 
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used by actors such as the media, politicians and political parties, and in public 
discussion.63 
A second frame, narrow, pays greater attention to the specific components of the 
judgements that were made by the ECJ.  This view can be summarised as follows: 
 
The ECJ ruling states that a country cannot use industrial action to prevent social-
dumping (and to keep out low-wage firms).  They are, however, able to use legislated 
minimum wages, or extension of collective agreements (erga-omnes) to combat social-
dumping. 
 
The third frame, wide, reads a broader scope into the ECJ judgement and allows a 
greater degree of room to be made at the national level while still being consistent with 
EC law.  This view can be summarised as follows: 
 
The ECJ ruling states that a country cannot use industrial action, in the same manner as 
during the Laval dispute, to prevent social-dumping (and to keep out low-wage firms). 
There may be room in Article 3.8 of the PWD to find a solution in the autonomous 
collective agreement model. The options of legislated minimum wages, or extension of 
collective agreements (erga-omnes) to combat social-dumping have not been ruled out by 
the ECJ either.  
 
The wide frame, like the narrow frame, views legislated minimum wages and the 
extension of collective agreements as legitimate mechanisms to combat social 
dumping.  It has the view, however, that the Posted Workers Directive allow Sweden to 
find solutions that will impose minimal change on the Swedish model of industrial 
relations. 
Most of the social partners investigated in this thesis employ either a wide or 
narrow frame.  Actors that hold a simplified frame continue to exist: in particular, 
politicians and political parties have utilised this frame when communicating ideas and 
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proposals concerning the Laval ruling to the public, media, and political 
representatives.   
The next section will define the four core options that are found in the 
discussions between the social partners.  Defining these options is necessary in order to 
understand what the social partners want for the labour relations in Sweden. 
 
3.8 DEFINITIONS: LEGISLATED MINIMUM WAGE, ERGA OMNES, 
EXTENSION MODEL, AND STATUS QUO 
 
There are a range of options being considered by actors in Sweden on how to 
respond to the ECJ ruling.  The options available to the social partners and actors within 
the Swedish model are generally restricted to two spheres: first, changes at the 
European level; and second, changes at the national level.  Options for change at the 
European level include defiance of the ECJ ruling and exit from the EU.  Exit from the 
EU, however, has not been advocated by any significant actors.  Other options have had 
some support, although they tend to be marginalised within large actors.  The spectrum 
for change at the European level is outlined below: 
 
(1) defiance of ECJ and exit from the EU; 
(2) re-working of the Posted Workers Directive; or 
(3) linking of the Laval case to the Lisbon treaty ratification. 
 
It is the options for change at the national level, however, that have received the 
greatest attention from the social partners.  The changes proposed on this level are: 
 
(4) legislated minimum wage; 
(4)  erga omnes;  
(5)  extension model; or 
(6) status-quo (liberalisation for foreign workers, and the Swedish model for 
Swedish workers). 
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The term ‘minimum wage’ is widely used and is subject to competing 
interpretations. In addition, there are many institutional mechanisms that can be used to 
achieve minimum conditions.  Of particular concern to this study is that different 
mechanisms have varying degrees of state involvement; this is highly relevant when 
assessing change to the Swedish model.  As discussed earlier in this chapter, the 
‘Swedish model’ of industrial relation has wage setting practices that exclude the state.  
Thus, an increase in state involvement would be a substantial change to the model. 
This section will define the main mechanisms for wage setting, particularly those 
options which have been discussed by the social partners in the context of the Laval 
case.  Four potential mechanisms will be discussed. The first two, legislated minimum 
wage model and the extension of collective agreement model, are outlined in Article 
3(1) of the Posted Workers Directive.  The third category, the Autonomous Collective 
Agreement Model, is the most ambiguous and has attracted the greatest level of debate; 
it draws upon Article 3(8) of the Posted Workers Directive.  The fourth option to be 
outlined is the Status-quo option.  Within each of the four main types, a great deal of 
diversity exists. This section presents a sample of this diversity, however, does not 
claim to comprise an exhaustive list.64  
 
Legislated Minimum Wage 
 
The legislated minimum wage model is in widespread use as a regulatory 
mechanism throughout Anglo-Saxon countries, such as New Zealand, Australia, 
Canada, US, and UK.  However, a great deal of diversity exists between these 
countries, particularly regarding the following: obligations for consultation; review 
periods; and which actors can make recommendations.65 
Typically, in the above countries, legislated minimum wages are a single 
minimum floor.  They do not, however, necessarily take this form. A range of minimum 
wages may exist within a single country depending on factors such as occupation, 
industry, age, region, length of time in a company, and full-time or part-time status. 
                                                 
64
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Three broad methods of wage setting are identified: unilateral government 
decision; government decision in consultation with some or all of the social partners; 
and recommendation to the government from a specialised body.66 
Each method has different ramifications for the level and number of minimum 
wages that may be set in a particular country.  Each of these factors will in turn be 
influenced to a different degree by politicisation (minimum wages as an electoral issue, 
or being subject to lobbying) and the institutional constraints involved in passing new 
legislation. 
The key feature, however, of all legislated minimum wage processes, is that 
minimum standards are set by the government. 67  This may be in the form of changes 
coming directly from the government, or from an appointed committee delegated with 
that responsibility.68 The second option of extending collective agreements typically 
involves even less state involvement, albeit different degrees exist depending on the 
variant used.    
 
Universal Declaration of Collective Agreements or Erga Omnes 
(Allmangiltigförklaring) 
 
Extension procedures for collective agreements can be conceived of in two ways: 
narrow and broad.  The narrow use of universal declaration of collective agreements is 
a common extension practice widely used among EU member states.  This mechanism 
legally makes applicable collective agreements to all employers and employees that do 
not belong to a respective trade union or employers association.69  This generally occurs 
within a single sector, and is useful in countries that have low levels of union coverage. 
A wide variety of procedures exist to extend a collective agreement.  In countries 
such as Austria and Finland, the social partners determine the conditions in a collective 
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 Ibid., 14-15. 
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 The variation in who initiates and approves minimum wages gives an indication of 
the level of state involvement.  Thus, legislated minimum wage setting might have a 
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specialised body.   
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agreement and extension occurs automatically.70  In others, extension may come at the 
request of the social partners.71 In other scenarios, a collective agreement may only be 
extended at the request of the government.72 In many cases countries use a combination 
of the above examples. 
In addition to this there are often minimum criteria that need to be met before a 
collective agreement can be extended, whether automatically or from the initiative of a 
legitimate party.   In other cases, there are no minimum conditions and extension occurs 
automatically.  A common criteria, however, is that the collective agreement to be 
extended needs to be representative within a specific sector.  In  many countries, such 
as Greece and Germany, the collective agreement should cover at least 50% of the 
respective sector prior to extension.73  The most common extension procedure is to a 
particular sector, however, it can also be applied across a geographical region. 
Another nuance with regard to the erga omnes of collective agreements is what 
parts of the collective agreements are extended.  In many examples it is the entire 
collective agreement, but this does not need to be the case.  In the case of Denmark, 
only the areas with specific regard to EU directive are extended.74 Ireland uses an 
approach where the only clauses extended are those that regard minimum wages and 
working conditions.75  This is of relevance to Sweden, and it is likely this type of 
application would be followed rather than a system that extends the whole collective 
agreement. 
Thus, while a degree of diversity exists within the universal declaration of 
collective agreement model, its core features are rather explicit.  It involves extending 
all or part of an existing agreement across a particular sector or region given certain 
criteria are met.   
These variants of both the legislated minimum wage and the universal declaration 
of collective agreement mechanisms are consistent with EC law and are supported by 
Article 3(1) of the Posting of Workers Directive.  Article 3(8) allows for a system that 
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is not explicitly outlined in Article 3(1), so long as the provision of services between 
member states is not impeded.76 
 
Extension Model (Autonomous Collective Agreements) 
 
The definitions of the legislated minimum wage model, and the system of 
universal declaration are clearer than those of the ‘extension model’.  The third group of 
options arise primarily from Article 3(8).  Due to the predominance of universal 
declaration of collective agreement and legislated minimum wages being used 
throughout Europe, this ‘third way’ is less developed and, as a result, there is more 
uncertainty concerning its definition.  It was originally created for the use by countries - 
Denmark, Sweden, and Italy - that did not have either of the first two mechanisms. 
This section will outline two variants of this ‘third way’: the extension model; and 
its subset, the autonomous collective agreement model.  The autonomous collective 
agreement model allocates wage setting to the social partners and excludes the state.  
Thus, it acts as a voluntary system where both sides of labour and capital bargain 
minimum wages which are set out in collective agreements.  This system deviates the 
least from the ‘Swedish Model’ and in some respects, is only making small adjustments 
to ensure compatibility with EC law.   
In the autonomous collective agreement model, trade unions can force firms to 
sign a collective agreement through the threat of industrial action.  This mechanism to 
enforce minimum conditions is important for two reasons.  Firstly, it is working outside 
of legislation to regulate minimum conditions for workers.  The legislated minimum 
wage model and erga omnes principle both use law, and the creation of law on these 
cases lead to a rigidity in what are minimum conditions.  The autonomous collective 
agreement model is more fluid, allowing minimum standards to be ‘flexible’ so long as 
agreement is reached between the employer and employee representatives. 
Secondly, the autonomous collective agreement model does involve the state in 
the wage setting procedure.   The conditions for workers are set purely on the basis of 
negotiation between the social partners.  In other words, the mechanism to enforce 
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minimum standards is not through ‘state’ power; rather it is through the use of 
industrial action by representative groups.   
In order for the autonomous collective agreement model to be compatible with 
EC law, it must also meet a number of other characteristics.77  A trade union, in some 
cases, can force a company to sign a collective agreement.  The criteria for permitting a 
union to do this, however, cannot be based on the nationality of the collective 
agreement.  Trade unions can only make demands concerning minimum rates of pay, 
including overtime rate.78  
In summary, the voluntary and collaborative features of the autonomous 
collective agreement model distinguish it from the first two models.  The next model, 
the status-quo option, also contains some of its features, albeit with important 
differences. 
 
Status-quo 
 
The key distinction between the status-quo model and the autonomous 
collective agreement model is that unions are unable to use industrial action on foreign 
employers who enter Sweden on a foreign collective agreement.  This includes 
situations where minimum standards in the foreign collective are below those generally 
acceptable in Sweden. 
The status-quo option still allocates wage setting to the social partners, at the 
exclusion of the state.  The distinction to the autonomous collective agreement model, 
however, is that wage setting is no longer a ‘monopoly’ between Swedish trade unions 
and employers.  In the status-quo option, wage-setting processes are open to unions in 
all EU countries when concerning posted workers. 
Swedish unions can still force firms to sign a collective agreement when no 
previous agreement is in place.  If a firm has a collective agreement with a foreign trade 
union, however, no industrial action can be taken.  Thus, the status-quo option suggests 
the same wage setting system for domestic workers.  In terms of posted workers, 
however, a very new system of wage setting is introduced that is European wide. 
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Figure 3.1 provides a diagram for what each of the four wage setting models 
would mean for Swedish industrial relations.  It includes a distinction between its 
impact on domestic workers, versus the impact on posted workers. 
 
 
 
 
3.9 CONCLUSION 
 
 
The aim of this chapter has been to provide the necessary contextual information 
and definitions so the remainder of the analysis can be undertaken.  It outlined the 
details of the event and action taken by Swedish trade unions that stopped the firm 
Laval from using posted workers under foreign of collective agreement.   
The dispute was the result of tension between the Swedish model and Swedish 
law on the one hand, and EU employment policy and EC law on the other.  The chapter 
defined the main features of the ‘Swedish model’ to include: strong social partners and 
high levels of unionisation; political parties that do not deal with labour market issues; 
Change 
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wage formation which is decided by the social partners; and the right to strike. The 
parts of Swedish law that underpinned this model were the constitutional right to 
industrial action, Lex Britannia, and the Foreign Posting of Employees Act).  European 
employment policy aimed to co-ordinate labour markets, was legalistic, and had a 
liberal character.  The core aspects of the EC law relevant to the Laval case were found 
in Articles 12, 49, 50, and 234 of the EC Treaty. 
This background provides a framework under which the final European Court of 
Justice ruling can be understood.  The chapter outlined core areas of the ruling.  The 
ECJ ruled that trade unions cannot force foreign companies to sign a collective 
agreement.  Furthermore, Swedish law has not yet fully used all the tools available.  In 
addition, the collective agreements pushed by the trade unions were not sufficiently 
clear and as a result, the demands were unjustifiably made beyond the hard-core of the 
Posting of Worker Directive.  Finally, the court ruled that Lex Britannia discriminated 
on the basis of nationality and did not meet the criteria for the hard core of the Posting 
of Workers Directive to be extended. 
This ruling was not received and interpreted uniformly by all members of the 
Swedish social partners.  Different actors took simplified, narrow, or wide views. The 
distinction between narrow and wide is important as the wide frame sees additional 
options as compatible with EC law.  The narrow interpretation views these options as 
inconsistent with EC law, particular the autonomous model of collective agreements.  
The final part of the chapter defined the options considered important by the social 
partners. 
With this contextual information in place, the next chapter will assess the 
competing tensions within the Swedish model in response to the ECJ ruling.  It will 
look at what different actors (both labour and employers) want for the Swedish model, 
and illustrate the tensions that exist between them.  From here the study will be able to 
determine whether what we observe is change or continuity.  In particular, the study 
will be best able to determine which of the theories of institutional change 
(convergence, punctuated equilibrium, or incremental transformation) best explain the 
dynamics within the Swedish model in response to the ECJ ruling. 
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4 
 
 
Positions Taken by the Social Partners 
 
 
 
The preceding chapter provided the necessary background information in order 
for the remainder of the study to be undertaken.  It outlined the ‘Laval’ dispute and 
assessed the perspectives of Swedish and European law.  The ensuing ECJ ruling was 
defined, as well as the competing frames in which the ruling can be viewed.  In addition 
the previous chapter defined the Swedish model of industrial relations and European 
employment policy. And for the purposes of this chapter, it presented an overview of 
the main positions that have been taken by the Swedish social partners.  
From this starting point, this chapter will now assess the positions of the peak-
level social partners.  These consist of the two main private and public sector employers 
associations: the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise and the Swedish Agency for 
Government Employers (SAGE).  From a labour perspective, this section will discuss 
the positions of the three main trade union organisations: Swedish Trade Union 
Confederation (LO), Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees (TCO), and 
Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations (SACO).  In addition to these peak 
level associations, affiliate members will also be included in the analysis where 
necessary.  To maintain the anonymity of officials, interviewees will be referred to by a 
number and letter as outlined in Table 4.1 below. 
 In response to the ECJ ruling, the social partners have put forth different options 
for changing (or preserving) the Swedish model of industrial relations.  Previous studies 
suggest that there are conflicting view points on these topics.  Furthermore, competing 
explanations exist for how and why the tensions will arise. For example, employers 
could attempt to undermine labour unions, or act alongside the interests of unions to 
promote mutual interests.        
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Table 4.1 Interview Representatives and Organisations 
Representative Peak-level organisation Affiliate Organisation 
Official 1A • Confederation of Swedish 
Enterprise 
 
Official 1B  • The Association of the 
Swedish Engineering 
Industries 
(Teknikföretagen) 
Official 1C 
 
• Electrical Installer 
Organization (EIO) 
Official 2A • Swedish Agency for 
Government Employers 
(SAGE) 
 
Official 3A 
 
• Swedish Trade Union 
Confederation (LO) 
 
Official 3B 
 
 • Trade Union of 
Commercial Employees 
(Handels) 
Official 4A 
 
• Swedish Confederation of 
Professional Employees 
(TCO) 
 
Official 5A 
 
• Swedish Confederation for 
Professional Associations 
(SACO) 
 
 
 
This chapter will take a four fold approach and assess the views of the social 
partners on the main options: the legislated minimum wage model, the erga omnes 
model, the extension model (autonomous collective agreement), and the status-quo 
option.  These competing options will affect the Swedish model in different ways and 
indicate what type of change is expected.  As the previous chapter outlined the criteria 
for change, this section will illuminate the pressures for change within the model. 
To begin, this chapter will briefly discuss the nature of the positions of the social 
partners, in particular how they have evolved over the course of events.  Second, it will 
assess the legislated minimum wage option. This is the only model of the four not to be 
included in the Claes Stråth investigation.  It will look at the competing arguments for 
and against a minimum wage.  Third, this chapter will look at arguments for and against 
the erga omnes model, which is perhaps the most ‘European’ of all the options 
available.  The fourth section of the chapter will discuss the views on the autonomous 
collective agreement model. This is the most widely agreed upon model, but it also the 
most controversial: particularly as to whether this option is actually possible, and 
whether it can be kept consistent with European law.  The final section will discuss the 
status-quo option.  
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4.1 THE CHANGING NATURE OF POSITIONS 
 
The positions of the social partners have changed over time, particularly as actors 
have developed their understanding of the ruling and its consequences. At the beginning 
of this research in March 2008, some of the organisations investigated did not hold an 
official position on how the Swedish model should change in response to the ECJ 
ruling.  In addition, the positions of organisations that had made a decision were rather 
tentative, and did not hold a large degree of complexity. 
By October 2008, the situation was slightly different.  More social partners had 
publicised their official positions, and the existing positions had become more complex 
and in some cases altered.  October 2008 was by no means the endpoint for the 
development of such viewpoints.  Swedish Enterprise, the largest employers 
association, had still not taken any official position.  Similarly, knowledge about the 
effects of the ECJ ruling was still developing.  As a result, the positions below provide 
a ‘snapshot’ of views at a particular point in time.   
 
4.2 LEGISLATED MINIMUM WAGE 
 
The first option to be assessed is the model which sets minimum wages through 
legislation.  As discussed in Section 3.7, the legislated minimum wage option represents 
the largest deviation from the Swedish model, and its implementation would provide an 
indication of ‘significant’ change to Swedish industrial relations.  It is also perhaps the 
most contested position found between the various social partners.  This difficulty is 
further exacerbated by its exclusion as an option in the Claes Stråth investigation.  As a 
result, only one social actor advocates this model, and it is not a peak level 
organisation.          
An interesting feature of legislated minimum wage model is that there is no peak-
level organisation supporting its implementation as its first preferred option.  This, 
however, cannot validate the preliminary conclusion that no support for it exists.  An 
important matter is that the main peak level organisation of the private sector 
employers, Swedish Enterprise, does not hold an official position.  The organisation 
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suggests, however, that the legislated minimum wage option does have some degree of 
merit.1 
In addition to this, Swedish Enterprise’s largest and most influential affiliate 
organisation, the Association of Swedish Engineering Industries (Teknikföretagen), has 
explicitly stated that the legislated minimum wage option is the best model.2  According 
to Teknikföretagen, it is the best way to maintain the Swedish model.  This may suggest 
this option is a ‘de-facto’ position of the peak level organisation, or that a fault line 
exists within the peak level organisation. 
While Swedish Enterprise withholds an official position, its comments about the 
merits of the legislative minimum wage indicate that Swedish Enterprise may see it as a 
potential system to regulate the Swedish model of industrial relations.3  Official 1A of 
Swedish Enterprise, who views the ECJ judgment in the ‘narrow sense’, argued that a 
legislated minimum wage is one of only two methods which are compatible with ECJ 
law (the other being the universal declaration of collective agreements).4  He did, 
however, suggest that the legislated minimum wage option has pros and cons, and that 
the confederation had not ‘put its foot down’.5  Official 1A suggested that ongoing 
discussions with the affiliate organisations had not yet reached any conclusion.  In the 
words of the representative official of Swedish Enterprise: 
 
We tried in 2005 to solve the question, but at that time we thought the Laval ruling would 
be against us, so we did not come to a final point.  And with the new ruling in the Laval, 
it has opened up the debate.  But we are not ready, and frankly we are not in a hurry.6 
 
In other words, the preliminary ruling by the Swedish Labour Court in 2005 led 
to a cessation of discussion about the issue.  With the new ECJ ruling (which is 
perceived to be consistent with the interests of Swedish Enterprise) the discussion can 
be resumed.   
Thus, without Swedish Enterprise making public any open position, there is 
relatively little official pressure for the implementation of a legislated minimum wage.  
                                                 
1
 Official 1A, "Interview,"  (Confederation of Swedish Enterprise, 2008, October 15). 
2
 Association of Swedish Engineering Industries [Teknikföretagen], "The Swedish Model after 
Vaxholm,"  (2008). 
3
 1A, "Interview." 
4
 Ibid. 
5
 Ibid. 
6
 Ibid. 
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In the current debate this option has been marginalised by all, except for a small, albeit 
influential affiliate organisation.  Importantly, no labour organisations were in favour 
of this option.  Opposition to the legislated minimum wage from both employers and 
labour diminishes the likelihood of this type of change.                 
Despite the popularity of legislative minimum wage setting mechanisms 
throughout Europe, the social partners in Sweden viewed the option with a large degree 
of scepticism.  For both employers and labour, the implementation of a legislated 
minimum wage was seen to pose challenges to the Swedish model on a number of 
different levels in spite of any possible benefits.  This following section will discuss the 
arguments against a legislated minimum wage.  It will illustrate that four main 
arguments were used by the social partners: (1) fear of politicisation; (2) cartel 
preservation; (3) downward pressure on wages; and (4) wider system interests and 
societal issues. 
 
Fear of Politicisation 
 
Despite the ‘conventional wisdom’, public sector employers resisted the 
minimum wage option at hand.  The concern of politicisation of the wage setting 
process was strong despite the variety of minimum wage fixing procedures which are 
available.7  Swedish Enterprise, despite not having an ‘official position’, saw the issue 
of politicisation as a drawback to the legislated minimum wage model.  According to 
Official 1A: 
 
It is easy before an election to say vote for us and you will get 10,000 crowns, or you 
vote for us and you get 11, 000 crowns.  That is not good.8 
 
In other words Official 1A believes that a legislated minimum wage may mean 
that in elections, political parties will use wages as an incentive to entice prospective 
voters.  
                                                 
7
 See the following for an in depth overview of the range of options:  Franc ̧ois Eyraud, The 
Fundamentals of Minimum Wage Fixing (Geneva : International Labour Office, 2005), 1-27. 
8
 1A, "Interview." 
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Similarly, the representative of the public sector employers held strong 
reservations for the legislated minimum wage option.  This fear of politicisation is also 
a view which is held by the Swedish Agency for Government Employers.  In the words 
of Official 2A: 
 
We, however, feel there is a danger for legislated minimum wages as it is very appealing 
for politicians to use minimum wages during election periods.  In other words there will 
be a political influence on wages.9 
 
Even in a situation where there is a baseline legislative minimum wage alongside 
collective agreements, SAGE held the view that the risk of politicisation was still 
strong.10  It argued that while the process of increasing wages on the political side 
would be the same, there would be a difference in the degree to which this would 
occur.11 
These statements give insight to the interests of employers and whether they are a 
coherent group or a group with sharp internal divisions.  In this case, the private and 
public sector employers preferred stability over the prospect of lower wages.  This 
suggests that downward pressure on wages is not as important for Swedish employers 
as it is for employers in other LME’s. 
There is further evidence of agreement between labour union officials and 
employer groups.  Official 1A of the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise supported 
the critique offered by trade union organisations.  He believes the trade unions are 
correct when they argue that Sweden is not used to leaving wage setting to politicians.12  
This absence of this tradition means that politicians lack the experience and knowledge 
needed to deal with this issue effectively.  Because of this,  the ‘capturing’ and 
‘exploitation’ of government discretion in wage setting as an election campaign tool 
was believed to be a particular risk for Sweden especially in an environment where the 
state has little experience in this area of industrial relations.  While politicisation is a 
risk identified by both employers and labour organisations, it was the employers who 
                                                 
9
 Official 2A, "Interview  "  (Swedish Agency for Government Employers [SAGE], 2008, 
October 14). 
10
 Ibid. 
11
 Ibid. 
12
 1A, "Interview." 
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identified it as the most significant drawback of the model.  In addition to the fear of 
politicisation, the desire to preserve a cartel amongst the social partners in wage setting 
resulted in antagonism toward the legislated minimum wage model. 
 
Cartel preservation 
 
Cartel preservation was a strong imperative for the social partners.  They 
expressed a desire to keep the state out of wage setting procedures as a bi-partite 
arrangement between labour organisations and employers association would maximise 
the influence of each party.  Third party interference by the state would only serve to 
dilute their autonomy.  In an interview with Official 2A from the Swedish Agency for 
Government Employers, it was stated that: ‘we want to keep the state out.  This is very 
strange as we are also part of the state.’13 These sentiments were further mirrored in an 
interview with Official 3A the Swedish Trade Union Confederation.  In the words of 
the interviewee: 
 
Our primary function is to set the price of labour and we do it together with those that 
buy labour, and together we negotiate the price.  And we don’t want a third actor, the 
state.14 
 
In other words, the social partners share a large imperative to maintain their 
autonomy in wage setting.  This is consistent with Swenson’s (2002) notion of social 
partners in the solidaristic model behaving like a cartel in order to protect their 
interests.15  The legislated minimum wage is perceived to infringe upon this bi-partite 
arrangement which best serves the social partners.    Furthermore, the legislated 
minimum wage model would infringe upon the ability to set wages at a local level. 
Local wages were identified to be of high importance to the social partners. The 
bi-partite model is seen as an effective way to ensure that where possible, wages are set 
locally.  SACO argued that legislated minimum wages would disturb the local nature of 
the wage setting process.  Depending on the parties involved, the current system allows 
                                                 
13
 2A, "Interview  ". 
14
 Official 3A, "Interview,"  (Swedish Trade Union Confederation [LO], 2008, October 15). 
15
 Peter A. Swenson, Capitalists against Markets : The Making of Labor Markets and Welfare 
States in the United States and Sweden (New York : Oxford University Press, 2002). 
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wages to be flexible which is important to the organisation.  According to SACO 
Official 5A, the collective agreements to which its member affiliates are associated 
mainly have a policy of individual pay and not fixed numbers.16  Thus, collective 
agreements typically do not involve numbers, especially when they concern 
professional associations.17  This is in contrast to collective agreements concerning 
‘blue-collar’ workers which often do have precise values in their agreements.  
According to Official 5A: 
 
Where possible it [wages] should be local and individually agreed and therefore 
minimum wages could have an impact.  We don’t like to fix wages, it is against our 
policy.  If an affiliate organisation wants to have a posting in a situation where this is 
concerned we could probably say that we don’t want to have individual pay, but that is up 
to the affiliate to decide. 18 
 
In other words, professional associations prefer wage guidelines compared to 
rigid ‘numerical’ values as it allows for greater flexibility. 
In addition, SAGE supports the perspective that where possible, wages should be 
locally set.  According to Official 2A: 
 
Our collective agreements are very modern, and you can’t see anything about minimum 
wages.  You will see wages set on local level.  We are not interested in legislated 
minimum wages, this is very important to us.19 
 
In addition to infringing on social partner and local autonomy legislated 
minimum wage were believed to provide a downward pressure on wages. 
Overall, the loss of the wage-setting cartel implies a loss of control.  Most of the 
social partners believe they are able to determine a better and more stable model, rather 
than preferring short-term incentives offered by ‘politicised’ wages.  This suggests 
there are shared interests between the sides of labour and employers that the state could 
potentially undermine. 
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 Official 5A, "Interview,"  (Confederation of Professional Associations [SACO], 2008, 21 
October). 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 Ibid. 
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 2A, "Interview  ". 
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Downward Pressure on Wages 
 
The possibility of a downward pressure on wages is considered by some to be the 
primary reason for labour organisations resisting a legislated minimum wage.  The 
downward pressure on wages caused by legislated minimum wages was seen as 
especially harmful to the interests of blue-collar workers.  Official 3A of the LO 
viewed the impact of minimum wages in the context of class interest.  In his view, the 
primary objective of the employers was to buy labour as cheaply as possible.20  In the 
words of an LO official: 
 
Experience shows that if you have a legislated minimum wage set by the state it will be 
much lower than if set in an autonomous system.  This is because it has to fit across all 
companies, across all regions, across all sectors and branches.  So it won’t be the highest 
common denominator but rather the lowest common denominator.  So that’s why you see 
such large differences between paid wages (outgoing wages) and legislated minimum 
wages, and that’s why we don’t want this for any reason.21 
 
In other words, legislated minimum wages often fall to the lowest level accepted 
by the range of actors.  This is due to government constraints in determining broad 
‘blanket’ levels for the entire labour market. 
Further ‘alliances’ are identified between labour and employers.  An area of 
accord found between trade unions and Swedish Enterprise was the effect that 
legislation has on the minimum level wages.  According to Official 1A, Swedish 
Enterprise believes that having a legislated minimum wage will mean that outgoing 
wages will be lower than what has previously been set through collective agreements.22  
This is due to the difference between the broad nature of wage setting at the state level 
and the flexible and tailored nature of wage setting found in collective agreements that 
result from negotiation between the social partners.  In the words of Official 1A of 
Swedish Enterprise: 
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 3A, "Interview." 
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 1A, "Interview." 
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The politicians will have to take in to consideration the whole of the labour market, as 
well as those low paid employees.  I don’t think they will have the guts to put it at an 
especially high level.23 
 
An issue to take into account, however, is whether lower wages are desirable for 
the respective organisation.  The solidaristic model, which underpins Swedish 
industrial relations, removes wages as a variable for competition between firms.  
Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 3, the solidaristic model encourages higher firm 
investment in individual workers to increase levels of productivity.  This is in contrast 
to the segmentalist model, as found in the US, where worker investment is largely the 
responsibility of the individual.24  This suggests that low wages are not necessarily of 
importance to private sector employers Sweden and is the result of a particular labour 
market structure.   
 
Systemic and societal issues 
 
The fourth area to be addressed is the systemic and societal reasons the social 
partners may have for opposing a legislated minimum wage.  One critique of the 
legislative minimum wage method is that the price of labour is incorrect. According the 
Official 3A of the LO: 
 
The core concern is that the price on labour would be wrong, and this will have negative 
consequences on the economy as a whole.  And it would not be good for our members as 
it would be a negative push on wages.25 
 
In other words, this model would have poor results for the overall economy.   
Support is identified for the founding values underlying the Swedish model.  
Another argument against legislation in wages draws upon a broader ‘vision’ for 
Swedish society.  A particular concern is the effect of a legislated minimum wage on 
levels of wage disparities.  In an interview an official of the LO stated: 
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So it would not only be a technical change, but Sweden will become more like the US.  
Such as greater wage disparities.  It depends on what type of society you want.26 
 
This highlights broader societal interests as a driver behind standpoints toward 
changes in the Swedish model. 
Protection of the system as a whole, rather than direct individual interests, was 
further identified as a motive for opposing a legislated minimum wage.  There are some 
organisations, such as SACO, that believe the effect of legislated minimum wage will 
be minimal for their respective organisation and affiliates.  However, their concern for 
the system as a whole, and those unions which will be affected, consolidated their 
stance against the implementation of a legislated minimum wage. 
SACO seeks to protect its class interests by rejecting a legislated minimum wage.  
An example of this is the Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations.  
According to Official 5A, it is actually quite difficult to determine what the effects of a 
minimum wage will be on each respective labour organisation.  This is because it is 
unlikely that there will be just one minimum wage.  Rather, wages are likely to set 
according to a number of different criteria and vary depending on the type of work and 
profession.27 Despite this, Official 5A believes that it is possible that the effect of a 
legislated minimum wage would be less detrimental for professional associations than 
the blue-collar unions.28  This is because their member affiliates, as academics, often 
have quite high wages.  As the minimum wages in legislation are likely to be quite low, 
there would be a large gap between the legislated minimum wage and the existing 
wages for their members.29  This gap, argued Official 5A, would provide a buffer for 
the affiliates whom her organisation represents. 
This suggests that SACO is against legislated minimum wages not out of self 
interest but rather in the interest in maintaining the system as an entirety. 
The above examination of the social partner’s positions on the legislated 
minimum wage option adds some important findings for this study.  As outlined in 
Chapter 3.6, a push toward a legislated minimum wage would indicate change to the 
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Swedish model.  Strong pressure toward this would provide an indication of a move to 
a more European style of industrial relations; this is because the majority of EU 
member states use legislated minimum wages in some form or another in the regulation 
of their labour market.  Only Denmark and Sweden retain a model that keeps the state 
out of wage setting procedures.   
Our examination shows that there is little support for a shift to legislated 
minimum wages.  The support is from a single voice – the engineering employers 
association - and there is little support from any other parties.  This suggests that the 
Swedish model is unlikely to undergo a substantial shift to the legislated minimum 
wage model. 
 
4.3 UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS (ERGA 
OMNES) 
 
The method of ‘universal declaration of collective agreements’, or ‘erga omnes’, 
is viewed as a milder alternative to legislated minimum wages.  Despite this, significant 
criticisms have been voiced against its potential ill effects upon the Swedish model.  In 
addition, no peak-level organisation holds this position as its preferred option, although 
the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise has not yet taken a position. This section will 
outline the arguments for and against the ‘erga omnes’ model.  It will illustrate four 
core arguments from the social partners: (1) negative consequences for union 
membership; (2) the need to protect the wider system; (3) restrictions on that this model 
may have on the freedom of the social partners; and (4) the lack of an appropriate 
mechanism for determining which collective agreement is to be extended.      
To begin, the perceived negative consequences for union membership will be 
discussed.  One critique of the erga omnes model is that it would reduce union 
membership rates.  This largely stems from the assumption that an existing collective 
agreement will be extended across a sector or industry.  There is little incentive for 
individuals to stay in a union and continue to pay membership dues as erga omnes 
would result in automatic coverage.  Thus, a ‘free-rider’ issue would be produced as 
individuals may find it in their interests to withdraw from unions.  This is of particular 
concern to the LO.  According to Official 3A of the LO: 
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We don’t want this either. And here it is not so much that the price of labour would be 
distorted because it would be the price we set.  Here it could have negative consequences 
for membership, you may have the free rider problem.30 
 
As union membership rates have fallen in Sweden over recent years, continued 
decline in membership would threaten the future viability of unions in Sweden.31  It is 
not only the unions, however, who oppose ‘erga omnes’ due to the fear that it will hurt 
membership rates and union strength. 
The Swedish Agency for Government Employers held many of the same 
concerns as the LO concerning the effects of erga omnes on the Swedish model of 
industrial relations.  An important distinction is that the concern does not address the 
‘immediate interests’, as government employers would not be directly affected; rather, 
they seek to maintain the wider system.  In the opinion of Official 2A of SAGE, erga 
omnes is best suited to countries with weak unions, where the advantage of this system 
is that if only 10% of individuals belong to unions a collective agreement can be 
extended to cover all employees.32  According to Official 2A: 
 
In Sweden we have high unionization rates (80-90%), but we foresee this system will 
make unions weaker as people will think, why should we be a member of a union and 
pay, despite collective agreement already being application.33   
 
This illustrates that the LO and SAGE are in agreement of the consequences of a 
system of universally declared collective agreements.  The important distinction, 
however, is that SAGE seeks to preserve the current system of strong unions for quite 
different reasons.  According to Official 2A: 
 
we as employers are interested in strong unions in which we can bargain with.  We also 
want unions that are representative and have authority.  We see they will be weakened 
and weak unions are not in our interest.34   
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The core argument presented by the official from SAGE is that strong unions 
(and strong employers associations) are the basis for the Swedish model.  If collective 
agreements are going to be the primary tool of wage setting, it is important to have 
strong partners to bargain with.35 According to Official 2A, ‘that’s the basis of the 
social dialogue’.36 Bargaining with weak counterpart is subsequently harmful.   
The fact that the government employers advocate strong unions, and thus will not 
support an option that weakens them, suggests that they take a holistic approach, to 
labour relationships.  It is not just individual interests which matter, but rather 
collective interest - and the overall well-being of counterpart organisations - that is 
important.   This provides evidence that some social partners want to keep the system 
strong in its entirety. 
The next issue to be addressed is the way in which ‘erga omnes’ infringes upon 
the ‘freedom’ within the Swedish labour market.  In the opinion of Official 5A from the 
Swedish Confederation for Professional Association (SACO) it was important that both 
parties involved in creating the terms and conditions for collective agreements should 
take full responsibility for the agreement.37  ‘Erga omnes’ would change this, making 
collective agreements follow legislation, rather than being the responsibility of the 
bargaining parties.38   Thus, extending collective agreements would restrict the freedom 
of individuals and firms to belong to - or stay outside of - a collective agreement.  It 
would no longer be the decision of the respective trade unions or employers 
associations, but rather the decision of the state.   
The fourth concern raised is the issue of which collective agreements would be 
extended.  This was raised by all of the interviewees but was of particular concern to 
Official 5A of SACO.  A characteristic of the Swedish labour market is that a large 
number of collective agreements exist over the entire labour market.  As currently over 
800 collective agreements are in force, this would create the problem of which single 
agreement to extend.  Choosing only one collective agreement would limit the social 
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partners’ range of choices, and freedom on the labour market would be disturbed.  In 
the words of the official representing SACO: 
 
In Sweden we have a ‘free market’ of collective agreements. It up to the unions to decide 
whether they want to try to get a collective agreement.  Many employers have more than 
one collective agreement.  And if you have this option, the freedom at the labour market 
level will be disturbed.39 
 
In other words, the social partners believe that the universal declaration of 
collective agreement model would hinder their freedom and autonomy. 
 
4.4  EXTENSION MODEL 
 
The debates over the legislated minimum wage model and the system of 
universal declaration are noticeably clearer than those of the ‘extension model’.  As 
discussed in Section 3.8, this may be due to the occurrence of countries, both within 
and outside the EU, having clear examples of these previous systems.  In contrast, the 
extension model has no concrete examples in the EU other than Denmark. The model, 
which was developed recently, made its first appearance in the 1996 Posting of 
Workers Directive.40  The extension model can be identified as the options that are 
possible under Article 3(8) of the Posting of Workers Directive. 
Significant debates have developed over the interpretation of Article 3(8), 
indicating a lack of clarity.  There is also significant division over the desirability of 
applying the extension model to the Swedish model.  There are two competing 
arguments against the extension model.  First, an interpretation in the narrow sense 
views it as being an untried and untested type of ‘erga omnes’.  The extension model 
interpreted in the wide sense (autonomous collective agreements), however, is viewed 
by some parties as inconsistent with EC law.   
Overall, a number of influential parties support the extension model, indicating 
that for them, the benefits outweigh its drawbacks.  A note must be made that in many 
cases this model is defined in the ‘negative’ sense.  In other words, actors often 
                                                 
39
 Ibid. 
40
  
Peak Level Organisation Positions 
 
77
describe all the things they don’t want, and label what is left as this ‘extension model’.  
Reference is often made to Claes Stråth as the enquiry group who will define what the 
‘extension model’ really is.   Some actors, however, have been more successful in 
clearly stating what it is and why it would be the best solution for the ECJ Laval ruling.        
An initial problem identified with the extension model is its lack of clarity. This 
lack of clarity is the result of the hurried way in which it was included in the Posting of 
Workers Directive.  As a result, EU countries have been reluctant to use this model.  
According to Official 1B of Teknikföretagen:   
 
It was created in the very last minutes of the negotiations concerning the directive.  Those 
taking part in the discussion were not labour law experts.  None of the member countries 
in the EU have used it, and the main reason for not using it is because it is legally 
unclear.41  None of the legal experts in Swedish universities (myself included) can 
understand the text directive when it comes to the extension model. 42  
 
This extension model was created as a fog to be able to get this through the two countries 
that did not have either of those: and there are only two Denmark or Sweden.  All of the 
others have one of those two, or a combination of both.43 
 
Some social partners consider the status of the extension model to be unclear.  
Those, such as the LO and TCO, however, believe that with time and the efforts of the 
Claes Stråth investigation, confusion will by resolved and a viable and successful 
solution will be reached.  This view is not, however, shared by Swedish Enterprise or 
Teknikföretagen.  According to these actors, the lack of clarity raises serious legal 
issues, which are likely to be harmful to the Swedish model.   
A core critique of the extension model is that it is just a type of ‘erga omnes’ in 
disguise.  In particular, it holds many of the drawbacks of the erga omnes system 
without any obvious benefits.  In the opinion of Official 1B of Teknikföretagen, an 
analysis of the Posted Workers Directive indicates that only two legal options exist: 
 
                                                 
41
 Official 1B, "Interview,"  (The Association of Swedish Engineering Industries 
[Teknikföretagen], 2008, October 30). 
42
 Ibid. 
43
 Ibid. 
Peak Level Organisation Positions 
 
78
My conclusion is if you analyse the PWD, there are only two legal options: by law, or by 
collective agreement that has been declared clearly and obviously by the member state 
universally applicable legislated minimum wages or erga omnes.44 
 
This viewpoint is shared by the peak level employers association for private 
sector employers, Swedish Enterprise.  According to Official 1A of Swedish Enterprise 
‘you can say there are two ways, by legislated minimum wage and by collective 
agreement.’45 
Official 1A presented a stronger argument that this ‘third’ option is just another 
form of erga omnes: 
 
The LO does not want to acknowledge that it is erga omnes. They do not want to 
acknowledge that the obligations according to the PWD is on the members states.  The 
member states cannot delegate to parties to regulate this on an ad hoc basis.  They can use 
regulation that the social partners have mapped. Declaring this regulation generally 
applicable either through a traditional erga omnes, or some variation that must then meet 
those criteria. 46 
 
In sum, Swedish Enterprise argues that the only way that this model could be 
implemented to be consistent with EC law is by replicating the erga omnes model.   
 
Inconsistent with EC law 
 
A major problem, however, is that the extension model is inconsistent with 
European law particularly if viewed in the ‘wide sense’ of the autonomous collective 
agreement model.  The extension model has been only used by one other country 
within the European Union, that being Denmark.  Both Swedish Enterprise and 
Teknikföretagen believe, however, that there are serious problems with the model that 
has been used by Denmark.  According to Official 1B of Teknikföretagen: 
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Denmark has used what they think is some variation of the extension model, but if you 
talk to those behind the scenes who are involved in the negotiations (on the employers 
side anyway), they are convinced that the implementation model from Denmark is not in 
line with EU law.47 
 
This shortcoming of the extension model in Denmark is also identified by 
Official 1A of Swedish Enterprise: 
 
For example the Danish model, in my opinion, is not in accordance with EU legislation.  
The Danish are tired of the question, they want legislation so they can put the issue 
behind them.  They don’t mind waiting ten or so years until the ECJ says that we are 
wrong. They can live with that. 
 
Thus, according to Official 1A of Swedish Enterprise, the Danish application of 
the extension model is likely to come under ECJ scrutiny in future years. These 
opinions suggest that Swedish Enterprise clearly views the ECJ Laval ruling in the 
‘narrow’ sense.  This is further confirmed by Official 1A in the statement that the 
direction of the Claes Stråth investigation ‘raises many legal questions with regard to 
European legislation.’48  It is believed that the Claes Stråth investigation is likely to 
deliver a decision that is not in accordance with European Law.49  While private sector 
employers have made legal criticisms, additional problems have been identified with 
the extension model. 
 
Transparency 
 
The lack of transparency is a significant shortcoming of the extension model 
from the perspective of by both Swedish Enterprise and Teknikföretagen.  Particularly, 
there is some reservation over whether it is possible to make existing collective 
agreements as transparent as required by the ECJ.  Official 1B of Teknikföretagen 
stated: 
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Peak Level Organisation Positions 
 
80
A serious legal evaluation of the extension model [is needed], if it will meet the criteria 
of being transparent and legally binding.50 
 
This critique is backed by Swedish Enterprise, suggesting widespread support 
across the private sector employers.51  Official 1A of Swedish Enterprise expects there 
to be significant problems if the extension model is projected on to the current system 
of collective agreements.  He notes that many collective agreements do not set a 
minimum wage.52  Thus, to follow the extension model will require those collective 
agreements to be changed or renegotiated to include a minimum wage.53  
Official 1A also believed that the extension model would have an upward 
influence on wages: 
 
From my point of view, one risk is that the minimum pay level will be rather high [it will 
force wages up]. 
 
And that has an impact on all wage levels above.  It will push them upwards.  There are 
studies that show this.  And there are also studies that also show that if you have a high 
minimum wage which exclude youth, there are some disadvantages to that model.54 
 
Thus, this suggests that although low wages are not necessarily a sticking point 
for Swedish Enterprise, overly high wages are not conducive for the interests of the 
organisation.   
In summary, Swedish Enterprise and Teknikföretagen were very critical of the 
extension model. In their opinion, the extension model is unclear due to the hasty way 
in which it was incorporated into the Posting of Workers Directive.  It also makes it 
difficult to achieve transparency, and according to Swedish Enterprise, may push 
wages upward.  The other two critiques, however, appear to be explicitly linked to the 
framing of the ECJ ruling.  Both Swedish Enterprise and Teknikföretagen viewed the 
extension model as just another form of erga omnes.  Second, it was argued that it is 
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highly likely that it would result in a similar model as the Danish model, which is 
expected to be inconsistent with EC law.   
Despite these strong reservations from both Swedish Enterprise and 
Teknikföretagen, the majority of the actors within the Swedish model considered the 
extension model to be the best way to protect the Swedish model from the effects of the 
ECJ ruling.  
The Swedish Agency for Government Employers (SAGE) has clearly stated that 
the extension model is its preferred option.55  But like the other employers association, 
it gave no clear definition of the model.  Rather, it appears that SAGE prefers it 
because it rejects the two other options available: the legislated minimum wage, and 
erga omnes.  According to Official 2A: 
 
This third way [extension model] is very interesting to us.  It is very difficult to say 
exactly what it is but the Swedish investigation has an idea of the model which can be 
applied.  This is the model we advocate.56   
 
SAGE has stated that it does not want legislated minimum wages or erga omnes, 
and this narrows the scope of available options.  As the Claes Stråth investigation is 
confident that it can provide a third solution, SAGE trusts that the extension model will 
provide the best outcome. 
 
Autonomous Collective Agreements 
 
The autonomous collective agreements option – part of the extension model - has 
been the ‘redeeming’ option for many of the social partners.  Particularly from the side 
of labour, autonomous collective agreements are believed to have the smallest impact 
on the Swedish model of industrial relation out of the four options.  While this may be 
the case, the social partners who advocate this position are not entirely explicit about 
how this option will work in practice.  Those that advocate this model do so because 
they do not support legislated minimum wages or erga omnes.  There is room in the 
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PWD in Article 3.8 to do something else, and Claes Strath agrees that this option is 
possible.   
The method of autonomous collective agreements has attracted a lot of attention 
from the social partners.  In essence, it causes the least amount of change to the current 
industrial relations system, and this suggests why the option is viewed so favourably.  
Official 5A stated that SACO advocated the autonomous collective agreements 
model.57  This is based on their desire for minimal change to the Swedish model, as 
only subtle changes in legislation are believed to be needed.  Official 3A of LO and 
Official 4A of TCO put forth joint statements.  Because the autonomous collective 
agreement is a viable option, ‘it is the best solution to the current problem’.58 
Each of these interpretations are based on a ‘broad’ reading of the ECJ ruling.  
According to Official 5A, SACO believes that it is not necessary to implement a 
legislated minimum wage or erga omnes because the PWD does not prohibit other 
systems, it only ensures the free movement of services.59  Thus, the best option is to 
preserve the current system with some slight alterations to ensure compatibility with 
EC law.60 
According to Official 3A from the LO, and Official 4A from TCO, two primary 
changes need to be made to the Swedish model for the autonomous collective 
agreement to be consistent with the ECJ Laval ruling.  These are: first, the legal 
framework for the autonomous collective agreement model needs to work properly; 
and second, the area of ‘large work’ needs to be addressed.61  These measures are 
supported by SACO. 62 
Official 3A argued that the following changes were needed to consolidate the 
legal framework:  change Lex Brittania; determine what collective agreements can 
require in terms of work conditions; and clarify for foreign companies the associated 
labour costs of undertaking work in Sweden. 
The second major change is in the area of ‘large work’.  This relates to changing 
the collective agreements that are currently used by the social partners.  In particular, it 
means ensuring that collective agreements applied to foreign undertakings are 
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transparent.63  Official 3A stated that the current lack of transparency is due to the way 
collective agreements have developed over time. 64 They have grown from over 120 
years of negotiations and express the power balance between labour and capital.65 
Official 5A agrees that a significant amount of work is required to ensure that 
collective agreements are transparent.  According to Official 5A of SACO: 
 
The judgement states [that] you need transparency and clear and defined condition.  
Perhaps that needs to be said in legislation but you don’t have to say in the legislation 
which collective agreements will be applied to foreign companies.66 
 
According to Official 3A, the LO views the autonomous collective agreement 
option as the most viable course of action.67  This model is not without problems, 
however, but it sees it as superior to the legislated minimum wage and the erga omnes 
option.  According to Official 3A, transparency will be difficult to establish in some 
areas, but can be achieved.   
Within the blue-collar areas (and the related unions), there will not be a great 
deal of work required in order to make collective agreements more transparent.  The 
white-collar unions, however, may face greater challenges.  This is because within their 
collective agreements, numbers and figures are generally not found. Instead, such 
agreements tend to include a set of principles on how to set wages.68 
The issue of posted workers is not as pressing for white-collar unions as for blue-
collar unions in areas such as construction.  As a result, there may not be a need to 
make the collective agreements in these areas significantly more transparent.  
According to Official 3A of LO: 
 
Introducing transparency for collective agreement means quite a lot, and if you don’t 
have the problem of posted workers you should not go through the process.  So I think 
you will have a lot of disobedience in a lot of branches and sectors as a consequence.69 
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If the sectors where posted workers are sent change significantly in the next 
future years, there may be a need to make the collective agreements for white-collar 
workers more transparent.70 
In summary, LO, TCO and SACO believe the autonomous collective agreement 
model is the best way to safeguard the Swedish model.  These social partners all 
believe there is room in Article 3.8 to do this. 
 
4.5 STATUS-QUO 
 
This option has been surprisingly popular with many of the social partners, 
although no actor has officially placed it as their preferred option.  In some respects, 
many groups see this option as changing the Swedish model very little, assuming that 
the Swedish model will still hold for Swedish workers.  The distinguishing feature of 
the model is that foreign employers are able to enter Sweden on the conditions of a 
home collective agreement, and unions are unable to take industrial action to improve 
the conditions for those foreign workers.71 
Because the Laval ruling affects the different sectors to varying degrees, some 
social partners have shown indifference to this option.  As such, many of the social 
partners have experienced little direct impact from the Laval ECJ ruling.  Swedish 
Enterprise has not expressed an official position, however, they identify both 
advantages and disadvantages to this method.   
Several of the peak level social partners have the view that the status-quo option 
will not particularly harm their organisation.  Discussion with these actors suggests that 
the direct effects of the ECJ Laval ruling will have the largest impact on blue-collar 
organisations, particularly those belonging to the LO.  The Swedish Agency for 
Government Employers (SAGE) has stated that this ruling does not have a significant 
effect on government employers because state employers are insulated from the issue 
of posted workers.  In the words of Official 2A of SAGE: 
 
This is interesting that you mention this option as we have talked about this.  It would be 
okay for us, because we don’t have any problems with the Laval case.  But for those 
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organizations that really need a collective agreement with a foreign company this could 
be a problem.  But we have tested this idea but it means that the unions have no legal 
right to take industrial action.  This other option [extension model], however, gives 
unions the right to industrial action.72 
 
The same perspective was found in the Swedish Confederation of Professional 
Associations (SACO).  The university trained professional employees that they 
represent are not usually subject to low wage competition from low income countries.  
Official 5A from SACO gave an indication of some of the diversity that exists within 
the organisation: 
 
An example is the health area [particularly doctors]: they don’t have a great problem, 
because in this sector they are dominant as a union and have high wage levels.  When 
foreign doctors come to Sweden they do not have low wages, and often have higher 
wages.  This is an example where it is not a problem for them.  They perhaps are not 
worried. 
 
Then you have other unions where you see their freedom being constrained.  But when 
looking at solutions there is no conflict.  Engineers, that would be one area.  Engineers 
also appear in different branches, it may be building construction, it could be 
telecommunications, so in their market there are different branches, and it is more 
unpredictable because their members work in different branches and there could be more 
risk.73 
 
In other words, in areas such as health, Swedish workers are generally paid less 
than the foreign competitors.74 This is due to the compressed nature of wages in the 
Swedish model of industrial relations.  In other areas, such as engineering, that may be 
spread over a number of sectors and thus covered by more than one peak-level union 
umbrella organization, professional workers may be exposed to greater low-wage 
competition.  In aggregate, however, the issue of posted workers is not critical for 
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SACO and subsequently the status-quo option would not hurt the organization and its 
members.75 
Despite the compatibility with the status-quo option, neither of these 
organizations held it as their preferred option in the Laval discussions.  On the contrary, 
SACO and SAGE preferred other models as this may harm other unions in the Swedish 
model.  In the words of Official 2A of SAGE: 
 
I would say that we are interested in good relations with the unions.  But we also have 
our own unions, and those unions affected by the Laval ruling do not belong to us.  But 
we do not want to upset the unions.  If they were our unions we would perhaps be much 
more careful, but they are not our unions. 
 
I must handle things in a way so as to maintain good relations with other employers 
associations.  Because we cooperate with the private employers associations and I can’t 
act in a way that makes life harder for them.76 
 
In other words, government employers did not wish to act in a way that would 
harm other unions, even those with whom they were not directly affiliated.  This 
suggests a strong incentive to protect the overall model and promote a position where 
common ground can be found.   
The same behaviour was identified in the professional union representative, 
although this was more expected if assessed from a class-centred analysis because 
SACO is a labour representative.  Official 5A similarly stated that the status-quo option 
was not the organisation’s official position, and instead it sought a more collaborative 
approach.  According to Official 5A: 
 
We work together, we meet almost every week.  We cooperate, but then the reality looks 
a bit different and we don’t always have the same position.  We think, however, that we 
cooperate well and we have to respect our different realities but we don’t always have the 
same opinion.  But we have the same position that we want to find a solution which fits 
within the model of [autonomous] collective agreements.77 
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According to Official 5A it is important for SACO to work in a manner that 
promotes the greatest degree of consensus.  Other social partners were against the 
status-quo option because it harmed their interests directly.  There is evidence to 
suggest, however, that SAGE and SACO would not act in a way that would harm the 
interests of the broad array of social partners. 
 
4.6 CONCLUSION  
 
The above findings illustrate the debates and pressures within the Swedish model 
in response to the Laval ECJ ruling. These positions are illustrated in Table 4.1. In the 
context of the four options assessed above, the strongest response appeared to be in 
favour of the extension model and, in particular, its subset the autonomous collective 
agreement model.  This option would represent the least change to the Swedish model 
in response to European integration.  However, this ‘most favoured’ solution is not 
uncontested. 
The legislated minimum wage option was the model that would represent the 
most significant change to the ‘Swedish model’ outlined in Section 3.6.  Interestingly, 
all peak level organisations saw significant problems with this option.  While this 
model is used extensively throughout the European Union and the rest of the world, it 
was seen to pose a significant challenge to the Swedish model.  Problems identified by 
the social partners included a unanimous fear of politicisation, and of the removal of 
the monopoly that the social partners hold on both sides of labour and capital.  A 
concern to the peak level organisations (Swedish Enterprise, SAGE, LO, TCO, and 
SACO) was the negative consequence of state involvement in wage setting. In addition, 
some social partners saw downward pressure on wages and wider systemic issues as 
potential drawbacks. As a consequence, no peak level organisation held legislated 
minimum wages as their official position.  The main supporter of this option was the 
Swedish Enterprise affiliate Teknikföretagen.  Swedish Enterprise, while identifying 
some merit alongside concerns was, however, unable to articulate any formal position.  
This subsequently weakened the already marginalised support for significant change to 
the Swedish industrial relations through a legislated minimum wage. 
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Table 4.1 Positions of Social Partners 
 Organisation Legislated 
Minimum 
Wage 
Universal 
Declaration of 
Collective 
Agreements 
(Erga Omnes) 
Extension 
Model 
(Autonomous 
Collective 
Agreement 
Model) 
Status-
quo 
model 
Employer  
Associations 
Confederation 
of Swedish 
Enterprise 
 
NoP NoP NoP NoP 
 Teknikföretagen 
 
                                                                                  
✓ X X X 
 EIO                                             NoP NoP NoP NoP 
 Swedish Agency 
for Government 
Employers 
(SAGE) 
X X ✓ X 
Employee  
Associations 
Swedish Trade 
Union 
Confederation 
(LO) 
 
 
X X ✓ X 
 Handels X X ✓ X 
 Swedish 
Confederation 
of Professional 
Employees 
(TCO) 
 
X X ✓ X 
 Swedish 
Confederation 
for Professional 
Associations 
(SACO) 
 
X X ✓ X 
Source: Official Interviews and Position Documents NoP: No official position 
 
The Universal Declaration of Collective Agreement model (also called the erga-
omnes option) is characterised as a change to the Swedish model, but to a lesser degree 
than the legislated minimum wage option.  This model was also unpopular among the 
social partners, with no peak level or affiliate organisation holding this as their first 
option.  Although it was identified as having undesirable characteristics, the erga 
omnes option was not considered as severe as the legislated minimum wage system.  
Social partners expressed fears that it would lead to negative consequences for union 
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membership and restrictions on the freedom of unions and employer associations to 
enter a collective agreement of their choice. Furthermore, there was an absence of 
appropriate mechanisms to determine which collective agreement is to be extended.  A 
broader reason for opposition, voiced by several social partners, was the desire to 
protect the wider system of the Swedish model, which they perceived erga omnes 
would undermine. 
The extension model (or its subset, the autonomous collective agreement model) 
proved to be the option preferred by the Swedish social partners.  This model would 
result in the least amount of change to the Swedish model.  The main areas of change 
considered were revision of ‘Lex Brittania’ and work around making collective 
agreements more transparent.  This however, is seen as an ‘unsubstantial change’ rather 
than an identifiable realignment for the Swedish model.  The main private sector 
employers association, Swedish Enterprise, and its influential affiliate, 
Teknikföretagen, strongly critiqued the suitability of the autonomous collective 
agreement model.  Their arguments identified four systemic problems with the 
solution. First, the model was deemed to be unclear and the result of hasty amendments 
to the Posting of Workers Directive (96/71/EC).  Second, it was believed to be another 
form of erga omnes in ‘disguise’.  This point is particularly salient if a narrow 
interpretation of the ECJ ruling is taken, labelling much of the work done by the Claes 
Stråth investigation as inconsistent with EC law.  This leads to the third argument that 
this option is inconsistent with European law.  Such claims are based on perceived 
flaws with the Danish system of industrial relations. And fourth, it was believed that 
the transparency objectives would not be feasible, instead having an inflationary effect 
on wages. 
The fourth and final option considered is the status-quo model.  This option can 
be characterised as minimal change or significant change, dependent on the perspective 
taken.  For Swedish workers, the current system of collective agreements (and the 
Swedish model) would still be viable within the Swedish labour market.  For foreign 
posted workers on the other hand, there would be a de-facto liberalisation of the labour 
market. 
As expected, none of the peak level or affiliate organisations held this choice as 
their preferred position.  However, the reasons behind this were complex.  Employer 
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and employee associations in the high-skill or protected sectors saw this option as 
having little direct impact on their organisation.  As a result, it was believed to be a 
good solution if viewed purely from the direct interests of their respective 
organisations.   These social partners, however, did not support this option due to the 
negative effects on other actors within the wider Swedish model.  This supports the 
observation - identified in the other options - that there is a strong impetus to uphold 
the overall ‘health’ of the Swedish model of industrial relations, rather than acting to 
increase benefits for a single actor. 
The next chapter will examine the institutionalised constraints that have shaped 
these positions.  It will also assess the impact of the Claes Stråth investigation and the 
Head Agreement on the positions of the social partners. 
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5 
 
 
The Claes Stråth Investigation and Head Agreement 
 
 
Various actors within Sweden have formulated positions on how the Swedish 
labour market model should change in response to the Laval ruling.  These positions, 
however, are not wielded with an equal level of authority; nor have they received the 
same degree of attention.  The previous chapter documented the official positions of the 
main actors; this chapter focuses to how institutional arrangements may shape the 
influence of particular positions and/or actors.  As highlighted in the literature review, 
institutions may influence behaviour by shaping preferences or interests, constraining 
options, and providing incentives/disincentives for particular types of action.   
This chapter responds to this issue by looking at the core enquiry of the Laval 
case: the Claes Stråth investigation.  It will discuss what role the Claes Stråth enquiry 
plays in determining how the Swedish model will change, or remain static, within the 
context of the ECJ ruling.  Specifically, it will determine whether the investigation 
constrains or aids the positions advocated by the social partners.  Another issue to be 
assessed is the impact of the renegotiation of the new ‘Head Agreement’ on the Claes 
Stråth investigation. 
This chapter will do so in the following way.  First, it will assess the structure of 
the Claes Stråth enquiry and discuss the nature of the enquiry and its directives.  
Second, this chapter will assess the perspectives of the social partners toward the 
investigation and determine whether the Claes Stråth investigation constrains or aids 
social partner influence.  Thirdly, it will evaluate the impact of the new Head 
Agreement on the investigation, paying particular attention to issues of the agreement’s 
timing, issue-linkage and use in limiting options.  Fourth, this chapter will draw on how 
the Claes Stråth investigation acts as an institution that affects the Swedish labour 
market. 
Before embarking on the more substantive part of the chapter, some contextual 
remarks will be helpful.  The Claes Stråth enquiry is a government-led investigation set 
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up to make recommendations to the Swedish government on the changes needed for the 
Swedish labour market model to be compatible with the ECJ Laval ruling.  While the 
government is not bound in any way to implement its proposals, the conclusions will be 
the single most authoritative source in Sweden on the issue, particularly with regard to 
detail of policy design.  The enquiry has a large degree of political autonomy and 
widespread legitimacy amongst interest groups and social partners.  It is likely to 
provide a framework for discussing issues related to Laval case by explicitly and 
implicitly demarcating those areas which are considered to be ‘legitimate’ or 
‘illegitimate’.   
 
5.1 STRUCTURE OF THE INVESTIGATION  
 
Participant Groups 
 
The structure of the enquiry deserves attention as its institutional design may 
influence its final recommendations.  The enquiry is driven and accountable to a single 
actor, the Swedish state.  Currently, Sweden is governed by a four party centre-right 
coalition called the Alliance for Sweden which is composed of the following parties: 
the Moderate Party, Centre Party, Liberal Peoples Party, and Christian Democrats.  Led 
by the Moderate Party, the Alliance for Sweden was responsible for setting up the 
investigation. As a result, there is little room to influence the initial design and structure 
of the enquiry except through the political parties directly.  It is based on the founding 
principles of the political parties at hand, particularly regarding the normative goals of 
what they want for the Swedish model. Thus, rather than allowing for a wide scope of 
analysis, the enquiry is designed to meet political needs.   
The theme of a ‘single driver’ is reinforced by the structure of the investigation.  
It is headed by Claes Stråth, who is Director-General of the Swedish National 
Mediation Office, a state appointed post. 1 He is supported by a three person secretariat 
from the ministries of Labour, Industry, and Foreign Affairs.2  A group of seven 
                                                 
1
 Ministry of Employment, "Committee Terms of Reference "  (Consequences of action in 
response to the Laval judgment; decision at a Government meeting on 10 April 2008). 
2
 Claes Stråth, "Interview,"  (National Mediation Office, 2008, October 30). 
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experts, most of whom are from the government, was also appointed by the state.3  The 
implication is that the report is driven by a single person, Claes Strath.  He has some 
latitude to unilaterally frame the issue and the government’s directives. 
Despite this, Stråth is provided with a large degree of support and expertise by 
the three person expert group and secretariat.  This apparatus is viewed as sufficient 
with regard to technical support and cross fertilisation of expert viewpoints. 
The structure of the reference group, however, creates some constraints on the 
ability of interest groups to influence the inquiry.  One tier below this is a reference 
group with representatives from six main social partners: Swedish Enterprise, SAGE, 
LO, TCO, SACO, and the Association of Local Authorities.4  Claes Stråth chose to 
have a reference group with three representatives from trade unions and three from 
employers associations.5  The individuals themselves, however, were appointed by the 
respective organisations. 
An important observation is that the reference group is limited to a representative 
from each of the peak level organisations.  This brings forth issues that were raised 
earlier regarding the constraining effects of these peak level organisations.  The 
structure of the reference group fails to recognise certain divisions that exist within 
each umbrella organisation.  Furthermore, it reduces the voice of affiliates that may 
form cross-class alliances on specific issues. 
Nevertheless, the wide number of groups consulted during the process, adds to 
the integrity and inclusiveness of the investigation.  During the process of the 
investigation, the group followed a wide consultation process, meeting approximately 
11 academics from Sweden, Finland, Norway, and Denmark.6  In addition, it has 
consulted with government officials from Finland, Norway, Denmark, and Germany, 
and met twice with European Commission representatives.7 Thus the investigation has 
taken an inclusive approach, with the objective of wide consultation with experts from 
academia, government, and the social partners.   
Another important parameter is the timeline for the investigation.  Some groups, 
such as parliamentary members, have argued that it is too long specifically with regards 
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 Ibid. 
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to the timing for ratification of the Lisbon Treaty.8 Members of the enquiry, as well as 
the government, however, firmly insist that the timeline is already pressured.  The 
government mandate on the enquiry was delivered on 10 April 2008 with the final 
report due no later than 15 December 2008 (Approximately 8 months).9   
Thus, the structure of the investigation does place some restrictions on the way 
the investigation is operationalised. This composition is illustrated in Figure 1.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 This study identifies the unilateral nature of the enquiry as a constraint in some 
measure.  In addition, social partner representation is limited to ‘peak-level’ (and thus 
class based) organisations.  A note must be made that there are limitations to looking 
just at the structure.  However, Stråth does have a deep understanding of the 
complexities and divisions that exist among the peak level organisations.10  This is 
likely to mitigate the issues of representation discussed above.  Furthermore, a larger 
reference group may make the investigation more cumbersome.  The directives of the 
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 Swedish Parliament, "Response to Interpellation 2007/08:483 on the Investigation in Response 
to the Laval Case,"  (Parliamentary Protocol, 2008, March 10). 
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 Employment, "Committee Terms of Reference ", 1. 
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investigation, however, do suggest that important constraints have been imposed on 
Stråth from above. 
 
Directives 
 
The Directives outline the ways in which the investigation can approach the ECJ 
ruling and provide parameters for what can and cannot be included in the investigation.  
These guidelines have been criticised as an unnecessary ‘constraint’ and as a result 
have come under severe criticism by some social partner bodies.  Other organisations, 
by contrast, view the directives as appropriate and highlight examples of flexibility that 
suggest an extensive range of options have been considered during the course of the 
investigation. 
The core areas of the enquiry’s remit are the following: (1) maintain the Swedish 
model; and (2) ensure compatibility with European law and the ECJ ruling.  The first 
objective of the enquiry is to: 
 
maintain the fundamental principle in the Swedish labour market, that the main 
responsibility for regulating pay and employment conditions has been assigned to the 
social partners.11 
 
This shows the commitment of the enquiry to not move beyond what is 
considered to be the core of Swedish industrial relations: keeping the state out of 
regulating pay and employment conditions.12  The second core objective of the Claes 
Stråth enquiry is to ensure that: 
 
Community law, principally the provisions of the EC Treaty on the freedom of movement 
of services and the principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality, and the 
Posting of Workers Directive, as these rules have been defined by the European Court of 
Justice, shall be fully respected.13 
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Figure 5.2 Parameters of Claes Stråth Enquiry 
In other words, the enquiry will only consider changes at the national level.  It 
does not examine options for change at the European level; nor does it advocate any 
positions that may be rejected by the European Court of Justice at a later stage.  
Therefore, the options to be considered by the enquiry fall within the area of overlap 
between the following three areas: maintenance of the Swedish model of industrial 
relations; EC community law; and change at the national level.  See Figure 5.2 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thus, only a limited range of tools can be used to address the issue.  These 
include: the Co-determination in the Workplace Act (and changes to Lex Britannia); 
changes to the Swedish Posting of Workers Act; and amendments to rules around 
industrial action and the transparency of collective agreements.14  This is important for 
a number of reasons.  Most notably, it rules out important options which are advocated 
by key stakeholders.  It rules out change at the European Level (either coupled with 
change at the national level or in separation), an option advocated by some members of 
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political parties.15  In addition it rules out the legislated minimum wages model which 
prominent employer representatives argue should be included. 
 
5.2 PERSPECTIVES OF THE SOCIAL PARTNERS  
 
The above section began the discussion on how the Claes Stråth investigation 
may constrain the range of possibilities available.  In particular, what options can be 
used in order to buffer the effects of the ECJ ruling.  While this is legitimate, the ways 
in which actors in the Swedish model view this phenomenon vary significantly.    
Views on the constraints of the structure and directives of the enquiry vary 
between different social partners.  Depending on its interests, a social partner may view 
the Claes Stråth investigation either as a process which constrains its interests, or as a 
well balanced investigation that looks at all options equally and according to their 
merit.  Understanding how the social partners view the Claes Stråth investigation will 
give this study a richer perspective on the inner dynamics of the Swedish industrial 
relations model and its propensity for change.  This section argues that the social 
partners view the investigation in one of the two following ways: either as a 
constraining or aiding process.  In addition to assessing the views of the peak-level 
organisations, it will also discuss smaller affiliate organisations. 
 
Aiding  
 
The investigation can be seen as an ‘aiding process’ on two levels: first, some 
social partners believe that they can influence the enquiry to serve their preferred 
options.  Second, some argue that the enquiry is well run, and ensure the best option is 
chosen.   
The first point, on the ability of actors to influence the investigation in their 
favour, will be considered.  While the government has determined the directives, and it 
is managed by Claes Stråth, some social partners have felt able to influence the enquiry 
during the initial consultation period.  This is illustrated by comments from government 
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employer organisation SAGE.  According to a SAGE senior official, before the 
directives were decided, they were given ample opportunity to see them and prepare 
feedback.16  In response to his suggestions on the preliminary directives, Official 2A of 
SAGE could see that the suggestions on the preliminary directives had been taken up, 
altering the final directives.17  This illustrates how a social partner was able to influence 
the directives in a way that was positive for their organisation.18 
The degree to which this ‘influence’ is formally institutionalised, however, is not 
clear.  Official 2A of SAGE was unable to gauge whether his influence was official or 
unofficial.  But rather, he stated that ‘I was able to have an impact on it’.19 
Other organisations such as SACO, felt they did not influence the directives. 
However, SACO did not believe that the government guidelines constrained their 
particular position.20 Further, a senior official of SAGE felt this because the starting 
point of the investigation was to preserve the Swedish model, and it did not constrain 
the organisation’s position in any way.  The official was aware, however, that it is 
possible to make a wide range of recommendations within the existing directives.21 
A second point is that most social partners believed that the overall quality of the 
investigation was high.  Some of the social partners praised the composition of the 
enquiry.  Official 2A of SAGE commented that a ‘very good investigator was chosen’ 
as:   
 
He is very experienced and a very good listener.  He has very good experience of how the 
organisations work, but also how they are thinking and how they deal with each other. 22 
 
The SAGE official stated that he was aware that the final verdict by the 
investigation was likely to be candid.  But in light of this, he believed that Stråth was 
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‘exactly the right person to deliver a verdict which everyone can live with and can 
accept’, as he is an investigator who has a low profile and is very willing to listen. 23  
Officials from TCO, LO, and SACO also held a great deal of respect for the 
Claes Stråth investigation.24  They highlighted aspects of the institutional framework, 
which enhances the legitimacy and quality of the investigation.  There was a 
unanimous impression that Stråth tried to listen and was interested in a solution that all 
social partners could accept.25  Official 5A of SACO in particular believed that for the 
government to accept a recommendation, agreement from the majority of the social 
partners was necessary.  It is not in Stråth’s interest to ‘have a proposal that only a few 
of the social partners can agree upon’.26 Similarly, Official 2A believed that it was wise 
to have an investigation where the social partners are members and enhances the 
possibility to give input. 27 
Most social partners emphasised the role of the Claes Stråth investigation as an 
‘aiding institution’.  However, this view was not universal. 
 
Constraining 
 
Swedish Enterprise and Teknikföretagen held strong views concerning the 
constraining effects of the investigation.  They saw the Claes Stråth investigation as a 
constraining process on three different levels:  first, with regards to the directives set by 
the government; second, with regards to the overall quality of the investigation and its 
ability to make recommendations which are in compliance with EC law; and third, with 
regards the social partners’ lack of ability to influence the direction of the investigation. 
To begin, these groups emphasised the restrictive nature of the directives.  A 
strong perception, particularly from the side of the employers is that the parameters of 
the enquiry were too narrow and subsequently could not take into account the full range 
of options discussed in Chapter Four.  According to senior Official 1A of Swedish 
Enterprise: 
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 [Claes Stråth’s] mission is obviously too tight.  He should have a mission: we have the 
Laval case, what changes are preferable in Sweden - that, or that, or that.  Now they have 
said that [he] should provide a solution in a certain way.28   
 
Similarly, Official 1B of the Engineering Employers (Teknikföretagen) believes 
that the parameters were so restrictive that they have prescribed a predetermined 
outcome.  Both officials from Swedish Enterprise and Teknikföretagen were adamant 
that the narrow scope of the investigation is the consequence of a political imperative.  
The government gave the mission to Stråth and required that the outcome be in 
accordance with the Swedish Model.29  It seeks to preserve the model that has always 
regulated the labour using collective agreements.  According to Official 1A of Swedish 
Enterprise, ‘in my opinion we don’t have a Swedish model for foreign employers.’30  
An important restriction imposed by the government is that they do not plan to make 
any changes to labour legislation. 31 Thus according to Swedish Enterprise, the current 
government is as restrictive as the prior Social Democratic government. 
As a result of the narrow scope of the Claes Stråth investigation, Official 1A of 
Swedish Enterprise stated that: ‘it is difficult for us to make a standpoint if we don’t 
have the other option.’32  This may help to explain their lack of a stated position as 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
A second constraint imposed by the investigation is its inability to make 
proposals that are in line in European legislation. This is believed by some to be caused 
by a poor quality investigation overall.  Teknikföretagen had some of the strongest 
opinions on this matter: 
 
I wouldn’t describe the investigation as a real investigation.  I would say the government 
has….it is like the ordering of a dish.  I want salmon today.  There is no investigation.33 
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Swedish Enterprise held much of the same opinion, albeit to a less explicit 
degree.  The representative of Swedish Enterprise felt that the Claes Stråth 
investigation may not be able to make proposals that are compatible with ECJ law.  For 
this official, the investigation raises many legal questions, of which the most important 
is to find a solution that is in complete accordance with EU legislation. 
Official 1A of Swedish Enterprise official raised the Danish example, which he 
believes is in not in accordance with EU legislation.  It was argued that if Sweden 
follows a similar path it could face comparable problems.  While no legal challenges 
have yet been made against the Danish model at the European level, it is likely that it 
will become an issue in the future.  According to Official 1A of Swedish Enterprise: 
 
They don’t mind waiting ten or so years until the ECJ says that we are wrong. They can 
live with that.34 
 
This suggests that Sweden’s government may also be willing to make use of the 
time delays associated with such legal cases to extend the ‘life-period’ of an existing 
institutional arrangement.  However, both Swedish Enterprise and its affiliate 
Teknikföretagen expressed the desire for a better solution. 
A third constraint is the inability of the respective parties to influence the 
investigation.  Swedish Enterprise had recommended that the enquiry consider the 
legislated minimum wage option, but this advice was not taken into account.35  
Teknikföretagen also recognised that the clear signal has been made that legislated 
minimum wages will not be included.36 
Another issue that has not been addressed is the potential incompatibility with 
European law.  Officials from both Swedish Enterprise and Teknikföretagen have 
raised this concern.  Nonetheless, both parties believe that this issue was not taken into 
account. 
In contrast to the government employers (SAGE), the private employers and 
engineering employers association feel that they have not been successful in 
influencing the directives of the Claes Stråth investigation.  This is likely to be 
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associated with the type of recommendations made by the respective organisations.  
The recommendation by SAGE was made on an issue that Stråth had some flexibility 
over.37  On the other hand, private employers wanted to make changes to the core 
directives of the enquiry.  Neither their reasoning, nor their influence as social partners, 
was able to shift the core directives concerning these issues.  
These arguments by the social partners suggest that the structure and directives of 
the Claes Stråth investigation were created in order to protect and ensure continuity for 
the Swedish model. In particular, the structure and directives are the result of feedback 
effects in the existing institutional arrangements.  The equilibrium that has been created 
around the Swedish model is difficult to shift. 
The Claes Stråth investigation also has displayed contingent effects, which are a 
feature of path dependent processes.  The structure of the enquiry has the consequence 
of restricting which actors will be heard and those that will not.  Once the structure was 
decided, it made it difficult for actors with alternative – such as Teknikföretagen – to 
gain any real influence.  Similarly, the government directives affected the social 
partners’ ability to propose options.  Ruling out a legislated minimum wage resulted in 
Swedish Enterprise – the largest private sector employers representative – being unable 
to formulate a position.  This led to a significantly reduced voice for the private sector 
firms it represents. 
 This observation of ‘inertia’ and ‘contingency’ illustrates how the institutional 
structure of the Claes Strath enquiry has amplified the pressure to maintain the 
‘Swedish model’, whilst dampening the internal forces seeking substantial change.   
The next section will discuss the impact of current renegotiation of the ‘Head 
Agreement’ between the core social partners on the Claes Stråth investigation.  It will 
assess the issue of timing and sequencing and its role in ‘issue linkage’.  A particular 
focus will be the role of the Head Agreement negotiations in altering bargaining power, 
which will provide the opportunity for actors to limit the options within the Claes 
Stråth investigation.  Thus, the following section will discuss the ‘Head Agreement’ on 
the Swedish model and its impact on legislated minimum wage option. 
 
 
                                                 
37
 Karl Pfeifer, "Laval-Utredningen (Laval-Investigation),"  (Swedish Agency for Government 
Employers [SAGE], 2008). 
The Claes Stråth Investigation 
 
104
 
5.3 THE HEAD AGREEMENT 
 
The impact of the renegotiation of the ‘Head Agreement’ on the Laval problem 
(in particular the Claes Stråth investigation) is subject to competing opinions. What 
makes this issue so important is that the Saltsjöbaden Agreement (Head Agreement) is 
the foundation of the Swedish model.  As a result, it is relevant to any debate over 
change to the Swedish model.  It forms the basis of the partnership between employers 
and labour and outlines the terms and conditions upon which the partnership is 
founded.  This section assesses how the conditions placed on the renegotiation of the 
Head Agreement are likely to affect the Claes Stråth investigation. In particular, LO 
does not want to renegotiate the agreement if Swedish Enterprise advocates the 
legislated minimum wage option.  This section will determine whether LO’s influence 
(and  pressure for the autonomous collective agreement model) is amplified by the 
simultaneous renegotiation of the ‘Head Agreement’.  This may explain why Swedish 
Enterprise has come to no official position in the Claes Stråth investigation. 
 
Context 
 
The renegotiation of the ‘Head Agreement’ (successor of the 1938 Saltsjöbaden 
agreement) is important here due to its particular timing in relation to the Laval 
problem and the Claes Stråth enquiry.  As it is the founding agreement of the Swedish 
model, renegotiating a new Head Agreement is of high importance to the main social 
partners. The close proximity of the renegotiation to the Claes Stråth investigation has 
led to concerns that it is being used as a tool to limit the options of the social partners. 
The Head Agreement is a bipartite agreement between Swedish labour and 
industry concerning rules around collective bargaining and general labour conditions 
and regulation.  The original Saltsjöbaden agreement came about in 1938 between the 
LO and the SAF after a period of intense conflict resulting in significant number of 
working hours lost in both industrial action and employers blockades. It was the 
founding document of a new era of industrial peace between the social partners without 
the involvement of the state.38 
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This state of co-operation characterised the relationship between the social 
partners for a period of 30 years before piecemeal labour legislation partially eroded the 
autonomy of the social partners in wage bargaining processes.39 In 1997 a new 
Industrial Agreement (IA) was made which embodied the majority of the 
characteristics and ‘spirit’ of the 1938 agreement.40  In 2008, the social partners started 
to renegotiate this ‘Head Agreement’, which outlines the level of agreement and co-
operation from both sides of the social partners. 
The bi-partite agreement can therefore be characterised as the ‘foundation’ of the 
Swedish model. If it is not renegotiated, the state is likely to come into the labour 
market, which suggests an end to the Swedish model.  As a result, the social partners 
concerned want the new Head Agreement to be renegotiated, but both have conditions 
that need to be met before they finalise a new agreement. The timing of the 
renegotiation has been influential in tipping the balance of power between the main 
social partners. 
A parallel can be drawn between the impact of the negotiation of the Head 
Agreement and the effect of other ‘negotiations’ taking place at the same time as the 
‘Laval dispute’ (and the Claes Stråth investigation).  For example, some employee 
representatives and (left-wing) political representatives saw the Laval case as a tool to 
prevent Lisbon Treaty ratification.  This did not eventuate, however, as both the LO 
and SAP refrained from officially linking the two issues.  The timing of these two 
issues were somewhat pivotal in the attempts (albeit failed) to gain leverage during the 
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty by Swedish parliament. 
This suggests that the issue of timing is also important in the Claes Stråth 
investigation.  One possibility is that without agreement on the recommendations to the 
Claes Stråth investigation, LO will not engage with the Swedish Enterprise in the 
renegotiation of a new Head Agreement.  It can be identified that in the renegotiation of 
the Head Agreement labour holds a powerful position.  According to Swedish 
Enterprise, the right to industrial action and sympathy action is a powerful tool 
currently held by labour which can be used at will against employers.  According to 
Official 1A of Swedish Enterprise: 
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Our major problem is the sympathy action. It is the most powerful collective action in the 
trade unions tool box.  There is no doubt about that.41 
 
Employers believe that the unions’ use of collective action is a source of power 
imbalance between the two groups. 
The timing of the renegotiation of the Head Agreement has shaped the bargaining 
power held by the main social partners.  It presented the opportunity to link the Head 
Agreement with the Claes Stråth investigation and allowed the LO to place conditions 
on Swedish Enterprise for signing the agreement.   It limits the options that can be 
advocated by Swedish Enterprise as the Head Agreement would only be signed if 
Swedish Enterprise did advocate the legislated minimum wage model.  Renegotiation 
of the Head Agreement at a different time than the Laval case is likely to have 
significantly decreased the ability of LO to link the two issues. 
This asymmetry in power between the representative of labour and employers 
has meant that the renegotiation can be used to limit the employers’ range of responses 
to the Laval case.  Swedish Enterprise and Teknikföretagen both believe that labour 
organisations have successfully achieved this.  As stated by Official 1A of Swedish 
Enterprise: 
 
If we don’t agree with the trade unions with how to solve the Laval problem, there will 
not be any head agreement.  The things are combined in their world and that is why we 
do not have any hurry [to make a position].42 
 
This is supported by statements by LO and TCO who view that it is impossible 
to separate the two issues.43   
On the other hand, an important leverage point for employers is that there is no 
deadline by which the new Head Agreement must be finalised.  As such, the Claes 
Stråth enquiry could be over before the Head Agreement negotiations are complete.  
According to Official 1A: 
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We have no date, we have said until next year we will negotiate.  Whether this happens 
or if the negotiations break down I don’t know.44 
 
In other words, the flexibility around when the agreement must be concluded, 
gives Swedish Enterprise some leverage over the impact of the ‘Head Agreement’ on 
limited legislated minimum wages from the positions put to the Claes Stråth 
investigation. 
While labour has some important issues on which it is unwilling to compromise, 
this suggests that Swedish Enterprise also has some pressing issues on which it is 
reluctant to negotiate.  The degree to which each can protect its ‘non-negotiable’ 
territory is a product of their relative strength in negotiations. 
According to Official 1A the potential for sympathy action during the Laval case 
was a critical danger for Swedish Enterprise.  In the words of the official: 
 
One thing that hasn’t been mentioned so much. The two trade unions which where active 
were the trade union and the electricians.  But there were lots of other trade unions which 
were going to take sympathy action.  The sympathy action was going to involve 43, 000 
of our members. That is why it is such an important issue for us.  And we have given 
money to Laval in the trial, so we sponsored their procedure both before the ECJ and 
Swedish Labour Court.  Because the issue concerns so much of our member companies.  
We have 55, 000, and of those 43, 000 were actually involved.45 
 
This suggests that there are certain ‘sticking’ points that employers are not 
willing to negotiate.  And as a consequence, the Head Agreement, in which labour has 
extra bargaining power vis-à-vis the employers, is being used as a ‘safeguard’ and limit 
the possible changes to the Swedish model that will be considered by Claes Stråth in 
the government investigation. 
The result of the asymmetry in power between the main social partners is that the 
legislated minimum wages option has been excluded as an option for Swedish 
Enterprise at the request of LO.  As stated in previous chapters, Swedish Enterprise has 
not taken an official position toward the Laval case.  The two possible explanations are: 
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first, Swedish Enterprise does not have or know a position it wishes to advocate; or 
second, it is not disclosing its position for tactical reasons. 
Swedish Enterprise has raised problems with all of the major positions put forth.  
An important observation, however, is that its largest and most important affiliate, the 
engineering employers, stated in an extensive position paper that its preferred option is 
a legislated minimum wage.   
The LO has stated that there are areas which they are not willing to negotiate 
upon, particularly those that will cause a large deviation from the Swedish model.  
According to the LO’s own officials, a legislated minimum wage falls into the category 
of a ‘large deviation’.46  Thus, there is evidence to support Official 1A’s claim that 
particular conditions have been put on Swedish Enterprise in the renegotiation of the 
Head Agreement.  In other words, advocating a legislated minimum wage option or 
another ‘large deviation’ will lead to a breakdown in negotiations.     
This line of reasoning, however, can be criticised by an alternative explanation. It 
is possible that that if Swedish Enterprise states a position that conflicts with the 
current government, it could result in negative implications for their re-election.  
According to Official 1B, however, this conclusion is ‘ill founded on an intellectual 
level’.47   
While it is evident that legislated minimum wages were excluded in the 
directives of the Claes Stråth investigation, there is evidence that this option would 
have been removed from the table in any case.  An important variable of change would 
be if the Claes Stråth investigation parameters were to include a legislated minimum 
wage.  In this case, it could be seen whether Swedish Enterprise was willing to forgo 
the renegotiation of the new Head Agreement in favour of the possible implementation 
of legislated minimum wages.  Given the widespread opposition to this option, it is 
unlikely that this gamble would have succeeded.  Furthermore, this presupposes that 
legislated minimum wages are the preferred option of Swedish Enterprise.   
The engineering employers may have taken a different approach, as they are 
willing to forgo the main agreement if their position can be improved (for example, by 
implementing a legislated minimum wage).48 
                                                 
46
 3A, "Interview." 
47
 1B, "Interview." 
48
 Ibid. 
The Claes Stråth Investigation 
 
109
 
In summary, the renegotiation of the Head Agreement has several implications 
for the Claes Stråth investigation.  The Head Agreement seeks bi-partite industrial 
peace between labour and industry and the renegotiation has particular ramifications for 
the process of institutional change.  Its timing alongside other events such as the Lisbon 
Treaty ratification and the Laval case provided the opportunity for the multiple issues 
to be negotiated in tandem.  This has the effect of influencing the level of ‘bargaining 
power’ held by the main social partners.  In particularly, it magnifies the asymmetry in 
power between labour and employers.  The current renegotiation of the Head 
Agreement has been used to take legislated minimum wages off the agenda for 
Swedish Enterprise.  This was done by LO placing certain conditions on the Head 
agreement, meaning that if Swedish Enterprise were to advocate a legislated minimum 
wage, the negotiation would break down.  Thus, there is evidence of a coupling 
between the Head Agreement and the Claes Stråth investigation. 
 
5.4 CONCLUSIONS 
 
In assessing the impact of the Claes Stråth inquiry in the context of the current 
Laval problematic, the following findings were reached.  First, the structure of the 
enquiry was found to be important.   The enquiry was driven in a unilateral manner, by 
the state and its representative, Claes Stråth.  Its uni-dimensional nature was further 
reinforced by the presence of a single chair.  Despite these factors, the enquiry was 
found to have a very wide consultation process that involved academic experts, 
government officials, and social partner representatives.   
The manner in which the social partners were consulted was revealing.  Only 
peak level organisations were consulted. This is not unusual, and somewhat intuitive, 
given the timeframe of the investigation.  However, this mode of representation does 
have the effect of missing the key divisions and minority viewpoints that exist within 
peak level organisations.  As the peak-level social partners are divided along class 
lines, this effectively suppressed cross-class positions.  This is particularly salient for 
Swedish Enterprise, an organisation that represents 40 sectoral and employers 
associations.  The Claes Stråth investigation has no formal way of understanding the 
internal factions that may divide these larger organisations. 
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In saying this, however, evidence from an interview with Claes Stråth does 
suggest that he is aware of the factions that exist within Swedish Enterprise.   But 
ultimately, including only peak level representatives in the reference group, served to 
dilute diverging positions which exist at lower levels.   
The second conclusion of this chapter concerns the directives that the 
government issued to the enquiry.  These directives do have a constraining effect on the 
type of options which can be looked at by this study.  Their objective is to maintain 
social partner autonomy in the wage setting process (therefore excluding a legislated 
minimum wage).  A further constraint is that they give the enquiry scope to look at 
changes only at the national level, excluding the possibility of change at the European 
level.   This only leaves several organs that can be used including the Swedish Posting 
of Workers Act, changes to the Lex Britannia, legislation around social partner 
‘conduct’, and the right to industrial action.  This leaves only a very narrow scope for 
the investigation (see previous Figure 5.2).  
The third conclusion of this chapter concerns the opinions of the social partners 
on the role of the Claes Stråth investigation as an aiding or constraining process.  The 
opinions toward the Claes Stråth investigation were strongly polarised.  First, there 
were those social partners which perceived the investigation as having an aiding effect.  
The majority of the peak level social partners (SAGE, LO, TCO, and SACO) saw the 
investigation as being ‘well run’ and suited for determining the optimal solution to the 
problem.  Some actors (in particular SAGE) felt they were able to influence the 
investigation in their favour.  In other words, the directives were flexible enough to 
adjust to concerns raised by the relevant actors.  
Other social partners viewed the investigation as having a constraining effect.  
This perspective was held by the peak level organisation Swedish Enterprise and its 
affiliate organisations Teknikföretagen and EIO.  These actors argued that the 
directives of the investigation were too narrow.  In contrast to the actors above, they 
felt they were unable to influence the investigation.  A point does need to be made that 
their demands fell outside of the enquiry’s core directives.  This provides an 
explanation for the investigation’s lack of flexibility in this area.  A further criticism 
voiced by Teknikföretagen was that the investigation was of ‘poor quality’ and as a 
result would make proposals that are inconsistent with European law.   
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In aggregate, the Claes Stråth investigation promotes continuity of the Swedish 
labour relations model.  It does this by dampening (and in the case of the legislated 
minimum wage eliminating) those positions which seek change.  Concurrently, it 
provides government mandated legitimacy for options that are consistent with the 
Swedish model.   
The investigation further consolidates the peak-level organisations as the core 
‘voices’ in the current discussion.  It has the effect of excluding positions that are 
mobilised along cross-class lines and incapable of gaining support from a peak level 
social partner.  Positions that form along class lines (for example, within blue-collar 
workers represented by LO, or white-collar workers represented by TCO) do have an 
influential representative institutionally located within the enquiry. 
Thus, the enquiry plays an important role in channelling positions, amplifying the 
influence of some options.  This is linked to the purpose of the inquiry that is to find 
the intersection between maintaining the Swedish model, making changes at the 
national level, and ensuring Sweden’s consistency with European law.   
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What This Tells us About the Swedish Model 
 
 
The previous chapters described and analysed the competing ‘tensions’ within the 
Swedish model.  This analysis took a two-fold path.  First, Chapter Four investigated 
the official positions of the social partners.  Second, Chapter Five assessed how the 
Claes Stråth investigation constrained some positions, while aiding others.  Chapter 
Five also placed the enquiry in the context of the current renegotiation of the Head 
Agreement and considered how the negotiation might alter the degree of bargaining 
power between the social partners.  Ultimately, these chapters identified a strong 
imperative for continuity within institutions and social partners. These issues all lead to 
the wider concern of the relevance of these observations to change in the Swedish 
model of industrial relations.  
This chapter approaches the issue of institutional change in two parts.  First, it 
will assess whether or not change is occurring.  From this point it will discuss what this 
study can deduce about the interests of actors and the internal dynamics of institutions.  
The second part of the chapter returns to the theoretical models from Chapter Three to 
assess which best explains the empirical findings.  The models are the ‘convergence 
model’, the ‘punctuated equilibrium model’ (Krasner) and the ‘incremental 
transformation model’ (Thelen). 
 
6.1 IS CHANGE OCCURING? 
 
The conclusion drawn from the preliminary chapters is that the ECJ ruling has 
not yet resulted in real change for the Swedish model.  This is deduced from the 
empirical findings of the previous chapters, assessed against the criteria that this study 
uses to define real change (see Section 3.2). Internal pressures are not yet of sufficient 
magnitude to threaten the core features of the Swedish model as defined in Chapter 
Three.   
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First, this section will make clear what types of change are being considered for 
the Swedish model of industrial relations. The option that has had the greatest influence 
is the model of autonomous collective agreements.  The range of ‘levers’ available in 
the Claes Strath investigation include the following1: 
 
(1) limiting unions’ right to strike to the minimum terms of the trade 
agreements (or the ‘hard-core’ of the PWD); 
(2) increasing the transparency of collective agreements; 
(3) permitting industrial action to be taken only if the potential new 
collective agreement is an improvement on the conditions of the 
existing collective agreement (albeit within the hard-core of the 
Posting of Workers Directive); 
(4) giving a greater role to the Swedish Liaison Office (Work 
Environment Authority);  
(5) amending the Swedish Posting of Workers Act (1999:678); and 
(6) amending the Co-determination in the Workplace Act. 
 
These are likely to be the ‘tools’ used to respond to the issue.2 It is likely that 
there will be an increase in legislation that encroaches upon some aspects of the labour 
market.  In addition, the Work and Environment Authority may play a greater role that 
may also be perceived as an increasing role of the state labour markets.  Some 
restrictions are likely to be applied to the right to strike, not allowing unions to go 
further than what is defined as the hard-core of the Posting of Workers Directive. 
 What this study finds, however, is that the changes that are being considered are 
marginal and do not qualify as ‘substantive’ or real change.  The ‘core areas’ of the 
Swedish model are projected to remain unchanged.3  Figure 6.1 provides a diagram of 
what constitutes change.  The areas that this study identifies as unchanged primarily 
revolve around social partner autonomy in particular key areas, such as wage setting. 
                                                 
1
 An important issue is that although the Claes Stråth investigation recommendations were 
released on December 2008, these were not final.  They are subject to scrutiny by the social 
partners and the public.  Only when parliament officially votes for any changes, can it be said 
with any concrete certainty what changes have taken place.  This is unlikely to happen before 
late 2009/10 
2
 Claes Stråth, "Action in Response to the Laval Judgement,"  (State Public Enquiry, 2008). 
3
 See Section 3.6 
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A core indicator of continuity is that wage formation is still decided by the social 
partners.  The peripheral legislation that is likely to arise will not undermine this.  
Alongside this, strong social partners are still present and these changes do not lead to 
implications for rates of unionisation.  A further aspect is that political parties do not 
deal with labour market issues, as they are left in the realm of the social partners.  
Unions also retain the right to industrial action.  This right may be limited in that unions 
cannot strike to force employers to take up a collective agreement that has worse 
conditions for employees.  But it is seldom in the interests of unions to worsen 
conditions for members.  Swedish Enterprise and Teknikföretagen argue that 
restrictions on unions’ rights to strike outside the hard-core of the Posting of Workers 
Directive may help to clarify Swedish model rather than change it.  There has been no 
real change to the degree of bargaining centralisation.  In addition, the Laval case has 
not raised any implications for the use of active labour market policies or public 
employment.  As a result, the response to the ECJ ruling has caused no overall change 
to the core ‘ends’ of the Swedish model: high aggregate wages, wage restraint, wage 
solidarity, and strong worker protection. 
 
 
 
 
 
Substantive change No Change Change 
0 
10
Effect of the ‘Laval Case’  
Figure 6.1 What constitutes change 
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6.2 ACTORS AND LABOUR MARKET CHANGE  
 
Interests of Actors 
 
 The interests of actors show where areas of tension and pressures for change 
may exist in the Swedish labour market system.   The discussion of the literature in 
Chapter Two gave an overview of how their interests may influence a model of 
industrial relations. 
Power Resource Analysis (PRA) suggests that Swedish industrial relations are the 
result of benefits gained by labour as a result class-related collective action. According 
to a labour-centred analysis, we should expect employers to be in favour of a shift to 
lower wages.  This is based on the assumption that the current model of industrial 
relations reflects an imbalance in power toward labour.  This implicitly assumes a 
degree of class solidarity based on shared interests.  As a consequence, an assumption 
often attributed to employers is their desire to keep wages low. 
  The findings from Chapter Four illustrated that low wages are not necessarily a 
priority for Swedish employers in both the private and public sectors.  Instead 
employers desire a strong degree of stability and a steady labour supply.  This desire to 
maintain a reliable and skilled labour force was indicated to be more important than the 
raw drive for lower wages.  Alongside stability, an important interest for employers is 
to keep the state out of the wage setting process. 
Pressure for more flexible and lower wages came from the Association of 
Swedish Engineering Industries (Teknikföretagen).  This correlates to the well-
documented split between the employers in what are to be considered the ‘protected’ 
versus the ‘exposed’ industries.4  Teknikföretagen, the representative of engineering 
employers, a highly exposed sector, have long been a strong proponent of change 
within the Swedish model.5   
In the current debate on the Swedish model, there is little internal pressure from 
the social partners to bring the state into labour relations.  An examination of why most 
                                                 
4
 Peter Swenson and Jonas Pontusson, "The Swedish Employer Offensive against Centralized 
Wage Bargaining," in Unions, Employers, and Central Banks: Macroeconomic Coordination 
and Institutional Change in Social Market Economies ed. Torben Iversen, Jonas Pontusson, and 
David Soskice (Cambridge University Press 2000). 
5
 Ibid. 
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actors are against this type of substantial change to the Swedish model is also 
revealing. 
The majority opposed change to the Swedish model in the form of legislated 
minimum wages.  Social partners were particularly concerned that a system of 
legislated minimum wages would encourage a politicisation of the wage-bargaining 
process.  This was identified as a concern by all of the peak-level employer and labour 
representatives.  It suggests a strong desire to maintain the ‘cartel-like’ organisation of 
the wage-setting process.  Thus, in some sense there is a cross-class alliance to 
maintain this.   This can be illustrated by the consensus reached by all sides of the 
social partners.  The fact that employers want a labour market in which the state is not 
involved in the wage-setting process appears to have been a strong sticking point.   
These findings suggest that politicians have quite different incentives to those of 
both employers and employees.  One aspect is the short-term outlook held by 
politicians.  A partnership between the representatives of labour and employers is 
believed to provide more effective long-term planning for the needs of those parties it 
represents. Due to Sweden’s relatively low level of experience with this model of 
employment regulation, it may not be as efficient as for other European countries with 
a tradition of regulation through legislated minimum wages. 
Overall, the loss of the cartel would imply a loss of control for the social 
partners.  Most of the social partners believe that they are able to determine a better and 
more stable model than the short term incentives associated with a low wage labour 
force.  This suggests that labour and employers share interests that the state could 
potentially undermine. 
However, employers also want an industrial relations structure where unions do 
not exert a disproportionate degree of influence.  Thus, an important demand is to 
reduce the ability of unions to perform industrial action.6  Unions have displayed a far 
clearer picture of their interests and what they want for the Swedish labour market.  
Employee representatives have a core imperative to keep the state out of wage-setting 
institutions.  They do not want wages to be driven down and want to keep control of 
                                                 
6
 With the final recommendation of the Claes Strath investigation, this has been achieved, albeit 
not to the degree envisioned. 
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wage setting.  As a result, Swedish unions want to maintain the current system of 
industrial relations.   
 
Class Solidarity 
 
Power Resource Analysis, which depicts particular models of industrial relations 
as the result of class conflict, suggests that classes have a level of unity or ‘solidarity’ is 
based on their assumption of shared interests.  If this assumption of ‘class solidarity’ 
does not hold, it brings into the question the explanatory power of PRA in explaining 
institutional change in the Swedish case.  In other words, labour having greater 
bargaining power vis-à-vis employers does not appear to be the only reason for 
Sweden’s system of industrial relations system being robust. 
There is, however, some evidence to support the existence of class solidarity, 
particularly on the side of labour.  LO, TCO, and SACO, were all unified in their 
support of the autonomous collective agreement model.  This was despite the 
recognition of diversity and difference between these peak level organisations that have 
member groups from a range of different industries.  A particularly salient observation 
was the degree to which SACO was willing to put aside the status-quo option if it 
would harm other unions. Although it would not be affected by this model, SACO was 
willing to reject it as it would have negative implications for unions belonging to other 
organisations.  Although ‘pure self interest’ is apparent in some cases, there appears to 
be a large push to protect the overall class interests in others. This indicates that there is 
a degree of ‘class solidarity’ on the side of labour.   
An analysis of employers, however, does not indicate the same level of class 
solidarity.  To the contrast, an assessment of the positions of employer organisations 
provides evidence of critical disagreements and unproductive stale-mates. SAGE, the 
Swedish Agency for Government Employers, gave a position that was in line with the 
positions of the peak-level labour representatives.  It supported minimum changes to 
Swedish industrial relations through advocating the extension model.  Swedish 
Enterprise, which is a hugely influential organisation and represents the majority of 
private sector employers in Sweden, abstained from making an official position.  
Within its affiliate organisations, significant tensions exist.  While internal tensions 
What This Tells us About the Swedish Model 
 
118
were not explicitly cited by Swedish Enterprise as the reason for its lack of a 
standpoint, the competing positions among the affiliates suggest otherwise.  Thus, there 
is a clear absence of intra-class solidarity on the side of the employers, as many 
employers share support with labour for a particular system of industrial relations.  This 
may help explain why the Swedish model has been robust to the challenges of the of 
the ECJ Laval ruling.   
This study identifies that there is class solidarity among employees, but not 
among employers.  Consequently, a shift in power from labour to employers, as a result 
of the ECJ ruling, has not led to employers acting coherently to oppose the traditional 
interests of labour in Swedish industrial relations.  This suggests that PRA has a limited 
ability to explain the dynamics of the Swedish labour market in this particular case.  
Contrary to what we would expect from PRA, there was no major change despite a shift 
in power from labour to employers. The varying degrees of class-solidarity reflect the 
mixed interests of the social partners in this case. The next section will look at the role 
of cross-class alliances.   
 
Cross-class alliances 
 
Evidence exists to support an explanation that is based on a ‘cross class alliance’ 
in which actors from both labour and employers share mutual goals.  There appears to 
be a cross-class alliance with the purpose of keeping the state out.   
This is important and it suggests several things.  First, it adds support to the initial 
assumption that Sweden embodies a particular model of capitalism as suggested in the 
Varieties of Capitalisms literature.  The Swedish model, based on solidarism, creates 
the conditions in which labour is under-priced and there is a scarcity of employees. The 
compressed nature of wages that is a result forms the basis of the Swedish model.  Here 
the price of labour is taken out of competition which both labour and employers 
support. Second, it suggests that convergence is buffered as the social partners have 
chosen not to opt out of the existing system of solidarism. 
This is evident as SAGE, SACO, TCO, and LO supported the autonomous 
collective agreement model (extension model), citing keeping the state out as a prime 
goal.  Furthermore, Swedish Enterprise argued that it too wanted to keep the state out.  
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This was a primary reason for its lack of support for the legislated minimum wage 
option.  Thus, there is evidence of a cross class alliance for the purpose of maintaining a 
cartel by keeping the state out of the wage setting process. 
The manner in which this alliance has been co-ordinated is subject to further 
debate.  The social partners stated that there is a large degree of consultation and 
meeting between the actors, even between employers and labour.  On the other hand, it 
appears to be in all actors’ interests to keep the state out, and as such, each may have 
come to this option unilaterally. 
There has been less identifiable support for a cross class alliance with the purpose 
of bringing the state in, particularly through a legislated minimum wage.  
Representatives of ‘exposed sectors’, in particular the engineering sector, have failed to 
gain sufficient support to bring the state in.  In other words, they have not been able to 
introduce the legislated minimum wage method.  Consequently, this model was not 
considered by the Claes Stråth investigation.   
 The existence of a cross-class alliance to keep the state out suggests that VoC is 
highly useful for explaining the internal dynamics of the Swedish labour market.  It 
shows that a shift in power from employees to employers does not in itself lead to a 
weakening of the industrial relations model.  This is because there is sufficient support 
from employers to uphold social partner autonomy in the Swedish model.  It suggests 
that employers’ interests have not changed significantly as a result of the ECJ ruling.  It 
is the change in employer interests which may give us the greatest indication of 
‘significant change’.  To complement this discussion on the relationship between 
institutions and actors, the next section will discuss the theoretical models from Chapter 
three to assess which best explains the empirical findings. 
  
6.3 MODELS OF CHANGE 
 
This thesis finds that the Swedish model displays evidence of resilience.  This is 
particularly clear if viewed in the framework of ‘punctuated equilibrium’ and ‘critical 
junctures’.   
The causes of continuity appear to be the result of the following points.  First, 
there is a large impetus by the actors within the Swedish model to maintain the system 
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of autonomous collective agreements and keep the state out.  This suggests that there is 
a level of positive feedback between the existing Swedish wage bargaining model and 
the underlying solidarity between social partners.  The solidaristic model, based of 
compressed wages, is optimal for both employers and employees but requires a level of 
agreement and co-ordination.  Since this process has been long established in Sweden, a 
degree of inertia has been set in place as a result of increasing returns for both parties. 
Second, there are institutional constraints which impede the propensity for 
change.  Specifically, the Claes Stråth investigation has constrained particular options, 
locking out options for significant change such as the legislated minimum wage model.  
This particular constraint in the Stråth investigation, however, was established by the 
centre right coalition government.  Commentators have claimed that electoral 
constraints resulting from public opposition to change have emerged after labour law 
de-regulation earlier in the government’s term. 
This is consistent with the concept of ‘contingency’ from the theory of path 
dependency.  Small events or decisions can have large and enduring consequences if 
they occur at particular points in time.  In the Claes Stråth investigation the legislated 
minimum wage option was ‘locked out’ in the directives of the investigation.  
Consolidating this in the initial directives of the investigation, made any change very 
difficult; in other words, this small ‘contingency’ had significant successive effects. 
A third cause of continuity appears to be the timing of the renegotiation of the 
new ‘Head Agreement’ between key social partners.  This led to an asymmetry of 
power that had the effect of empowering labour.  This point reinforces the critical role 
of ‘timing and sequencing’ in path dependence processes.  In increasing returns 
arguments, the timing of an event is crucial.  This theory holds that ‘earlier parts of a 
sequence are more important than other parts, particularly if an event happens too late.’7  
In this case, the simultaneous timing of the Claes Stråth investigation with the 
renegotiation of the Head Agreement meant the LO could place conditions on the 
positions put to the Claes Stråth investigation by threatening to withdrawing from the 
Head Agreement.  
There is some evidence to suggest a ‘critical juncture’ may have occurred under 
different conditions.  An explanation of why it did not occur is that the countervailing 
                                                 
7
 Paul Pierson, "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics," American 
Political Science Review 94, no. 2 (2000): 263. 
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interests within the Swedish model were not yet powerful enough to instigate its 
collapse. This section will undertake a short counterfactual exercise to illustrate this 
point. 
We will first consider the actors’ positions.  Even if Swedish Enterprise officially 
supported legislated minimum wages, support for the autonomous collective agreement 
model would continue to dominate.  This is due to the majority social partners in favour 
of this option. 
If in addition the Moderate Party built the legislated minimum wage option into 
the directives of the enquiry, evidence suggests it is unlikely that the Claes Stråth 
investigation would have concluded with a different outcome.  The addition of the 
legislated minimum wages to the enquiry directives would probably not be sufficient to 
change the Swedish model. 
A critical juncture may have occurred, however, under different circumstances.  
Were events timed differently, the terms of the discussion would have been 
significantly altered. 
Had the ECJ specified a ruling in the ‘narrow’ sense, instead of the ‘wide sense’, 
the autonomous collective agreement model would have been explicitly ruled out. In 
this scenario, the structural factors encouraging continuity would be weakened.  In 
other words, a narrow ruling from the ECJ, would enable positions advocating change 
to be a lot more influential. Thus, the probability of change occurring is significantly 
enhanced. The concerns of Swedish Enterprise and the Teknikföretagen would be 
validated; particularly their suggestion that there is inconsistency between the Swedish 
model of labour relations and EC law. This would authorise the need for some real 
change, and potentially mobilise more support for the legislated minimum wage option 
among the social partners. 
Similarly, different timings of the renegotiation of the Head Agreement may have 
resulted in a different outcome, possibly a critical juncture. This is another example of 
the crucial role of timing.  Additionally, if Swedish Enterprise was not willing to meet 
the LO’s conditions - not renegotiating the Head Agreement - it may have led to a 
critical juncture after a failure of renegotiation.  This would enable the constraining 
structure of the Head Agreement to be relaxed, and substantially increase the range of 
choices open to actors, particularly Swedish Enterprise. 
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 From this point, how do we reconcile the actual level of continuity with the 
possibility of incremental transformation?  It is difficult to dismiss any forms of change.  
The issue at hand is whether the events meet the criteria of the incremental 
transformation model. 
 
Incremental Transformation 
 
This section will test the application of Thelen’s fivefold typology of incremental 
change to what has occurred to the Swedish model in response to the Laval ruling. 
No evidence for displacement was found from the positions advocated by the 
social partners.  The Claes Stråth recommendations do not give any additional ‘power’ 
or status to subordinate institutions.  On the contrary, they strengthen and consolidate 
the role of the social partners as the core actors in the wage setting process.  While 
subordinate institutions may exist, the response to the ‘Laval’ ECJ ruling did not lead to 
any amount of power displacement.   
The concept of layering, however, is perhaps the one area where a gradual 
transformation could be seen.  But earlier statements suggests that any ‘new elements’ 
have not changed the status or structure of existing institutional arrangement.  The role 
of encroaching legislation could be perceived as layering.  However, the role of 
legislation considered in this case does not deviate beyond existing norms, nor does it 
change the status of the current structure.   
Little evidence exists to support the occurrence of drift.  In the particular case, no 
areas of ‘neglect’ were identified. Again, to reiterate, no proposals indicate any 
significant shift from the mandated autonomous collective agreement model.  Similarly, 
there is no evidence of exhaustion. 
Furthermore the Laval Case does not support an observation of Conversion. In 
this case there are likely to be new mandates for the Swedish Liaison Office (Work 
Environment Authority), and changes to the Swedish Posting of Workers Act 
(1999:678) and Co-determination in the Workplace Act.  Any ‘new’ purpose (for these 
existing institutions) does not display evidence of conversion.  In summary this 
particular case study does not display sufficient evidence for incremental change.  
There is the issue, however, that this study is only a ‘snapshot’ rather than a 
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longitudinal study.  This study does not suggest that incremental change cannot happen.  
There are previous studies that show evidence of incremental change.8 
But, in order to validate these findings, we have to refer back to the methodology 
noting that this is a single case study and is not capable of capturing longitudinal 
change.  These resulting caveats will be discussed below. Because this study has not 
shown evidence of ‘incremental transformation’ it does not preclude it from happening 
at any other stage.   
This study has shown that tensions exist in the following areas, which should be 
studied for further evidence of change: 
 
(1) how the preferences of actors may be influenced; and 
(2) the timing of particular events relating to institutions. 
 
Institutional change may appear as the result of: 
 
(1) sufficient support from actors choosing to replace a system; 
(2) capture or drift of particular institutions; and 
(3) particular timing of events where power is in favour of the group or 
groups that have an interest in change. 
 
6.5 CONCLUSIONS  
 
This chapter concludes that the ECJ ruling has not prompted immediate 
substantive changes.  The changes that have been identified in Section 6.1 cannot be 
classified as significant.  Despite the observation of continuity and stasis, however, 
pressures for change do exist within social partners. From the interests of employers, 
there is a imperative to have stability and a steady labour supply.  In addition to this, 
there is a desire to have social partner autonomy in the wage setting process.  These 
objectives have proven to be more important than a pure desire for lower wages.  
Employees, on the other hand, have a shared desire to maintain autonomy in the wage 
setting process. 
                                                 
8
 See Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen, eds., Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in 
Advanced Political Economies (Oxford University Press, 2005). 
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These interests held by the actors indicate  both a level of class solidarity and the 
presence of cross class alliances.  This is important as it provides an indication of where 
‘ruptures’ may form.  There appears to be a significant degree of class solidarity on the 
side of employee associations over a number of areas.  On the side of employers, 
significant division and disagreement exists.  This suggests a lack of co-ordination 
among this group.   
There is, however, a general cross class alliance to keep the state out of the 
wage bargaining process.  A countervailing alliance to bring the state in, through 
legislated minimum wages, was not identified.   In an assessment of the role of 
institutions, it was found that the Claes Stråth investigation had the effect of 
strengthening the former and dampening the latter. 
 The final conclusion is which theory of institutional change best explains the 
impact of the Laval case on the Swedish model.  The punctuated equilibrium model 
proved to be the most useful at explaining this specific case.  This was due to its ability 
to explain the strong forces of continuity that can resist a significant ‘shock’ to a 
system.  However, this approach was not without limitations – in particular it is not 
possible to fully assess the merits of this approach in the absence of a ‘critical juncture’. 
 Incremental transformation was, however, not as useful at explaining the 
empirical observations of this situation.  While Thelens’ fivefold typology has been 
useful in explaining the behaviour of institutions in response to other ‘shocks’, it was 
not able to sufficiently explain the dynamics of this particular case.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
7.1 SUMMARY  
 
This thesis posed a number of questions on the response of the Swedish model to 
European integration.  Specifically it asked: (1) What are the positions for change held 
by actors within the Swedish model toward the ECJ Laval ruling (C-341/05); (2) do 
institutions play a role in shaping the positions of social partners; and (3) what can these 
findings tell us about the pressures within the Swedish model and its propensity for 
change? This thesis evaluated these questions through semi-structured interviews, 
position papers/documents, in the context of academic publications.   
The study began by surveying the literature and identified three approaches to the 
study of institutions.  It identified Historical Institutionalism – which emphasise the 
importance of historical events, temporal processes, and institutional legacies – as the 
most relevant approach for this study of Swedish labour market institutions.  
Furthermore, it took the assumption that there are institutionally distinct groupings of 
countries, rather than viewing all countries to be passing through different stages of the 
same historical process.  From this starting point, three models of institutional change 
were outlined: convergence, punctuated equilibrium, and incremental transformation.  
These three theories were assessed against the study’s findings. 
The Laval dispute was the result of inconsistencies between Swedish and EC law, 
and also controversy over competing interpretations of EC law.  The ECJ Laval ruling 
was identified as having four core implications for Swedish law.  The first of these is 
that trade unions cannot discriminate on the basis of the nationality of a collective 
agreement.  Second, trade union demands cannot be made beyond the ‘hard-core’ of the 
Posting of Workers Directive.  Third, the Laval case did not meet the criteria for 
extending the ‘hard-core’ on grounds of public policy, public health, or public security.  
Finally, the ECJ ruled that that Lex Britannia is discriminating toward foreign 
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companies.  Different actors have viewed the ECJ ruling in three different frames: 
simplified, narrow, or wide.  As a result, actors hold different views on what types of 
changes to the Swedish model are legally possible to ensure compatibility with EC law. 
The Swedish model was identified as having a specific relationship between 
social partners and wage setting.  This includes, strong social partners and high levels 
of unionisation, political parties that do not deal with labour market issues, wage 
formation that is decided by the social partners, and the right to strike.  These features 
had their roots in the Rehn-Meidner model and centralised bargaining.  As a result, the 
state plays a large role through ‘active labour market policies’ and public employment.  
This results in a model which is characterised by: high aggregate wages, wage restraint 
(low distribution between wage earners and employers), wage solidarity (low 
distribution of income among wage earners), and strong worker protection   
Employment policies at the European level showed some inconsistency with 
Swedish law.  The three core characteristics of European employment policy were 
identified as: co-ordinating, legalistic, and liberal.  The final part of Chapter Three 
characterised the three levels of potential change to the Swedish model: legislated 
minimum wages would represent the most change; erga omnes would result in the least 
change; and the extension model would result in the least change.  The status-quo 
option, in contrast, would have a dual effect, causing large change for foreign workers 
and minimal change for domestic workers.  
The study found that the extension model, or the autonomous collective 
agreement model, had the greatest degree of support from the Swedish social partners.  
This option would result in the least amount of change for the Swedish model.  
However, the peak-level employers association Swedish Enterprise, along with its 
affiliate Teknikföretagen, offered a strong critique of this position.  The option of erga 
omnes, or universal declaration of collective agreements, characterised as ‘some 
change’, received no support from the social partners.  The option of legislated 
minimum wage, which represented the most change, found no official support among 
the peak level organisations.  Thus, this option was marginalised in much of the public 
debate.  The Swedish Enterprise affiliate organisation Teknikföretagen, however, did 
hold this as its official position, suggesting that there are some pressures for change.  Its 
influence, however, was constrained by other factors such as the Stråth enquiry and the 
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timing of the Head Agreement negotiation.  The status-quo option was not held as the 
first option by any of the social partners, which suggested an overarching aim to 
maintain the efficacy of the autonomous system for all workers in Sweden.  
The positions of the social partners were not, however, equally influential.  
Existing institutional arrangements shaped the real influence of these positions.  In 
particular, the Claes Stråth investigation amplified some positions and dampened 
others.  The structure of the investigation that only formally received input from the 
peak-level social partners meant that positions were channelled along class lines.  As a 
consequence, divisions among employers may have led to the ‘deadlock’ in the official 
position of the peak-level employer Swedish Enterprise. The wide consultation, 
however, suggests that the leaders of the enquiry do understand the conflicting 
positions.  In other words, although official positions were withheld by Swedish 
Enterprise, Claes Stråth did understand the debates and divisions within the 
organisation. What the Stråth enquiry did, however, was legitimate the peak level social 
partners as the main actors in the debate. 
The directives of the Claes Stråth investigation limited particular options in two 
ways.  First, it did not consider options for change at the European level.  Second, it 
ruled out a large change, particularly in the form of the legislated minimum wage.  
Thus, options were limited to changes at the national level that do not lead to significant 
change of the Swedish model. 
Some social partners view the investigation as an institution that aids their 
positions.  First, these actors believe they can positively influence the Stråth enquiry.  
And second, these actors believe the investigation is well run and that it will find the 
best solution.  Other social partners believe that is a constraining institution, and present 
three arguments. First, they argue that the parameters set by the directives are too 
narrow.  Second, they argue that the investigation is of poor quality and likely to lead to 
recommendations that are inconsistent with EC law.  And third, they believe that they 
were not able to influence the investigation directives.   
The timing of the renegotiation of the new ‘Head Agreement’ in conjunction with 
the Claes Stråth enquiry altered the bargaining power of the social partners.  This has 
given the unions the ability to limit options advocated by employers.  As a result, 
Swedish Enterprise claims that the legislated minimum wage option was taken off the 
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agenda. The Claes Stråth investigation has acted as an institutionalised constraint that 
has supported continuity of the Swedish model. These observations enhance our 
understanding of how actors within the Swedish industrial relations behaved in 
response to this shock. 
Through restricting union activities, the ECJ ruling suggests that power has 
shifted from employees to employers. However, there was a high degree of intra-class 
solidarity on the side of labour.  In contrast, employers lacked the same degree of 
solidarity.  This questions whether Power Resource Analysis is an effective model to 
analyse this case.  Due to the existence of factions within employers, weakening labour 
does not necessarily weaken the Swedish model.  Thus, looking only at the ‘power’ 
held by labour misses the most important tensions. 
From a Varieties of Capitalism perspective, a shift in power from labour to 
employers will not necessarily change Swedish industrial relations.  This is particularly 
true of this case, as the ECJ shock resulted in no major change to the interests of 
Swedish employers.  Thus, a shift in power to employers as a result of the ECJ ruling 
may not affect the strength of the industrial relations model, as many employers are 
supportive of the Swedish model.  This explanation is supported by the study that 
showed that some employer representatives (such as SAGE) strongly supported no 
change to the Swedish model.  Continuity is explained by a broad cross-class alliance to 
maintain social partner autonomy and keeping the state out of wage setting procedures.  
When looking at our theoretical models of institutional change, our understanding 
of change within the Swedish model is enhanced.  There is strong evidence that the 
model is enduring.  This can be seen from both the positions of actors themselves and 
the existence of institutionalised constraints such as the Stråth investigation parameters 
and Head Agreement. 
The punctuated equilibrium theory, of critical junctures followed by periods of 
continuity, appears to best explain the continuity of the Swedish model in response to 
the ECJ ruling.  What this theory suggests is that other conditions may have resulted in 
a critical juncture.  For example, if the ECJ ruling specified a ‘narrow’ interpretation 
instead of a ‘wide’ interpretation, change may have been forced upon the model. 
The incremental transformation model, on the other hand, appeared to be less 
relevant at explaining the dynamics within the Swedish model in this particular case.  
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Institutions within the Swedish model did not display evidence of displacement, 
layering, drift, conversion, or exhaustion.  While incremental transformation was not 
observed, the institutional continuity was not without internal pressure.  
The study identified particular tensions within the model.  Some actors, such as 
Teknikföretagen wanted to change the existing institutional arrangements.  In the 
future, their influence could be magnified by a further shock to the Swedish model, or 
the timing of important events. 
 
7.2 CLOSING REMARKS 
 
The punctuated equilibrium model has proven to be an insightful model for 
explaining the events following this particular shock to the Swedish model.  Punctuated 
equilibrium explanations have become increasing questioned within political science in 
recent years, but this case illustrates how it continues to be relevant.  The explanatory 
power illustrated in this study suggests why it has been so popular within the discipline 
for so many years. 
This study has observed that the Laval ruling did not result in a critical 
juncture; concurrently, the Swedish model has not collapsed, and does not display signs 
of transformation as a result of the ECJ ruling.  Particular factors and characteristics at 
the domestic level put up large resistance to ‘convergence’ with other EU states. 
As a result, this is a case where national sovereignty in the form of industrial 
relations has proven ‘robust’ against the forces of European integration.  If and when 
change does come to the Swedish model, other theoretical models may prove useful. 
The study shows that the Swedish model is by no means indestructible.  Rather 
it displayed a weak or fragile side that may undermine it in the future.  Another 
significant shock to Sweden from the ECJ or challenges in the renegotiation of the 
Head Agreement may result in a ‘critical juncture’ as elucidated by Krasner.   
Alternatively, we may see more of what Thelen describes as an incremental 
transformation as a result of future challenges. 
PRA may not be the most useful framework to analyse institutional dynamics 
when only a minor shock has been observed.  In the case of Sweden, the shock was not 
large enough to shift power to the exposed employers.  Furthermore, this study suggests 
Conclusion 
 
131
that it is not the best framework to use when large divisions exist among, for example, 
employers.  Industrial relations systems that observe fewer divisions among employers 
may be more effectively explained using a PRA analysis.  Therefore, PRA is likely to 
be more useful for the analysis of such countries, particularly where classes have 
unified interests. 
The events in this study reinforce the importance and relevance of the VoC 
literature in providing useful insights about various systems of industrial relations.  
VoC appears to be useful even in a small external shock.  It also shows how employers 
may be important in maintaining a system – or at least, not pressing for change.  In this 
case, the event did not necessarily shift the preferences for employers within the 
particular model of capitalism found in Sweden. 
This suggests that Swedish labour market institutions, both formal and 
informal, remain relevant and powerful in the face of Europeanisation.  The institutions 
remain strong because the social partners are committed to upholding them, even where 
it may not be in their immediate (short-term) interests. The diversity within the EU 
suggests that not all institutional forms will react in the same way as the Swedish model 
of industrial relations.  On the contrary, institutional designs that are less entrenched 
and enjoy less legitimacy amongst key social partners are likely to be more affected by 
the Europeanisation. 
The next section draws some broader conclusions.  Each country and policy 
area is unique – therefore, before embarking on regional integration a number of factors 
should be considered.  The findings of this study suggest that the success of national 
labour market institutions will be influenced by the degree of class solidarity or cross-
class alliances. 
Regional integration will continue and only time will tell if the Swedish model 
continues to remain robust.  If and when it changes, it will be interesting to identify 
whether change came through a critical juncture or other means (such as incremental 
change). Tensions and alliances between the social partners are likely to drive much of 
this change. 
From a European perspective, we can identify a number of observations that are 
important to countries embarking on regional integration.  The Laval case confirms a 
new direction for ECJ rulings, particularly in light of the Viking and Rüffert rulings.  
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These cases represent a step-change from the Rush Portuguesa ruling of 1990 which 
emphasised national sovereignty over community law.  The Laval case, by contrast, 
holds the free-market principles of the EU foremost.  In the face of this shock, the 
Swedish model of industrials displayed a level of resistance, led by active and vocal 
social partners. 
Several areas for further research are suggested by this study.  The following 
questions are raised:  
 
(1) Why is class solidarity, in Sweden, stronger on the side of labour?  
What factors make employers less united? 
(2) Why did Swedish institutional arrangements heighten cross-class 
alliances to keep the state out of wage formation, and why was there no 
significant cross-class alliance to bring the state in? 
 
The Swedish Presidency over the European Union began in July 2009 and will 
continue until December 2009.  The focus of the current work programme includes the 
global financial crisis and climate change, while the impact of EU level institutions on 
national labour market institutions has not been raised by the presidency.  This may be 
because the social partners and public within Sweden do not perceive EU level 
institutions as threatening as previously.   
For the time being, internal pressures will prove the greatest challenge to the 
Swedish model of industrial relations.  To understand future change, the relationship 
between institutions and actors should be the area of focus for academics and policy 
makers. 
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I 
 
 
Articles 3(1) and 3(8) of the Posting of Workers 
Directive (Directive 96/71/EC) 
 
 
Terms and conditions of employment  
 
Article 3(1) 
 
Member States shall ensure that, whatever the law applicable to the employment 
relationship, the undertakings referred to in Article 1 (1) guarantee workers posted 
to their territory the terms and conditions of employment covering the following 
matters which, in the Member State where the work is carried out, are laid down: 
- by law, regulation or administrative provision, and/or 
- by collective agreements or arbitration awards which have been declared 
universally applicable within the meaning of paragraph 8, insofar as they concern 
the activities referred to in the Annex: 
(a) maximum work periods and minimum rest periods; 
(b) minimum paid annual holidays; 
(c) the minimum rates of pay, including overtime rates; this point does not apply to 
supplementary occupational retirement pension schemes; 
(d) the conditions of hiring-out of workers, in particular the supply of workers by 
temporary employment undertakings; 
(e) health, safety and hygiene at work; 
(f) protective measures with regard to the terms and conditions of employment of 
pregnant women or women who have recently given birth, of children and of 
young people; 
(g) equality of treatment between men and women and other provisions on non-
discrimination. 
For the purposes of this Directive, the concept of minimum rates of pay referred to 
in paragraph 1 (c) is defined by the national law and/or practice of the Member 
State to whose territory the worker is posted. 
 
Article 3(8) 
 
'Collective agreements or arbitration awards which have been declared universally 
applicable` means collective agreements or arbitration awards which must be 
observed by all undertakings in the geographical area and in the profession or 
industry concerned. 
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In the absence of a system for declaring collective agreements or arbitration awards 
to be of universal application within the meaning of the first subparagraph, 
Member States may, if they so decide, base themselves on: 
- collective agreements or arbitration awards which are generally applicable to all 
similar undertakings in the geographical area and in the profession or industry 
concerned, and/or 
- collective agreements which have been concluded by the most representative 
employers' and labour organizations at national level and which are applied 
throughout national territory, 
provided that their application to the undertakings referred to in Article 1 (1) 
ensures equality of treatment on matters listed in the first subparagraph of 
paragraph 1 of this Article between those undertakings and the other undertakings 
referred to in this subparagraph which are in a similar position. 
Equality of treatment, within the meaning of this Article, shall be deemed to exist 
where national undertakings in a similar position: 
- are subject, in the place in question or in the sector concerned, to the same 
obligations as posting undertakings as regards the matters listed in the first 
subparagraph of paragraph 1, and 
- are required to fulfil such obligations with the same effects. 
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Information Sheet 
 
 
 
 
Project Title: Industrial Relations and Institutional Change in Sweden 
 
Researcher: 
 
Kelvin Bannan  
BCA, BA (Hons), MA Candidate 
Political Science and International Relations Programme 
Victoria University of Wellington 
New Zealand 
 
Phone: +64-4-463 5233 ext. 8499 
Fax: +64-4-463 5414 
Cell: +64-21 263 2414 
Email: kelvin.bannan@vuw.ac.nz 
 
Supervisor: 
 
Dr. John Leslie 
Lecturer 
Political Science and International Relations Programme 
Victoria University of Wellington 
New Zealand  
 
Phone: +64-4-463 9494 
Email: john.leslie@vuw.ac.nz 
 
 
Background Information: 
 
I am currently writing a thesis for the requirements of a Masters of Arts in Political 
Science.  This study will, on a macro-level, assess the relationship between national 
level Swedish labour market institutions and EU level supranational labour market 
institutions.  Particularly, whether the ‘Swedish Model’ is enduring or collapsing due 
to integration pressures and its impact on the foundations of national systems of 
capitalism.   
 
This study investigates such arguments in the context of the December 2007 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) Laval ruling and changes to Swedish industrial 
relations. This thesis analyses the positions advocated by unions, employers 
associations, ministries, and political parties, on strategies to buffer effects caused by 
the ECJ ruling. 
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Role of Interviews: 
 
The data, collected through semi-structured interviews, will be published in an 
academic thesis, publications, and presented at academic conferences and forums.  
Approximately 8 interviews will be conducted, up to a length of 60 minutes. 
 
The interviewee will be identified in the research, unless confidentiality is requested.  
If this is the case, the material concerning the individual will be presented in a 
manner which protects the identity of the person concerned. 
 
Interviews will be transcribed by myself, and will be returned to interviewee if 
requested.  All written material will be kept in a locked file and access is restricted to 
the investigator.  All questionnaires, interview notes and similar materials will be 
destroyed two years after the conclusion of the research. 
 
Questions: 
 
The questions will cover the following areas: 
 
1. Official position toward the ECJ Laval ruling. 
2. How can these changes best be made (institutional constraints). 
3. Conflicts within the organisation regarding these positions. 
4. Future of the Swedish model. 
5. Political constraints.  
 
The interviews will be recorded on an electronic voice recorder and transcribed. You 
will be given the option of whether you would like to view the transcribed material. 
 
Consent: 
 
A consent form will be enclosed to ensure that you have an understanding on the 
nature of questions and use of material so informed consent can be made. 
 
This project has obtained approval from the Victoria University of Wellington Human 
Ethics Committee. 
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III 
 
 
Consent Form 
 
 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATION IN RESEARCH 
 
Title of Project: EU Industrial Relations and Institutional Change in Sweden 
 
 
 
I have been given and have understood an explanation of this research project.  I 
have had an opportunity to ask questions and have them answered to my 
satisfaction.  
 
 
   I consent to information or opinions which I have given being attributed to me 
in any reports on this research. 
 
  I would like the tape recordings of my interview returned to me at the 
conclusion of the project. 
   I understand that I will have an opportunity to check the transcripts of the 
interview before publication. 
 
   I understand that the data I provide will not be used for any other purpose or 
released to others without my written consent. 
 
   I would like to receive a summary of the results of this research when it is 
completed. 
 
   I agree to take part in this research 
 
   I would like a copy of a research report to be sent at the end of the project 
 
 
 
 
 
Signed: 
 
 
 
 
 
Name of participant:        Date: 
(please print clearly)   
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IV 
 
 
Interview Schedule 
 
 
 
Social Partners- Employers 
 
Swedish Agency for Government Employers (SAGE) 14 October 2008 1:08:55 
 
The Association of Swedish Engineering Industries  
 (Teknikföretagen) 30 October 2008 0:40:00 
 
Electrical Installer Organization (EIO) 29 October 2008 0:52:30 
  
Confederation of Swedish Enterprise 15 October 2008 1:04:38 
  
 
Social Partners- Employees 
 
Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO) 15 October 2008 1:41:56 
 
Trade Union of Commercial Employees (Handels) 14 October 2008 0:32:36 
Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees (TCO) 24 February 2009   
  
Swedish Confederation for Professional Associations (SACO) 29 October 2008 1:02:25 
 
 
Political Parties 
 
Moderate Party  15 October 2008 0:37:10 
 
Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP) Unable to gain interview 
 
 
Government Agencies 
 
Claes Stråth - Swedish National Mediation Office/ 
                      Enquiry Chair Claes Stråth Investigation 30 October 2008 1:08:10                                   
 
 
Academics 
 
Torsten Svensson - Professor, Department of Government 
 Uppsala University 28 October 2008 0:55:47 
